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INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this study is to examine and organize
some of the current contrasting methodologies of theological
ethics in an attempt to determine the Biblical method of
choosing the moral option. This will be done in two
different ways.
In the first part, two common methods in moral
philosophy, the deontological method and the teleological
method, will be defined and illustrated. It will be
demonstrated that Scriptural ethics has elements in common
with both rule deontology and rule teleology.
In the second part, the Scriptural method of moral
reasoning will be examined more closely by comparing three
different ways that numerous absolute prescriptive commands
are used in theological ethics. Of the three methods
discussed it will be shown that two contradict the moral
methodology of the Holy Scriptures. Only the method of
conflicting absolutism will prove to be satisfactory. This
is the only method that contains elements in common with both
rule deontology and rule teleology.
1
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The conclusion reached will stress that the Scriptural
method of theological ethics not only emphasizes characteristics of both deontology and teleology, but it also emphasizes
that these characteristics are to be used in a very precise
and specific way. The Scriptural method is similar to rule
deontology; however, when there is a conflict of duties the
rule teleological element serves as the arbitrator to determine the lesser evil. When this is understood one can begin
to have a prolegomenon for theological ethics that properly
incorporates the usus didacticus of God's law.
This investigation also assumes three basic presuppositions which, while not directly discussed, nevertheless,
need to be underscored since they form an essential background for the method proposed herein. The first presupposition of this dissertation is that the Holy Scriptures are the
inspired Word of God and inerrant in the autograph manuscripts. It is assumed that Moses is the author of the
Pentateuch, the four gospels each bear the name of their one
and only author, and St. Paul is the author of the pastoral
epistles. Since the Holy Spirit is the divine author of the
entire Holy Scriptures, the numerous human authors inspired
by the Holy Spirit do not conflict with, or contradict one
another, but rather, confirm and complement one another.
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This is the case not only with respect to theological content
but also with references to history as well as with the
method and content of all moral teaching.
The second presupposition of this dissertation is the
Pauline emphasis that one's salvation precedes any good
works. In this way any type of synergism or works righteousness which understands good works to precede, contribute to,
or result in one's salvation is necessarily precluded.
St. Paul taught, and Luther reemphasized, that salvation has
already been freely and completely earned for all by the
gracious work of Christ. It is only after one receives this
salvation by faith that one is then motivated, inspired, and
strengthened to live the Christian life (that is, do good
works). In this way it is the gospel alone that provides the
motivation and strength for good works. A truly good work
can only be performed by the "new man" in Christ.
The third presupposition is the continuing necessity
of the third use of the law in the life of the regenerate.
The first problem in living a moral life, incentive and
power, is solved by the gospel. The second problem becomes
one of moral knowledge. This is solved by the third use of
the law. While the "new man" in Christ no longer needs the
direction and guidance of God's moral law, the "old man," who
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is with us to the grave, nevertheless, needs to be instructed
and admonished by the law. Thus as far as the "new man" is
concerned the law is merely indicative-descriptive, but as
far as the "old man" is concerned, the law is imperativeprescriptive. As long as the regenerate life contains both
the "new man" and the "old man" there will be conflict,
confusion and struggle in making moral decisions. To help
the Christian clarify and distinguish right from wrong God
has revealed his divine will to mankind in the Holy
Scriptures. The vast majority of this dissertation is
referring to this imperative-prescriptive third use of the
law which God uses to guide the regenerate in moral living.
General normative ethics is that field of endeavor
which seeks to discover the basic principles with which one
can discern right from wrong. Applied normative ethics then
seeks to apply these general principles to specific
situations. The focus of this dissertation is solely on
general normative ethics.

PART ONE

The Deontological and Teleological
Elements in Theological Ethics
Throughout the history of general normative ethics the moral
option has often been determined either by a deontological
method, which focuses on one's duty and obligation, or by a
teleological method, which focuses on the end results of the
act or rule in question.' These two methods are not
'According to Peter Vallentyne, "The Teleological/
Deontological Distinction," The Journal of Value Inquiry
21(1987):21-32, the first one to contrast deontology and
teleology as two contradictory moral methodologies was
Charles D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1930), 206-16. For more
information on the contrast between the deontological and the
teleological methods of moral reasoning the reader may wish
to consult one or more of the following: Heinrick Richard
Niebuhr, The Responsible Self (1963) (San Francisco: Harper
and Row, 1978), 47-54. William Frankena, "Love and Principle
in Christian Ethics," chap. in Faith and Philosophy (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1964), 203-25. Richard
Garner and Bernard Rosen, Moral Philosophy (New York: The
Macmillan Co., 1967), 55-113. William Frankena, Ethics 2d
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 14-16.
Ethel Albert, Theodore Denise and Sheldon Peterfreund, Great
Traditions in Ethics (New York: D. Van Norstrand Co., 1975),
5-6. James Childs, Christian Anthropology and Ethics
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 153-56. Samuel
Gorovitz, Doctor's Dilemmas: Moral Conflict and Medical Care
5
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necessarily mutually exclusive.
It is the purpose of this first chapter to give a
fuller exposition of these two methods. It will be shown
that Scripture does not choose one method to the complete
exclusion of the other; rather, Scripture allows elements of
both methods to be brought together and used in a very
specific way.

(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 83-90. Tom
Beauchamp and James Childress, Principles of Biomedical
Ethics 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1983), 25 47. Neil Brown, "Teleology or Deontology?" Irish Theological
Quarterly 53(1987):36-51. Norman L. Geisler, Christian
Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989), 24-25.
Thomas M. Garrett, Harold W. Baillie, and Rosellen M.
Garrett, Health Care Ethics: Principles and Problems
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 2-3. Franklin I.
Gamwell, The Divine Good (New York: Harper Collins, 1990),
19-84. John Klotz, Men, Medicine and Their Maker (Univeristy
City, MO: Torelion Productions, 1991), 9-12. Frequently the
distinction between deontology and teleology is made by
authors who differentiate between the concepts of right
(deontology) and good (teleology). For an example of this
right (deontology)/good (teleology) distinction see Philip P.
Wiener, ed. Dictionary of The History of Ideas 4 vols. (New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1973), s.v. "Right and Good,"
by Abraham Edel. Elizabeth M. Pybus, "False Dichotomies:
Right and Good," Philosophy 58(1983): 19-27. Ann Maclean,
"Right and Good: False Dichotomy?" Philosophy 60(1985):129 32.

CHAPTER ONE
The Deontological Method Defined and Illustrated
The term deontology has been used in three different
ways.' First, Jeremy Bentham seems to have coined this
phrase as a synonymous, yet more descriptive term, for the
word "ethics."2 However, it is seldom used in this sense
today. Second, some Roman Catholic moralists use the term to
describe ethics that is particularly associated with a
special profession, such as business ethics or professional
ethics. The third use of the term deontology is the most
common. In this use
"deontology" denotes a view of morality which takes as
its fundamental categories the notion of "obligation" or
"duty" and the "rightness" of acts. This deontological
view of morality may be contrasted with the views which
stress the end of action (the "good"), sometimes called
"agatheology" or more often teleology . . . a deontologist in the third sense must hold that some acts are
'James Childress and John Macquarrie, eds. The
Westminster Dictionary of Christian Ethics (Philadelphia:
Westminster Press, 1986), s.v. "Deontology," by John
Macquarrie.
2The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring. 11
vols. (New York: Russell and Russell, 1962), 8:93.
7
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obligatory, right, or wrong, independent of their ends
and their consequences.3
William Frankena explains this third use of deontology
in this way:
a deontologist contends that it is
action or rule of action to be the
obligatory one even if it does not
possible balance of good over evil
universe.4

possible for an
morally right or
promote the greatest
for self, society, or

It is in this most frequently used sense that this
term "deontology" is used in the present study. In this
sense the main emphasis in deontology concerns the fulfillment of duties and obligations.
According to William Frankena the deontologists of
this third sense may be divided into three categories depending upon how they use pre-established rules. Pure act deontologists have no use for pre-established rules. Modified
act deontologists accept the use of pre-established rules
only to a certain qualified extent. Rule deontologists
insist on the use of pre-established rules.5 Further
3Childress and Macquarrie, 151.
4William Frankena, Ethics, 15.
5Frankena, "Love and Principle," 209-10. William
Frankena was born in 1908. He received his Ph.D. from
Harvard in 1937. He taught philosophy at the University of
Michigan from 1937-1978. He was chairman of the department
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examination and illustrations of these three categories will
highlight their distinctive characteristics.
Pure Act Deontolociy
Pure act deontologists maintain that moral rules are
unnecessary. They believe that the duty or obligation of the
moral agent is to be determined anew in each particular
situation. Frankena explains that
Act-deontological theories maintain that the basic
judgments of obligation are all purely particular ones
like "In this situation I should do so and so," and that
general ones like "We ought always to keep our promises"
are unavailable . . . . Extreme act-deontologists
maintain that we can and must see or somehow decide
separately in each particular situation what is the
right or obligatory thing to do, without appealing to
any rules.6
According to Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, "If the
act deontologist is asked how he can say 'A is right' on the
basis of his knowing 'A has F, G, and H,' he might give the
of philosophy at the University of Michigan from 1947 to
1961. He was the author of over seventy-five articles which
deal with various aspects of philosophical ethics. For a
bibliography of William Frankena's works the reader may wish
to see K. E. Goodpaster, ed., Perspectives on Morality (Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976), 235-9. This
dissertation is greatly indebted to him for the development
of the categories which clarify and distinguish the different
forms of deontology and teleology.
6Frankena, Ethics, 16.
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reply that he 'knows directly' that A, which has F, G, and H
is right."7
For the purpose of this dissertation the method of
pure act deontology will be illustrated by the three "Sermons
on Human Nature" by Joseph Butler.8
In his first sermon on human nature Joseph Butler
emphasizes three distinct theses. In the first thesis Butler
explains that there are two different natural principles at
work in human morality, benevolence and self-love. "First,
there is a natural principle of benevolence in man, which is
7Garner and Rosen, 89. Examples of prominent pure act
deontologists of the twentieth century include, E. F. Carritt
(1876-1964) Theory of Morals (1928), H. A. Prichard (1872 1947) "Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?" (1912) and
also "Duty and Ignorance of Fact" (1932).
8"His 'Sermons on Human Nature,' which are his most
important contribution to ethics, were delivered at the Rolls
chapel, and were published in 1726 after he had resigned his
preachership there." Charles D. Broad. Five Types of Ethical
Theory (London: Routledge & Regan Paul Ltd., 1930), 5.
"Joseph Butler, an Anglican clergyman who was a contemporary
of George Berkeley and David Hume, a protégé of Samuel
Butler, a favorite of Queen Caroline, Dean of St. Paul's,
Clerk of the Closet to George II, Bishop of Bristol at the
time John Wesley defected and Bishop of Durham, and who was
not Archbishop of Canterbury because he rejected the office,
was the most influential Anglican Theologian of the
eighteenth century." Frank N. Magill, ed. World Philosophy 5
vols. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Salem Press, 1961), s.v.
"Fifteen Sermons Preached at The Rolls Chapel," by Leonard
Miller.
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in some degree to society what self-love is to the
individual."9 These two natural principles do not conflict
with one another. One's concern for society at large (that
is, benevolence) and one's concern for one's self (that is,
self-love) work together and promote one another.
The comparison will be between the nature of man as
respecting self and tending to private good, his own
preservation and happiness, and the nature of man as
having respect for society and tending to promote public
good, the happiness of that society. These ends do
indeed perfectly coincide: and to aim at public and
private good are so far from being inconsistent that
they mutually promote each other.10
The reference here to "ends" must not be taken to mean
that Butler is using a form of teleological reasoning. He is
merely stating that the nature of mankind strives for certain
ends. Fulfilling one's moral duties may even accomplish
those ends. However, contrary to the teleologists, Butler
does not claim that the morality of a particular act is
determined by the goal which a certain act may achieve. For
Butler, and other deontologists, a moral act is moral in and
of itself in spite of the end that is accomplished. Yet,
this does not mean that no end can be accomplished. This
9Joseph Butler, Five Sermons (Indianapolis, IN:
Hackett Publishing Co., 1983), 26.
10Ibid.
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illustrates that a moral methodology does not have to be
pointless or aimless in order to avoid being classified as
teleological.11 It must not be presupposed that anytime an
author mentions the words "end" "goal" or "aim" that he is
using the teleological method of moral reasoning. It is only
teleological if the morality of the act or rule is determined
by the end.
The second thesis Butler emphasized is that apart from
the natural principles of benevolence and self-love humankind
also has other tendencies which lead the moral agent to
contribute to both the public and the private good.
"Secondly . . . men have various appetites, passions, and
particular affections, quite distinct both from self-love and
from benevolence - all of these have a tendency to promote
both public and private good."12 Such affections or passions
would include the "desire of esteem from others" and
"indignation against successful vice."13
The third thesis of Butler stresses that it is the
role of the human conscience to determine whether or not the

11See also footnotes 21, 46 and 49 below.
12Butler, 28-29.
13Ibid., 29.
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moral agent approves or disapproves of specific actions.
Thirdly, there is a principle of reflection in men by
which they distinguish between, approve and disapprove,
their own actions. We are plainly constituted such sort
of creatures as to reflect upon our own nature. The
mind can take a view of what passes within itself, its
propensions, aversions, passions, affections . . . . In
this survey it approves of one, disapproves of another,
and toward a third is affected in neither of these ways,
but is quite indifferent. This principle in man by
which he approves or disapproves his heart, temper and
actions is conscience . . . . This faculty tends to
restrain men from doing mischief to each other, and
leads them to do good . . . . It cannot possibly be
denied that there is this principle of reflection or
conscience in human nature.14
For Joseph Butler the use of conscience in his first
sermon on human nature completely precludes any need for preestablished rules. In his second sermon on human nature he
carries out this point even further when he states,
There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man which distinguishes between the
internal principles of his heart as well as his external
actions, which passes judgment upon himself and them,
pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just right, good; others to be in themselves
evil, wrong, unjust, which . . . magisterially exerts
itself, and approves or condemns him the doer of them
accordingly . . . . It is by this faculty, natural to
man, that he is a moral agent, that he is a law to
himself (emphasis mine).15
14Ibid., 29-30.
15Ibid., 37.
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Butler's deontological emphasis is seen in his
insistence that the conscience determines actions to be right
or wrong in themselves, that is, without regard to the end
they may or may not accomplish. Because of the role of
conscience any pre-established rules are completely unnecessary. "Every man is naturally a law to himself .

.

.

•

Everyone may find within himself the rule of right, and
obligations to follow it."16 Thus it is evident that Joseph
Butler uses a form of pure act deontology. It is deontological in that the morality of the act is determined in the act
itself, that is, without regard for the end that is accomplished. It is "pure act" in that the magisterial function
of the conscience precludes the need for any pre-established
rules. Without the use of rules the conscience has the
authority to pronounce judgment on each individual act. In
the third sermon Butler writes,
Yet let any plain honest man, before he engages in any
course of action, ask himself, "Is this I am going about
right, or is it wrong? Is it good, or is it evil?" I
do not in the least doubt that this question would be
answered agreeably to truth and virtue, by almost any
fair man in almost any circumstance.17

16Ibid., 36.
17Ibid., 42.
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Butler concludes that,
Conscience does not only offer itself to show us the way
we should walk in, but it likewise carries its own
authority with it; that it is our natural guide, the
guide assigned us by the Author of our nature; it therefore belongs to our condition of being, it is our duty
to walk in that path and follow this guide.18
The verdict of the conscience is its own authority. It does
not need to resort to rules nor to consequences. Thus
Butler's use of conscience is a good example of pure act
deontology.
Modified Act Deontoloqv
Modified act deontologists do not completely reject
the use of all pre-established rules as do the pure act
deontologists. Modified act deontologists accept a qualified
use of pre-established rules. For the modified act deontologists rules are not absolutely binding, as they are for the
rule deontologist; however, they may still serve an important
function either as rules of thumb, (that is, summary rules),
or as prima facie rules.
For the modified act deontologists a rule that serves
as a rule of thumb (or summary rule) is useful insofar as it
summarizes the wisdom of the ages. Such a rule may be used
18Ibid., 43.
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by the moral agent if it helps him to determine his duty in a
particular situation.
One of the most prominent ethists of the twentieth
century to emphasize a form of modified act deontology is
William David Ross. He emphasizes that moral duties arise
from the numerous relationships that exist in society, "of
promisee to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to
husband, of child to parent, of friend to friend, of fellow
countryman to fellow countryman . . ."19
These relationships impose duties upon the moral
agent. However, these duties, and the rules that express
these duties, are not absolute. They are merely prima facie.
"Each of these relations is the foundation of a prima facie
duty, which is more or less incumbent on me according to the
circumstances of the case."20
Ross continues by explaining that there are at least
six types of prima facie duties that are self evident to
mankind.
(1) Some duties rest on previous acts of my own [such as
promise keeping] . . . . (2) Some rest on previous acts
of other men [such as duties of gratitude] . . . . (3)
19William David Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1930), 19.
20Ibid.
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Some rest on the fact or possibility of a distribution
of pleasure or happiness [such as duties of
justice] . . . . (4) Some rest on the mere fact that
there are other beings in the world whose condition we
can make better [such as duties of beneficence] . . . .
(5) Some rest on the fact that we can improve our own
condition in respect of virtue or of intelligence [such
as duties of self improvement]. (6) [There are also]
duties that may be summed up under the title of "not
injuring others," [such as the duty of non-maleficence].21
In any particular situation two or more of these
duties may conflict with each other. In such a conflict
situation the moral agent must determine which duty outweighs
the others. Ross explains,
When I am in a situation, as perhaps I always am, in
which more than one of these prima facie duties is
incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the
situation as fully as I can until I form the considered
opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one
21Ibid., 21. Even though several types of these prima
facie duties emphasize the consequences of one's action,
these consequences or results do not determine the moral
import and do not constitute a form of teleological
reasoning. Ross explains, "That his act will produce the
best possible consequences is not his reason for calling it
right . . . . Our duty, then, is not to do certain things
which will produce certain results. Our acts, at any rate
our acts of special obligation, are not right because they
will produce certain results . . . . An act . . . is right
because it is itself the production of a certain state of
affairs. Such production is right in itself, apart from any
consequences." Ibid., 17, 46. (See also footnotes 12, 47,
and 50.)
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of them is more incumbent that any other; then I am duty
bound to think that to do this prima facie duty is my
duty sans phrase in this situation.22
In this way the six self evident duties, and the rules
that express these duties, are not all absolute at the same
time. The only duty that becomes absolute is the actual duty
that outweighs the others. Thus there is an important
distinction between prima facie duties and actual or absolute
duties. In a conflict situation only one prima facie duty can
become absolute or actual. This is then the duty for which
the moral agent becomes responsible. According to Ross, the
moral agent is not responsible for the failure to fulfill a
lesser prima facie duty when it is outweighed by a higher
one. He writes,
It must be maintained that there is a difference between
prima facie duty and actual or absolute duty. When we
think ourselves justified in breaking, and indeed
morally obliged to break, a promise in order to relieve
some one's distress, we do not for a moment cease to
recognize a prima facie duty to keep our promise, and
this leads us to feel, not indeed shame or repentance,
but certainly compunction, for behaving as we do.23
When the moral agent fails to fulfill a prima facie duty Ross
explains that there is no shame or repentance, only a mere

22Ibid., 19.
23Ibid., 28.
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compunction or uneasiness. The prima facie obligation
continues to exert itself even in a conflict situation. Ross
continues saying that if we are morally obligated to break a
promise "it is our duty to make up somehow to the promisee
for the breaking of the promise."24
However, even though the prima facie duty continues to
exert itself, it is still not the same as the higher duty
that becomes actual or absolute. In this way prima facie
duties, and the rules which express them, do not specifically
show the moral agent what the actual absolute duty is in a
particular situation. They merely illustrate a range or a
variety of what obligations tend to be. Ross observes:
We have to distinguish from the characteristic of being
our duty that of tending to be our duty . . . . Tendency
to be one's duty may be called a parti-resultant
attribute, i.e., one which belongs to an act in virtue
of some one component in its nature. Being one's duty
is a toti-resultant attribute, one which belongs to an
act in virtue of its whole nature and of nothing less
than this.25
24Ibid.
25Ibid. Ross explains this distinction further by
showing that it is analogous to the natural forces of
gravitation. "Qua subject to the force of gravitation
towards some other body, each body tends to move in a
particular direction with a particular velocity; but its
actual movement depends on all the forces to which it is
subject. It is only by recognizing this distinction that we

20
Ross recognizes that it is extremely difficult for the
moral agent to choose the actual absolute duty from conflicting prima facie duties. The moral agent can never be certain
that the right decision has been made. The actual absolute
duty is not self evident as are the prima facie duties.
Our judgments about our actual duty in concrete situations have none of the certainty that attaches to our
recognition of the general principles of duty. A statement is certain, i.e. is an expression of knowledge,
only in one or other of two cases: when it is selfevident, or a valid conclusion from self-evident
premises. And our judgments about our particular duties
have neither of these characters.26
There is no formula or strategy that the moral agent
can use to determine the actual duty in a specific situation.
For the estimation of the comparative stringency of
these prima facie obligations no general rules can, so
far as I can see, be laid down. We can only say that a
great deal of stringency belongs to the duties of
"perfect obligation" - the duties of keeping our
promises, of repairing wrongs we have done, and of
returning the equivalent of services we have received.
For the rest, iv Tt alaerjoet h Kpiatg. This sense of our
particular duty in particular circumstances, preceded
and informed by the fullest reflection we can bestow on
the act in all its bearings, is highly fallible, but it
can preserve the absoluteness of laws of nature, and only by
recognizing a corresponding distinction that we can preserve
the absoluteness of the general principles of morality."
Ibid.
26Ibid., 30.
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is the only guide we have to our duty.27
Even though Ross admits that his ethical theory
contains "no principle upon which to discern what is our
actual duty in particular circumstances; n28 he, nevertheless,
insists that his method is sufficient because it adequately
aids the moral agent in choosing the moral option. Ross
writes,
We are more likely to do our duty if we reflect to the
best of our ability on the prima facie rightness . . .
of various possible acts in virtue of the characteristics we perceive them to have, than if we act without
reflection.29

27Ibid., 41-42. Duties of "perfect obligation" refer
to the Kantain "perfect duties" which relate to corresponding
rights and therefore allow no exceptions. This is in
contrast to "imperfect duties" which do not relate to
corresponding rights and therefore allows exceptions. See
Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik Der Sitten, in
Immanuel Kant's Sammtliche Werke, ed. Karl Rosenkranz and F.
W. Schubert, 12 vols. (Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1838-1840),
8:47 footnote. This has been translated into English in
Immanuel Kant, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals,
trans. James W. Ellington (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Co., 1981) 30, footnote 12.
Ross translates the Greek quote in the footnote on
page forty-two as "The decision rests with perception." He
also points out that it is a quote from Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics 1109b23 and 1126b4.
28Ibid., 23.
29Ibid., 32.
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Leonard Miller presents a succinct summary of Ross's
modified act deontology.
Each . . . moral principle . . . is a moral
truth . . . .
There will be many particular cases where these
principles will clash, it cannot always be obligatory to
keep a promise, or to rectify wrongs done to
others . . . . For this reason, Ross says that promise
keeping and other kinds of acts which are usually
obligatory are prima facie right, meaning by this that
if no stronger and contrary moral consideration is
relevant to the case in point, promise keeping, or
whatever it is, is morally obligatory . . . . This is
Ross's way of maintaining the absoluteness of moral
principles in the face of the obvious fact that they
clash in particular cases.
Ross does not think these principles can be
arranged hierarchically in such a fashion that when any
two clash we know beforehand which must take precedence
over the other, and he does not believe there is any
principle that enables us to resolve such conflicts. He
maintains that our moral life is far more complex than
the systematizers of ethics imply it is. We must
consider cases as they come, weigh the relative
strengths of the moral considerations as they occur in
the individual cases, and reach our decisions accordingly. As a result, we cannot be nearly as certain
about the rightness of particular acts as we can be
about the truth of the general principles, for while the
latter is self-evident, the former can never be "known
with certainty."30
This form of modified act deontology is distinct from

30Frank N. Magill, ed. World Philosophy 5 vols.
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Salem Press, 1982), s.v. "The Right
and The Good," by Leonard Miller.
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pure act deontology. The pure act deontology, illustrated by
Samuel Butler, has no use for any pre-established duties or
for pre-established rules which express such duties; whereas,
the modified act deontology, here illustrated by W. D. Ross,
accepts and uses pre-established duties, and the pre-established rules which express those duties, because as prima
facie duties they can be helpful to the moral agent in determining the actual absolute duty in a particular situation.
These two methods are also distinct from rule deontology.
Rule Deontology
The rule-deontologists maintain that the duty or
obligation of the moral agent is completely determined by a
set of pre-established rules. Frankena writes,
Rule-deontologists hold that the standard of right and
wrong consists of one or more rules - either fairly
concrete ones like "We ought always to tell the truth"
or very abstract ones like Henry Sidgwick's Principle of
Justice: "It cannot be right for A to treat B in a
manner in which it would be wrong for B to treat A,
merely on the ground that they are two different
individuals . . . ." Against the teleologists, they
[the rule-deontologists] insist, of course, that these
rules are valid independently of whether or not they
promote the good . . . . They assert that judgments
about what to do in particular cases are always to be
determined in the light of these rules.31
31Frankena, Ethics, 17.
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Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen explain that there is
an analogy between the use of moral rules in rule deontology
and the use of rules in the game of chess.
The rules of chess are not summary rules used to help
one play the game; rather, they define the game. One can
be said to be playing chess only if one plays according
to the rules of chess . . . . It is true that changes
have been made in the rules of chess, but they were not
changed to keep pace with the evolution of chess: the
changing of the rules was the evolution of the game.
When rules stand in this kind of relation to some
activity or practice, then the rules define the activity
or practice. Such rules are often said to be constitutive rules, for they constitute the activity. One who
knows and understands the rules of chess knows what
chess is.
The rule deontologists claim that the justification
of moral judgments ultimately depends upon the appeal
not to summary rules [as modified act deontology does]
but to constitutive rules. That is to say, the practice
of morality is defined by the moral rules.32
Tom Beauchamp and James Childress also emphasize the
necessity of rules in rule deontology when they write, "For
rule deontologists, the heart of morality is a set of binding

principles and rules that classify acts as right, wrong,
obligatory, or prohibited."33
The rule deontologists are quite diverse in their
opinion of how these rules are established. For instance,
32Garner and Rosen, 87.
33Beauchamp and Childress, 36.
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Samuel Clarke (1675-1729) in "A Discourse Concerning the
Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion (1705) and The
Truth and Certainty of the Christian Revelation" (1706) held
that moral rules are determined by reason and nature. Thomas
Reid (1710-1796) in "Essays on the Active Powers of Man,"
(1788) held that moral rules are self-evident premises known
by means of intuition. Richard Price (1723-1791) in "A
Review of the Principle Questions in Morals" (1758) held that
rules are determined by intellectual discernment along with
feelings of the heart.
The ethical analysis Socrates gives of his impending
death, recorded by Plato in the Crito, will be the first
illustration of rule deontology.34
As the Crito opens, Socrates is in prison. It is the
day before his execution. His good friend Crito arrives
early in the morning in order to convince Socrates that he
need not die. Arrangements have been made for an easy escape.
However, Socrates is convinced that an unlawful escape would
be morally wrong. For Socrates there are only two options.
34The English edition of the Crito used for this paper
is from The Dialogues of Plato, ed. and trans. B. Jowett, 4
vols. (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1871; Revised Fourth edition
1964). For a Greek edition of the text of Crito the reader
may wish to consult Ioannes Burnet, ed. Platonis Opera
(Oxonii: E. Typographeo Clarendoniano, 1900), 43-54.
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Either the law must be changed, or Socrates must go through
with his execution.
The reasoning Socrates gives is completely rule
deontological. He tells Crito:
I cannot repudiate my own doctrines, which seem to me as
sound as ever: the principles which I have hitherto
honoured and revered I still honour, and unless we can
find other and better principles, I am certain not to
agree with you; no, not even if the power of the
multitude could let loose upon us many more imprisonments, confiscations, deaths, frightening us like
children with hobgoblin terrors.35
The quote shows that Socrates is going to base his decision
on past "principles" and "doctrines," even if the end result
is his death.
Crito uses a teleological approach to moral reasoning.
He points out to Socrates that the end result of his execution will be nothing but evil. The execution will make
orphans of his children, who will then be forced to depend on
others for their education. His death will also bring
disgrace on his friends, because others will blame them for
not helping Socrates in his time of need. Others will accuse
the friends of Socrates of cowardice and ignorance. Thus,
Crito emphasizes the end result saying, "See now, Socrates,

35Plato Crito 46.c.
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how discreditable as well as disastrous are the consequences,
both to us and you."36
Arguing rule deontologically Socrates reminds Crito of
the principle that is at stake. "My first principle [is]
that neither injury nor retaliation nor warding off evil by
evil is ever right."37 This is the rule Socrates refuses to
break. He knows that his execution is evil, but he refuses
to ward off that evil by committing the evil of breaking the
law by escaping from prison. Socrates emphasizes that the
laws of Athens have been good to him; they have raised him
from his youth. As a citizen of Athens he has freely agreed
to abide by its laws. He could have moved to another city at
any time had he chosen to do so. However, he decided to
remain a citizen of Athens and that entailed obeying its
laws. He will not break her laws, even if they are unjust,
even if it means his death. He has often lectured on the
importance of justice and virtue, so that now he is not about
to play the role of a criminal. Socrates concludes by saying
it is better to suffer injustice than to inflict it. Then
the conversation ends with:

36Ibid., 46.a.
37Ibid., 49.d.
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Crito: "I have nothing to say."
Socrates: "It is enough then, Crito. Let us fulfill the
will of God, and follow whither He leads."38
Thus, Socrates emphasizes that he will obey his
principles, accept the law of Athens and thereby do his duty.
He will fulfill his obligation as an Athenian. The
consequences of his actions will be left up to divine
providence. This is a very typical example of the rule
deontological method of moral reasoning, which stresses the
necessity of obeying pre-established rules.
Another work which illustrates the rule deontological
method of moral reasoning is the Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals by Immanuel Kant."
38Ibid., 54.e.
39lmmanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten
(Riga, 1785). The English edition used for this dissertation
is Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. James E.
Ellington (Indianapolis and Cambridge: Hackett Publishing
Co., 1981). References to a German edition are taken from
Immanuel Kant's Sammtlich Werke, ed. Karl Rosenkranz and F.
W. Schubert, 12 vols (Leipzig: Leopold Voss, 1838-1840), 8:1 101, hereafter cited as K.S.W. For a more detailed
explanation of Kant's moral philosophy the reader may wish to
8:103-318,
refer to Kritik Der Praktishen Vernunft,
translated into English as Critique of Practical Reason,
trans. Lewis W. Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1949; reprint, New York: Garland Publishing Co., 1976).
Metaphysik Der Sitten, K.S.W., 9:1-336, translated into
English as The Metaphysic of Morals, trans. John Ladd
(Indianapolis: Hobbs -Merrill, 1965). The reader may also
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Kant begins by explaining that, "There is no possibility of thinking of anything at all in the world, or even out
of it, which can be regarded as good without qualification,
except a good will (emphasis his)..40 Any virtue such as
intelligence, courage, or perseverance cannot be good in and
of itself because a criminal with an evil will could also use
these virtues for an evil purpose. Therefore, only a good
will is truly good in and of itself.41 "A good will is not
good because of what it effects or accomplishes nor because
of its fitness to attain some proposed end; it is good only
through its willing, i.e., it is good of itself."42
According to Kant, once this good will has been
naturally established by reason, man has a natural duty to
obey it. From this Kant derives his three basic propositions
wish to consult Kant's lectures on ethics from the Konigsberg
University, 1775-1781, Paul Mentzer, ed. Eine Vorlesung Kants
fiber Ethik im Auftrage der Kantgesellschaft (Berlin: Pan
Verlag R. Heise, 1924), translated into English as Immanuel
Kant, Lectures on Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (London:
Methum and Co., 1930; Harper Torchbook, 1963).
40Grounding, 7. (Grundlegung, 11).
41Ibid.
42Ibid., "Der gute Wille ist nicht durch das, was er
bewirkt, oder ausrichtet, nicht durch seine Tauglichkeit zu
Erreichung irgend eines vorgesetzten Zweckes, sondern allein
durch das Wollen, d.i. an sich, gut." Grundlegung, 12.
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for morality. The first proposition is that only an action
done from duty has any moral worth.43
The second proposition is that,
An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the
purpose that is to be attained by it but in the maxim
according to which the action is determined. The moral
worth depends, therefore, not on the realization of the
object of the action, but merely on the principle of
volition according to which, without regard to any
objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been
done.44
The third proposition which Kant derives from the
previous two propositions is that, "duty is the necessity of
an action done out of respect for the law."45
In these three principles the rule deontological
element is clearly seen in Kant's emphasis on duty and law
over consequences. Kant continues to explain that man's
43Ibid., 10-12. (See especially his footnote 35).
(Grundlegung, 17-19).
44Ibid., 12-13. "Eine Handlung aus Pflicht hat ihren
moralischen Werth nicht in der Absicht, welche dadurch
erreicht werden soil, sondern in der Maxime, nach der sie
beschlossen wird, hangt also nicht von der Wirklichkeit des
Gegenstandes der Handlung ab, sondern blos von dem Princip
des Wollens, nach welchem die Handlung, unangesehen aller
Gegenstande des Begehrungsvermogens, geschehen ist."
Grundlegung, 19.
45Ibid., 13. "Pflicht ist die Nothwendigkeit einer
Handlung aus Achtung Mrs Gesetz." Grundlegung, 20.
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natural reason establishes the good will by imposing the law
of the categorical imperative, that is, regardless of the
consequences "I should never act except in such a way that I
can also will that my maxim should be a universal law.""
This categorical imperative is the one and only law which man
has a natural duty to obey. This is the primary rule in
Kant's rule deontology. All other imperatives of duty are
derived from this one. Kant gives four illustrations,
showing how this is done.
First, Kant applies the categorical imperative to the
question of suicide. A person considering suicide is
operating under the following maxim: "From self-love I make
as my principle to shorten my life when its continued
duration threatens more evil than it promises satisfac46Ibid., 14. "Ich soil niemals anders verfahren, als
so, das ich auch wollen konne, meine Maxime solle ein
allgemeines Gesetz werden." Grundlegung, 22. Here again (as
in footnotes 21 and 49) one may note that the deontological
method is not completely lacking any aim or goal. An act
done to fulfill a deontological duty is performed by the
moral agent with a goal or aim in mind (that is, to fulfill
his duty). However, even though there is the future goal that
the deontologist is striving to achieve, this future aspect
of deontology is only a secondary orientation. The primary
orientation of deontology is either in the past (if duties
have been previously determined, as in rule-deontology) or in
the present (if duties are immediately determined, as in act
deontology). The moral import is determined by the primary
orientation.
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tion."47 Kant dismisses this maxim rather quickly. One
could never will such a maxim to be a universal law because
self-love is the principle which stimulates the continuation
of life. It would be a contradiction to use that same
principle (or feeling) to end life. Consequently, suicide is
immoral.
Second, Kant applies the categorical imperative to the
question of keeping a promise. As an example Kant offers the
following maxim: "When I believe myself to be in need of
money, I will borrow money and promise to pay it back,
although I know that I can never do so."48 One could never
will this to be a universal law because it also is a self contradiction. If this were to become a universal law, then
anyone in a similar position could do the same thing. If
many would do this it would undermine and contradict the very
nature of making a promise, so that eventually no one would
believe such promises. Rather, they "would merely laugh at
all such utterances as being vain pretenses."49 In this way,
47Ibid., 30.

(Grundlegung, 48).

48Ibid., 31. (Grundlegung, 48).
49Ibid. (Grundlegung, 49). Here Kant is showing that
"The ordinary reason of mankind in its practical judgements"
(Grounding, 14. Grundlegung, 22) illustrates that there is a
practical reason for being honest. However, the moral reason
for honesty stands alone and is in no way derived from or
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practical reason substantiates the necessity of telling the
truth.
Third, Kant applies the categorical imperative to the
question of cultivating talents. Kant considers the
following maxim: Since I am independently wealthy I do not
need to work in order to support myself; therefore I will
neither develop my natural gifts, nor improve my talents. I
will simply pass my days in idle amusement and indulge myself
in pleasure. This could never be a universal law because it
is contrary to human nature. Kant writes, "But he cannot
possibly will that this should become a universal law of
nature. . . . For as a rational being he necessarily wills
that all his faculties should be developed."" Therefore,
that type of idleness is immoral.
dependent on this practical reason. Kant explains "To be
truthful from duty is, however, quite different from being
truthful from fear of disadvantageous consequences; in the
first case the concept of the action itself contains a law
for me, while in the second I must first look around
elsewhere to see what are the results for me that might be
connected with the action." (Grounding, 15. Grundlegung,
23). In the above example the moral agent should be honest
solely because of the duty imposed by the categorical
imperative. However, if the moral agent decides not to be
honest, then, the results will be to his own disadvantage.
This also illustrates that a deontologist and a teleologist
may do the very same act for entirely different reasons.
50Ibid. (Grundlegung, 49).

34
The fourth and final example Kant gives is in applying
the categorical imperative to the question of helping others
who are in need. Kant offers the following maxim:
What does it matter to me? Let everybody be as happy as
Heaven wills or as he can make himself; I shall take
nothing from him nor envy him; but I have no desire to
contribute anything to his well-being or to his assistance when in need.51
One could never will this to be a universal law
because (like promise breaking in the second example) it is
self-contradictory. The moral agent reciting this maxim
certainly may not wish to help others in need; however, there
may come a time when he himself will be in need. Then he
would not want such a law to be in effect. Thus practical
reason substantiates the necessity of beneficence, just as it
substantiates the necessity of honesty in illustration number
two above.
Kant concludes this section with the following
summary:
These are some of the many actual duties . . . whose
derivation from the single principle cited above is
clear. We must be able to will that a maxim of our
action become a universal law; this is the canon for
morally estimating any of our actions . . . . By means
of these examples there has been fully set forth how all
duties depend as regards the kind of obligation (not the
51Ibid., 32. (Grundlegung, 49-50).
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object of their action) upon the one principle.52
In this way Kant has clearly illustrated a rule deontological
method of moral reasoning by emphasizing that the duty of the
moral agent is determined by the rules that are derived from
the categorical imperative.
Even though the reasoning of Kant in his Grounding for
the Metaphysics of Morals is more complex than Socrates in

the Crito, they both illustrate the method of rule
deontology. Both Kant and Socrates insist that preestablished rules are absolutely necessary because rules
determine one's actual moral duty. This is to be
distinguished from the modified act deontologists who claim
that pre-established rules are necessary only in so far as
they are prima facie rules (that is, summary rules or rules
of thumb) that help the moral agent to determine his actual
duty. This must also be distinguished from the pure act

52Ibid. "Dieses sind nun einige von den vielen
wirklichen . . . deren Abtheilung aus dem einigen angefuhrten
Princip Klar in die Augen fdllt. Man muss wollen Karmen,
dass eine Maxime unserer Handlung eine allgemeines Gesetz
werde: dies ist der Kanon der moralischen Beurtheilung
derselben iiberhaupt . . . . Und so alle Pflichten, was die
Art der Verbindlichkeit (nicht das Object ihrer Handlung)
betrifft, durch diese Beispiele in ihrer Abhangigkeit von dem
einigen Princip vollstandig aufgestellt worden."
Grundlegung, 50-51.

36
deontologists who claim that pre-established rules are
absolutely unnecessary because the actual duty of the moral
agent can be immediately determined by other means such as
the conscience.
It will now be shown that of these three forms of
deontology the Scriptures would emphasize the rule deontological method with respect to God's absolute moral laws.
Characteristics of Rule Deontologv In The Holy Scriptures
In the Old Testament characteristics of the rule
deontological method are evident in the Mosaic covenant,
which God established with his people at Mount Sinai. When
God established this Mosaic covenant, he listed specific
moral, political and ceremonial duties the people were to
fulfill." The rule deontological emphasis can be seen in
530f course the ancient Hebrews made no distinction
among the moral, ceremonial and political laws. They all fit
together to form one body of duties for which they were
responsible. However, the New Testament makes it very clear
that the ceremonial and political laws are no longer
applicable to New Testament Christians. See Appendix I:
Biblical Testimony Concerning the Present Invalidity of the
Old Testament Ceremonial and Political Laws. The term moral
law is used throughout this dissertation to refer to all laws
that are neither ceremonial nor political. Being used in
this sense, the content of the moral law is identical to the
content of the natural law that is explained in both tables
of the Ten Commandments. Martin Chemnitz also used the term
moral laws in this sense when he wrote, "There are also moral
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the moral obligations of the Mosaic covenant on at least four
different occasions.
The most prominent example is the initial establishment of the Mosaic covenant in Exodus 19-31.54 The basic
outline of this covenant was summarized by God when he said
to Moses,
You yourselves have seen what I did to Egypt, and how I
carried you on eagles' wings and brought you to myself.
Now if you obey me fully and keep my covenant ( NIV1
laws which give commands concerning the acknowledgement of
God in our hearts and our obedience toward God [that is, the
first table] and concerning good works toward men [that is,
the second table] . . . It is common to call it the Decalog
when we are referring to the moral law." Martin Chemnitz,
Loci Theologici, 2 vols. trans. J. A. 0. Preus (St. Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1989), 2:342. This is in keeping
with a broad understanding of the term morality which
includes our obligations to God as well as to other men.
This is in contrast with the more narrow understanding which
equates morality only with the good works of the second table
of the law (directed toward men), which must be carefully
distinguished from the faith of the first table of the law
(directed toward God). This narrow sense is exemplified in
David Scaer, "Article IV. Good Works," chap. in A
Contemporary Look at the Formula of Concord (St. Louis:
Concordia Publishing House, 1978), 167.
54Unless otherwise noted the English translation of
the Scriptures used for this dissertation is the New
International Version. The Hebrew quotes are taken from the
Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Bibelgesellschaft, 1984). The Greek quotes are taken from
the Novum Testamentum Graece 26 edition (Stuttgart: Deutsch
Bibelgesellschaft, 1979).
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nations you will be my treasured possession (Exodus
19:4-5).55
Now that God had called the Israelites and empowered
them with his grace he expected them to dutifully obey all
his commandments. The people were willing to comply.
So Moses went back and summoned the elders of the people
and set before them all the words the Lord had commanded
him to speak. The people all responded together, "We
will do everything the Lord has said" (1grital
. (Exodus 19:7-8)
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Here the Israelites willingly confirm this covenant with God.
55Walter Kaiser writes, "The most common misconception
of the purpose of the law is that the Old Testament men and
women were brought into a redeemed relationship with God by
doing good works, that is, by obeying the commandments of the
law, not through the grace of God. The truth of the matter
is that this reading of the text will not fit the biblical
evidence." Walter Kaiser, Jr., Toward Old Testament Ethics.
(Grand Rapids: Zondervan Publishing House, 1983), 76. The
quote from scripture in the text above illustrates the
validity of Kaiser's point. First, God in his grace chose
the people of Israel to be his special nation. He graciously
delivered them from Egyptian bondage. Then he gave them the
laws in this covenant which they were to obey. Clearly in
this Mosaic covenant, obedience to God's law follows, and is
the result of God's initial gracious action in his election
and his deliverance. Obedience to these laws was not the
prerequisite for God's grace. Nor does obedience maintain
the covenant, as E. P. Sanders suggests in his understanding
of covenantal nomism, see E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian
Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977), 94, 236, 513.
Obedience is the faithful response of the "new man" in the
covenant that is established and maintained by God.
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Through the use of his law he will establish their duties and
they will obey.
Thus, three days later God met Moses on Mount Sinai to
establish the specific obligations of the Israelites. Once
again the opening words speak of God's initial grace. "I am
the Lord your God who brought you out of Egypt out of the
land of slavery" (Exodus 20:2). Immediately following this
is the decalog, which enumerates the moral obligations of the
people. Commandments one through three detail their obligations to God. Commandments four through ten detail their
obligations to one another.56 Even though the commandments
of the second table are not directed specifically toward God
(as are the commandments of the first table) they are still
obligations that are required by God and, therefore, part of
the covenant. After the obligations of the decalog, the

56Throughout this dissertation the Lutheran-Roman
Catholic enumeration of the ten commandments will be used.
For more information on the different numbering systems the
reader may wish to see Paul L. Maier, "Enumerating the
Decalogue: Do We Number the Ten Commandments Correctly?"
Concordia Journal 16 (January 1990): 18-26, Nathan Jastram,
"Should Lutherans Really Change How They Number the Ten
Commandments?" Concordia Journal 16 (October 1990): 363-69.
Paul L. Maier, "A Response to Nathan Jastram, "Concordia
Journal 16 (October, 1990): 370-72, Horace D. Hummel,
"Numbering the Ten 'Commandments,' A Response to Both Jastram
and Maier," Concordia Journal 16 (October 1990): 373-83.
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other obligations of the people follow, including those of a
moral, ceremonial and political nature.
The main characteristic of rule deontology is clearly
seen in that the moral duties of the Israelites were established by God in this covenant, by the commands of the
decalog. Any moral option would be determined by their duty
to keep the individual laws of the covenant.57
57Blessings are the result of living in the covenant,
and only curses will come from being outside the covenant
(see Deut. 30:15-20); however, ". . .the covenant relationship
does not rest on quid pro quo understanding. Israel is not
commanded to keep these commandments in order that God may
prosper her course; she is called to obedience without
qualification." Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible, s.v.
"Law in the 0.T." by W. J. Harrelson. In other words God's
continued blessings were not dependent on Israel's obedience.
Their obedience was not done in order to coerce, or bribe
God, or earn his favor. Rather, God's blessings were
dependent on their life within the covenant, of which their
obedience was an outward manifestation (as well as a
necessary result). Where one found obedience one found God's
continued blessing, not because of the obedience, but because
of the covenant which created the obedience. On the other
hand Israel could earn God's future curses by virtue of her
disobedience.
One can see how this could easily be misunderstood so
that over time it became distorted. "In the intertestamental
period a fundamental change occurred in the role of the Law
in the life of the people. The importance of the Law
overshadows the concept of the covenant and becomes the
condition of membership in God's people. Even more
importantly, observance of the Law becomes the basis of God's
verdict upon the individual. Resurrection will be the reward
of those who have been devoted to the Law (2 Macc. 7:9). The
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Other examples in the Old Testament which also
illustrate characteristics of the rule deontological method
of moral reasoning come from several different occasions when
the people reconfirmed their commitment to the Mosaic
covenant.
The first actual reemphasis of the initial Mosaic
covenant was by Moses himself in Moab before the children of
Israel crossed the Jordan to enter Canaan. The entire book
of Deuteronomy records this recommitment to the covenant
(except for the last chapter which records the death of
Moses). Moses repeatedly emphasized all that God had done
for them, for example,
The Lord your God has blessed you in all the work of
your hands. He has watched over your journey through
this vast desert. These forty years the Lord your God
has been with you, and you have not lacked anything.
(Deuteronomy 2:7)58

Law is the basis of the hope of the faithful (Test. Jud.
26:1), of justification (Apoc. Bar. 57:6), of life (IV Ez.
7:21; 9:31). Obedience to the Law will even bring God's
Kingdom and transform the entire sin-cursed world (Jub. 23).
Thus the Law attains the position of an intermediary between
God and man. This new role of the Law characterizes rabbinic
Judaism. . ." George E. Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament.
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1974), 497.
58Similar emphases are made in 2:31-33; 3:2-3,18;
4:36-38; 10:15; 11:2-7; 26:5-11; 29:2-3.
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He also explained that in view of the grace which God
had given them they were to be dutifully obedient to all the
laws of God, for example,
Hear now, 0 Israel, the decrees and laws I am about to
teach you ( VP?? / !t$ 101 trAy.urivr5t31 trptin- li
tnntA). Follow them so that you may live and go
in and take possession of the land that the Lord, the
God of your fathers is giving you. Do not add to what I
command you and do not subtract from it, but keep the
commands of the Lord your God that I give you ( MDO

lam
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) (Deuteronomy 4:1-2)59
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Once again rule deontology is emphasized because the moral
option is to be determined by the individual covenant laws.
The next recommitment(s) occurred with Joshua at
Shechem. This is recorded in Joshua 8:30-35 and 24:1-27. It
is difficult to determine from the texts if these are two
different occasions or simply two different accounts of the
same confirmation ceremony. However, the rule deontological
emphasis is present in both texts. The passage from chapter
59Similar emphases are made in 4:39-40,44-9:6; 7:11;
8:1-2; 10:12-13; 11:1-18; 13; 19:1-28, 68; 29:9. This is
also emphasized in the Lord's words to Joshua, "Be careful to
obey all the law my servant Moses gave you; do not turn from
it to the right or to the left . . . Do not let this Book of
the Law depart from your mouth . . . be careful to do
rii(R5 -hap_
everything written in it" ( 101

1101 5t4 11;11 rngil
11111celn :5
14. . . 5wMtpa
it zunrri/Dt nitiv5 nbvim
Ton min ) Joshua 1:7-8.
T

T1

43
eight reads:
Afterwards, Joshua read all the words of the law - the
blessings and the curses - just as it is written in the
Book of the Law. There was not a word of all that Moses
had commanded that Joshua did not read to the whole
assembly of Israel. (Joshua 8:34-35)
If Joshua read "all that Moses had commanded," one can
discern from the commands of Moses in Deuteronomy and in
Exodus (exemplified in the two previous quotes) that once
again the many laws of God's covenant and the importance of
Israel's absolute dutiful obedience were emphasized.
This emphasis is made even more clearly in Joshua
24:1-27. Verses two through thirteen begin by reminding the
people of God's gracious actions for them in the past. Then
in verse fourteen Joshua explains their responsibilities.
"Now fear the Lord and serve him with all faithfulness"
(Joshua 24:14).
Then the people answered, "Far be it from us to forsake
the Lord to serve other gods! It was the Lord our God
himself who brought us and our fathers up out of Egypt,
from that land of slavery, and performed those great
signs before our eyes. He protected us on our entire
journey and among all the nations through which we
traveled. And the Lord drove out before us all the
nations, including the Amorites, who lived in the land.
We too will serve the Lord, because he is our God . . .
We will serve the Lord our God and obey him" ( rtrinitfi

vbah
T3•

-bv] arrii,m)
On that day Joshua made a covenant for the people,
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and there at Shechem he drew up for them decrees and
laws ( tVePi p1). And Joshua recorded these things in
the Book of the Law of God. (Joshua 24:16-18, 24-26)
Here, again, one can note the rule deontological emphasis on
dutiful obedience to the "decrees and laws."
The next reconfirmation of the covenant which makes
this same emphasis is the reform of Josiah in 2 Kings 23.
He [King Josiah] read in their hearing all the words of
the Book of the Covenant, which had been found in the
temple of the Lord. The king stood by the pillar and
renewed the covenant in the presence of the Lord - to
follow the Lord and keep his commands, regulations and
decrees (mpTrmil rvtirmoniTtp nbtl) with all his
heart and all his soul, thus confirming the words of the
covenant written in this book. Then all the people
pledged themselves to the covenant. (2 Kings 23:2b -3)
Here King Josiah and the people are pledging that they will
do their duty in living according to all the laws of God.
Right and wrong will be determined by the various "commands,
regulations and decrees" of the Lord.
The final example that illustrates significant
features of the rule deontological method of moral reasoning
is the covenant reconfirmation with Ezra, recorded in
Nehemiah 9-10. The people are reminded of the sins of their
fathers as well as the steadfast faithfulness of the Lord.
You are the Lord God, who chose Abram . . . . You made a
covenant with him to give to his descendants . . . . You

45
saw the suffering of our forefathers in Egypt; you heard
their cry at the Red Sea . . .
You came down on Mount Sinai; you spoke to them
from heaven. You gave them regulations an laws that are
just and right and decrees and commandments that are
good . . . through your servant Moses . . .
But they were disobedient and rebelled against you;
they put your law behind their backs. . . . So you
handed them over to their enemies, who oppressed
them. . . . But in your great mercy you did not put an
end to them or abandon them, for you are a gracious and
merciful God. . . . In all that has happened to us, you
have been just; you have acted faithfully. (Nehemiah
9:7-33)
The Lord has kept his covenant. He has continually
been faithful. Israel, however was disobedient. She did not
fulfill her obligations. She failed in her duty to keep all
the covenant laws. Yet, because of the Lord's faithfulness
the people are willing (and able) to reconfirm themselves to
the covenant.
All these now join their brothers the nobles, and bind
themselves with a curse and an oath to follow the Law
of God given through Moses the servant of
(nnln;
God and to obey carefully all the commands, regulations
and decrees of the Lord our Lord (i1 nvot, 71? t#71
arpm
ni*?T ;: ) (Nehemiah 10:29).
171
In this example, as in all others given above, those
pledging their faithfulness to the Lord are in effect saying,
"Empowered by, and responding to your grace, we will
dutifully obey all your laws. Any moral decision will be
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based on our obligation to keep the laws of the covenant."
Thus, this recurring emphasis on their duty to obey all the
covenant laws illustrates that the ancient Israelites used a
rule deontological method of moral reasoning.
This same distinctive feature of rule deontology is
also found in the New Testament. In the gospels one can note
at least three different passages where Jesus himself
illustrates characteristics of this rule deontological form
of moral reasoning. Jesus says,
Anyone who breaks one of the least of these commandments
Toirrwv) and teaches others to do the same will
be called least in the kingdom of heaven, but whoever
practices and teaches (umajov at 6Wrt-(1) these commands
will be called great in the kingdom of heaven (Matthew
5 :19)

60
.

60The question, "Does the phrase 'these commandments'
(11Bvbrratilv TOljTWV) refer to the Old Testament law or to the
commandments about to be given by Jesus?" is addressed by H.
B. Green when he writes, "These commandments: the original
force of this saying must have had in view the OT law as it
stands; but the following verse, and the section it
introduces, suggest rather that Mt. takes it to mean the law
as reinterpreted by Jesus." H. B. Green, The Gospel
According to Matthew (Oxford: Oxford university Press, 1975),
81. However, such a separation is actually an artificial
dichotomy as Johannes Ylvisaker explains, "Jesus does not in
the Sermon on the Mount set up His own Word as a contrast to
the testimony of the Old Testament, as some have asserted.
For He says expressly that He has not come to destroy the Law
or the Prophets (Mat. 5:17). . . . It must not be supposed
that the morality of Jesus is not the moral philosophy of the
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In this text Jesus is not only reemphasizing the enduring
validity of the Old Testament moral law, but he is also
Old Testament. It is a gross mistake to regard Jesus as a
new lawgiver. . . .
Through the Word of God's Son on the mountain, our
thoughts revert naturally, then, to God's Word on Sinai."
Johannes Ylvisaker, The Gospels, trans. The Board of
Publication of The Norwegian Lutheran Church and Augsburg
Publishing House (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House,
1932), 251.
Martin Chemnitz also discusses this same artificial
dichotomy "For the fact that He [Christ] says, 'It has been
said by them of old time . . . but I say unto you . .
Matt. 5:21, does not mean that He is opposing His doctrine to
Moses and is rejecting and condemning him, . . . or that he
is trying to hand down commandments which are better, more
perfect, or of greater (meliora, perfectora + grauiova)
importance than those of Moses . . . . For Moses was clearly
giving the same interpretation . . . . Christ brings back to
mind the oldest interpretation which had been given by Moses
and the prophets . . . . Therefore Christ is asserting by
this mode of speaking ("I say to you") that He who
promulgated the Decalog possesses the absolutely surest
explanation of it." Martin Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, trans.
J. A. 0. Preus 2 vols. (St. Louis, MO: Concordia Publishing
House, 1989), 2:405. The Latin references are taken from
Martin Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, 3 vols (Francoforti ad
Moenum, 1591-1595), 2:81a.
Harold Buls also comments on this chapter of Matthew
writing "He [Christ] came not to do away with the OT
teachings but to bring out their true, original
meaning . . . . Jesus is not a new law giver, nor is He
adding anything to what Moses said . . . . He was the author
of this law and now is about to explain what He meant when He
gave this law through Moses." Harold Buls, Exegetical Notes
ILCW Gospel Texts Series A Festival Season Sundays (Fort
Wayne, IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press, 1980), 32,
34.
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stressing the enduring duty to obey and teach even "the least
of these commandments" (gay T631, iirraciiv

TOUTWV TM; aa&TWV).

Moral decisions are to be rule deontological because they are
based on the obligation to obey all of God's moral commandments.
A similar emphasis is made with Jesus' sermon in
Matthew 23.
The teachers of the law and the Pharisees sit in Moses'
seat. So you must obey them and do everything they tell
you (ncivTa obv o6a iav JIMMY tlµiv TronjaaTE Kai T1peiTE ) . But
do not do what they do for they do not practice what
they preach. (Matthew 23:2-3)
In both of the above passages Jesus is stressing the
importance of one's duty to obey the law. These passages
show that for Jesus, an important element in ethics is one's
obligation to obey the Old Testament laws. Insofar as Jesus
emphasizes the duty and obligation to obey the laws of God,
he is using a rule deontological method of moral reasoning. 61
This same rule deontological method is also prevalent
in the writings of St. Paul. This is noticeable both as a

61One could also add that "Jesus recognizes the Law
when He acts as the One who forgives sins. . . . Jesus
validates the Law by the judgment implied in His pardon."
Gerhard Rittel, ed. The Theological Dictionary of the New
Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1967), s.v.
"voitos" by Gutbrod.
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broad principle which he explains, as well as in specific
examples that he uses.
St. Paul uses what has become rule deontology as a
broad principle several times in his letter to the Romans.
In chapter two of Romans Paul emphasizes the numerous
individual moral obligations that are established by the law.
You who preach against stealing, do you steal? You who
say that people should not commit adultery, do you
commit adultery? You who abhor idols, do you rob
temples? You who brag about the law, do you dishonor
God by breaking the law? (Romans 2:21b-23)
In the next two chapters Paul reemphasizes this same
theme (that is, the numerous obligations of the moral law) in
yet another way. Because the moral law has established many
duties, St. Paul knows that he has sinned when he fails to
meet those duties. Paul's awareness of sin is related
directly to the obligations established by the moral law.
For this reason Paul writes, "Through the law we become
conscious of sin" (Romans 3:20b). In chapter seven he again
writes, "I would not have known what sin was except through
the law" (Romans 7:7). In all three of these passages St.
Paul is stressing the ongoing importance of the moral laws in
setting the standard for human behavior. St. Paul also
emphasizes that New Testament Christians still have a duty to
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obey all the moral laws of the Old Testament when he writes,
"Everything that was written in the past was written to teach
us" (Romans 15:4). St. Paul emphasizes this again when he
writes about the moral failings of the Old Testament
Israelites.
Now these things occurred as examples to us to keep us
from setting our hearts on evil things as they did. Do
not be idolaters, as some of them were; as it is
written: "The people sat down to eat and drink and got
up to indulge in pagan revelry." We should not commit
sexual immorality, as some of them did - and in one day
twenty-three thousand of them died. We should not test
the Lord, as some of them did - and were killed by
snakes. And do not grumble, as some of them did - and
were killed by the destroying angel.
These things happened to them as examples and were
written down as warnings for us . . . (1 Corinthians
10:6-11a)
To the Corinthians St. Paul even goes so far as to
say, "Keeping God's commands (E14Ta6w) is what counts"
(1 Corinthians 7:19). In all of these passages Paul used
what is now called the rule deontological method, which
emphasizes the obligation to obey all of God's moral laws.
One can also see how this principle is applied when
St. Paul uses it in specific situations. St. Paul writes to
the Romans, "Do not take revenge, my friends, but leave room
for God's wrath, for it is written: 'It is mine to avenge; I
will repay,' says the Lord" (Romans 12:19). Here Paul is

51
specifically saying that New Testament Christians still have
an obligation to obey Deuteronomy 32:35.
A similar emphasis can be noted in Paul's letter to
the Ephesians. "Children, obey your parents in the Lord, for
this is right. 'Honor your father and mother' — which is the
first commandment with a promise" (Ephesians 6:1-2).62 This
emphasis is stressed again in his first letter to the
Corinthians
For it is written in the Law of Moses: "Do not muzzle an
ox while it is treading out the grain." Is it about
oxen that God is concerned? Surely he says this for us,
doesn't he? Yes, this was written for us . . . . If we
have sown spiritual seed among you, is it too much if we
reap a material harvest from you? (1 Corinthians 9:9-11)
In these last two passages Paul not only shows that
Christians still have a moral duty to obey the fourth
62Long life may be the result of obedience to the
fourth commandment but it is not to be construed as the
reason for obedience. For any reward from God, including
longevity, is always a reward of grace. Francis Pieper
explains, "Scripture teaches that the good works of
Christians receive a reward (1 Cor.l 3:8), yea, a very great
reward (µmAis no)* - Matt. 5:12; Luke 6:23, 35) . . . .
But this reward . . . must be regarded strictly as a
reward of grace. The kingdom of Christ is the Kingdom of
Grace, and he who hands God a bill for his good works places
himself outside the Kingdom of Grace." Francis Pieper,
Christian Dogmatics 4 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing
House, 1953), 3:52. Thus the fourth commandment, with its
promise, is not an example of teleological morality.
(Compare footnote 50 above).
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commandment, but he even finds a moral implication in
Deuteronomy 25:4 (concerning oxen treading grain), which he
emphasizes as still being relevant for the New Testament
Church. Therefore, Wolfgang Schrage, in reference to Paul's
use of the Old Testament, writes:
The Old Testament and its laws are presupposed and
enforced as the criterion of Christian conduct. There
are instances where Paul as it were instinctively and
without further justification presupposes certain
conclusions deriving from Jewish thought based on the
Torah. [In] debating with gentile Christians [Paul]
appeals explicitly (expressis verbis) and deliberately
to the Old Testament and its Torah.
. . . it follows that for Christians the Old
Testament has "greater authority than the customs of
everyday economic life" and a natural sense of what is
just and proper."
The distinctive feature of the rule deontological
method of moral reasoning is noted in the Gospels as well as
the Epistles in that both Jesus and St. Paul emphasized that
Christians have a duty or an obligation to obey all the
individual moral commandments of Scripture."
63Wolfgang Schrage, The Ethics of the New Testament,
trans. David Green (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 205.
This also contains a quote from Heinz-Dieter Wendland, "Die
Briefe an die Korinther," Das Neue Testament Deutsch.
(Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1946) 53.
64The capability to be dutifully obedient comes only
from God. Because of the grace that is received from him,
his people are empowered to faithfully respond. On a
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Characteristics of Rule Deontology
in the Writings of Martin Luther65
Luther appreciated the importance of the moral laws in
the Old Testament just as Jesus and St. Paul. He consistently uses the decalog in order to stress the moral duties
and responsibilities for modern Christians. In this way
Luther, too, used the rule deontological method of moral
reasoning. This can be noted in both a negative and positive
way.
Luther illustrates the rule deontological method of
rational level such dutiful obedience may be perceived as an
expression of gratitude to God for the multitude of gracious
blessings which he has bestowed upon the believer. The
psalmist enjoins this gratitude when he writes "Give thanks
to the Lord, for he is good; his love endures forever" Psalm
107:1. (See also 1 Chronicles 16:8; Psalms 7:17; 28:7;
30:12; 35:18; 75:1; 100:4; 118:28; 136:1; 1 Corinthians
15:57; 2 Corinthians 2:14; 9:15; 1 Thessalonians 5:18;
Revelation 4:9).
However, on the spiritual level such dutiful obedience
is more than a mere human expression of gratitude. It is
also the very power of God working in and through the "new
man" in Christ. St. Paul emphasizes this when he writes, "I
have been crucified with Christ and I no longer live, but
Christ lives in me" Galatians 2:20. (See also Romans 8:5-14;
2 Corinthians 3:4; Ephesians 3:16).
65It is not the purpose of this section to give a
detailed account of every aspect of Luther's understanding of
the law. The purpose here is much more modest. It is merely
to illustrate that the rule deontological method of moral
reasoning can also be found in the writings of Luther.
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moral reasoning in a negative way with his explanation of the
primary (that is, the accusatory or spiritual) function of
the law. Luther writes,
Therefore the true function and the chief and proper use
of the Law is to reveal to man his sin, blindness,
misery, wickedness, ignorance, hate and contempt of God,
death, hell, judgment, and the well-deserved wrath of
God . . . . For since, the reason becomes hauty with
this human presumption of righteousness and imagines
that account of this it is pleasing to God, therefore
God has to send some Hercules, namely, the Law, to
attack, subdue, and destroy his monster with full
force.66
This is the same negative use of the rule deontological method of moral reasoning that was illustrated by St.
Paul in Romans 3:20; and 7:7.67 This accusatory function of
"Luther's Works, 55 vols., eds. J. Pelikan and H. T.
Lehmann, American Edition in English Translation
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press and St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1958-1986), 26:309-10. Hereafter this work
is abbreviated as L. W. In Epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas
Commentarius, [1531] 1535. "Itaque verum officium et
principalis ac proprius usus legis est, quod revelat homini
suum peccatum, caecitatem, miseriam, impietatem, ignorantiam,
odium, contemptum Dei, mortem, infernum, iudicium et
commeritam iram apud Deum . . . . Quia enim ratio humana
opinione iustitiae insolescit et putat se propter eam placere
Deo, Ideo oportet Deum mittere aliquem Herculem, scilicet
Legem quae monstrum istud toto impetu adoriatur, prosternat
et conficiat." D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritisch
Gesamtausgabe, 64 Bande (Weimar, 1883-), 40.1:481. Hereafter
this work is abbreviated as W. A.
67See page 49 above.
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the law demonstrates the rule deontological method of moral
reasoning in that it reveals to the sinner the failure to
fulfill the numerous obligations or duties which God has
commanded.68 Every accusation which the spiritual function
of the law makes illustrates a presumption that the individual moral commandments of God are obligatory. When the law
accuses the sinner of a particular sin it is emphasizing that
a deontological duty has been left unfulfilled. In this way
the accusatory function of the law illustrates the rule
deontological method of moral reasoning in a negative way.
Luther also illustrated the rule deontological method
of moral reasoning in a positive way when the law was used to
demand, coerce and drive the "old man" to good works. Luther
explained in a homily on 1 Timothy 1:8-11,
One must separate man into two parts and distinguish
between them, namely between the old [part] and the new
[part] as St. Paul has partitioned him. The new man
should not be disturbed with laws; however, continually
force the old man on with laws. Do not give him any
relief from them . . . .
The old man . . . who has no faith, has no pure
heart and does not have Christ. He must have the law.
68This negative function of the rule deontological
method forms a part of the second use of the law mentioned in
article six of the Thorough Declaration of the Formula of
Concord, "The Law of God is useful . . . . that through it
men are brought to a knowledge of their sins." Concordia
Triglotta (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921), 963.
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He must be continually forced on with works . . . . Nor
is he inclined to do anything that is good, even less
can he actually do what is good. Rather he will have a
immoral and wicked life.69
To drive the "old man" on with works is a positive use
of the rule deontological method because in this way the
numerous commandments enumerate the duties which God
demands." In a positive way the deontological duties are
listed and commanded. Because of this positive use of the
rule deontological method one can distinguish the good works
which God commands (which are the only good works) from those
69This is the author's own translation. "Diesen brauch
recht zuverstehen mustu den menschen yn zwey stuck teilen und
die beide wol scheiden, nemlich yn den alten und newen, wie
yhn Pau[lus] geteilt hat. Den newen menschen las nur gar
unverworren mit gesessen, Denn alten treibe on unterlas mit
gesessen und las yhm nur kein ruge darvon . . . .
Der alte mensch . . . der on glauben und nicht von
reinem herssen ist und Christum nicht hat, mus das gesess
haben und ymmer dar mit wercken getrieben werden . . . . er
kan such zu keinem guten geneiget seyn, veil weniger gutes
thuen, sondern eitel buberey und boscheit." Predigt Uber 1
Timotheus 1:8-11. 18 Marz, 1525. W. A. 17.1:122-23.
70This positive function of the rule deontological
method constitutes one aspect of the third use of the law
mentioned in article six of the Thorough Declaration of the
Formula of Concord. "The Holy Ghost employs the Law so as to
teach the regenerate from it, and to point out and show them
in the Ten Commandments what is the [good and] acceptable
will of God, Rom. 12,2, [and] in what good works God bath
before ordained that they should walk, Eh. 2:10." Triglotta,
965-69.
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fictitious good works invented by man. Luther explains,
The first thing to know is that there are no good works
except those works God has commanded . . . . Therefore,
whoever wants to know what good works are . . . needs
to know nothing more than God's commandments.71
As much as Luther emphasized the Gospel, the deontological emphasis in the ten commandments was no trifling
matter. Luther made this point again in a letter to Peter
Baskendorf concerning prayer.
Out of each Commandment I make a garland of four
strands. First of all, I take each commandment as a
teaching, which is what it really is, and reflect on
what our Lord God earnestly demands of me here.
Secondly, I make a thanksgiving of it. Thirdly, a
confession. Fourthly, a prayer . . . .
These are the Ten Commandments treated in a
fourfold way — as a doctrinal book, hymnbook,
confessional book, and prayer book.72
71L. W. 44:23. "Czum ersten ist zuwissen, das kein
gutte werck sein, dan allein die got gebotenn hat . . . .
Darumb, wer gute werck wissen . . . der darff nichts anders
dan gottis gebot wissen." Von den Guten Werken, 1520. W. A.
6:204.
72Baillie, John; McNeill, John; Van Dusen, Henery,
gen. eds. The Library of Christian Classics, 26 vols.
Luther: Letters of Spiritual Counsel ed. and trans. Theodore
Tappert (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1955), 18:129-30.
"Und mache aus einem iglichen Gebot ein gevierdes oder ein
vierfaches gedrehetes krensslin, Als: Ich neme ein iglich
Gebot an zum ersten als eine lere, wie es denn an im selber
ist, and dencke, was unser Herr Gott darinn so ernstlich von
mir fordert, Zum andern mache ich eine dancksagung draus, Zum
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Luther's reference to the "teaching" (lere) of the ten
commandments that are "demands" (fordert) of God aptly
illustrate what has become known as the rule deontological
method of moral reasoning.
The deontological method of moral reasoning has been
defined and illustrated above. It has been suggested that of
the three forms examined, pure act deontology, modified act
deontology, and rule deontology, the inspired authors of the
Holy Scriptures, as well as Martin Luther, used a method of
moral reasoning that contained characteristics in common with
rule deontology, which insisted on obedience to preestablished rules.

dritten eine beicht, Zum vierden ein gebot . . . .
Das sind die Zehen gebot vierfeltiz gehandelt,nemlich
als ein lerebuchlin, als ein sangbuchlin, als ein beicht
buchlin, als ein Betbuchlin." Eine Einfaltige Weise zu Beten
fiir Eine Guten Freund, 1535. W. A. 38:364-65, 372.

CHAPTER TWO
The Teleological Method Defined and Illustrated
The teleological method of moral reasoning (often
referred to as consequentialism and illustrated in utilitarianism) determines the moral option in view of the end result
or goal that the moral agent seeks to achieve. William
Frankena explains,
A teleological theory says that the basic or ultimate
criterion or standard of what is morally right, wrong,
obligatory, etc., is the nonmoral value that is brought
into being . . . . Thus an act is right if and only if
it or the rule under which it falls, produces, will produce, or is intended to produce at least as great a
balance of good over evil as any available alternative;
an act is wrong if and only if it does not do so
[emphasis his].1
Tom Beuchamp and James Childress write that,
Utilitarians maintain that the moral rightness of
actions is determined by their consequences, in particular by the maximization of the nonmoral value produced
1Frankena, Ethics, 14. Frankena continues by
explaining that "Teleologists have often been hedonists,
identifying the good with pleasure and evil with pain. . . .
But they . . . have sometimes been non-hedonists, identifying
the good with power, knowledge, self-realization, perfection,
etc." Frankena, Ethics, 15.
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by the action. The value produced-such as pleasure,
friendship, knowledge, or health-is said to be nonmoral
because it is the general goal of many human activities,
such as art, athletics, and academics, and thus is not a
distinctly moral value like fulfilling a moral obligation. A common feature of these theories is that standards of obligation and right conduct depend on and are
subordinated to standards of the good.2
Thomas Shannon affirms that,
The ethical theory of consequentialism answers the
question "What should I do?" by considering the
consequences of various answers. That is, what is
ethical is that consequence which brings about the
greatest number of advantages over disadvantages or
which brings about the greatest good for the greatest
number of people. Basically, in this method, one looks
to outcomes, to consequences, to the situation, and from
that perspective, one decides what is ethical.3
The main emphasis in teleological ethics is not
whether an act or rule is consistent with a duty or obligation, as in deontology, but whether or not an act or a rule
produces the desired end. The teleologists insist that
morality is determined by the results of the action or rule,
regardless of any predetermined duty. Teleological theories
may use the terms duty or obligation, but such terms are
always defined in light of the desired consequences.4
2Beauchamp and Childress, 25.
3Thomas Shannon, An Introduction to Bioethics, Second
Edition Revised and Updated (New York: Paulist Press, 1978),
20.
4An example of this teleological use of the term duty
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As with deontology above, William Frankena also
divides teleology into three subcategories.5 Using
utilitarianism as a form of teleology, Frankena explains that
pure act utilitarianism rejects all rules, modified act
utilitarianism uses rules only as helpful guides, and rule
utilitarianism insists on the use of rules.6 In order to

may be noted in the previous quote wherein Beauchamp and
Childress write, "obligations and right conduct depend on and
are subordinated to standards of the good." Beauchamp and
Childress, 19. Another example is given by C. D. Broad when
he writes that teleology is "the doctrine that it is the duty
of each to aim at the maximum happiness of all, and to
subordinate everything else to this end." C. D. Broad Five
Types of Ethical Theory. (London: Routledge and Regan Paul
Ltd., 1930), 183. Another example is given when G. E. Moore
also explains that, "What is 'right' or what is our 'duty'
must in any case be defined as what is a means to
good . . . . Our 'duty' is merely that which will be a means
to the best possible, and the expedient, if it is really
expedient, must be the same. We cannot distinguish them by
saying that the former is something we ought to do, whereas
of the latter we cannot say we 'ought.' In short the two
concepts are not, as is commonly assumed by all except
Utilitarian moralists, simple concepts ultimately distinct.
There is no such distinction in Ethics." George E. Moore,
Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1954), 167-68. Such a teleological usage of the term duty is
rather rare. Generally speaking the terms "duty" and
"obligation" are limited to deontology.
5Frankena, "Love and Principle," 207-8.
6Ibid., 207-8. The distinction between pure act
utilitarianism and rule utilitarianism is also noted by
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explain the teleological method of moral reasoning, each one
of these three forms will be defined and illustrated.
Pure Act Teleology
William Frankena stresses that pure act teleology has
absolutely no use for rules.
Pure act-utilitarianism is the view which has no place
whatsoever for such [that is, moral] rules, holding that
one is to tell what is one's right or duty in a particular situation simply by an appeal to the principle of
utility, that is, by looking to see what action will
produce or probably produce the greatest general balance
of good over evi1.7
Beauchamp and Childress explain act teleology as
follows:
Controversy has arisen, however, over whether this principle [that is, utilitarianism] is to be applied to
particular acts in particular circumstances in order to
determine which act is right or whether it is to be
applied instead to rules of conduct that themselves
determine which acts are right and wrong . . . . An act
utilitarian simply skips . . . rules and justifies
Beauchamp and Childress, 30-36, Garner and Rosen, 55-82,
J. J. C. Smart, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism,"
chap. in Contemporary Utilitarianism (Garden City, NY:
Doubleday Co. Inc., 1968), 99-115. This is a revised version
of an article originally published in The Philosophical
Quarterly 6(1956) 344-54. See also the bibliography in J. J.
C. Smart and Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against
(Cambridge: University Press, 1973), 151-55.
7Ibid., 207.

63
actions by appealing directly to the principle of
utility.
The act utilitarian considers the consequences of
each particular act . . . . The act utilitarian asks,
"What good and evil consequences will result from this
action in this circumstance?"8
Garner and Rosen write that, "The act utilitarian
holds that the rightness or wrongness of an action is solely
a function of its consequences."9
John Klotz emphasizes that,
Under act utilitarianism the rule level is skipped and
the utilitarian principle leads directly to judgments
regarding individual actions. The act utilitarian asks,
for example, "What good or evil consequences will result
from this action under these circumstances?"10
For the purpose of illustrating the method of act
teleology this dissertation will use Jeremy Bentham,
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation
(1789).11 Bentham discusses the act teleological method of
8Beauchamp and Childress, 25-26.
9Garner and Rosen, 55.
'°John Klotz, Men, Medicine and Their Maker
(University City, MO: Torelion Productions, 1991), 12.
11Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832) was born in London. As a
preschooler he studied both Latin and Greek. His father
collected scraps of Latin which Jeremy wrote when he was 5.
By the time he was 7 he could play several of Handel's
sonatas on a miniature violin. He entered Queens College at
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his entire system in the first five chapters.
In his opening paragraph he explains that all actions
and decisions, including those of morality, are to be determined solely on the basis of whether they produce pain or
pleasure.
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two
sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them
alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to
determine . . . the standard of right and wrong. . . .
They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we
think. . . . The principle of utility recognizes this
subjection.12
Bentham's principle of utility seeks to organize all
human action in such a way as to maximize pleasure and minimize pain.
By the principle of utility is meant that principle
which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the tendency which it appears to have
to augment or diminish the happiness of the party whose
interest is in question.13
Oxford when he was 12. At 16 he received his Bachelor's
degree. At 19 he was called to the bar. For more
information on the life of Jeremy Bentham the reader may wish
to see, Charles Everett, Jeremy Bentham (London: Wiedenfeld
and Nicolson, 1966) or Charles M. Atkinson, Jeremy Bentham
His Life and Work (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press,
1970).
12The Works of Jeremy Bentham, ed. John Bowring, 11
vols. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1962), 1:1.
13Ibid., 1. The great stress on "every action
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Bentham does not attempt to prove this principle of
utility. It is an unprovable first principle. "That which
is used to prove everything else, cannot itself be proved: a
chain of proofs must have their commencement somewhere."14
Pleasure, happiness, good, benefit or advantage are
all synonyms for Bentham which refer to the end that is to be
sought; whereas, evil, pain and mischief are all synonyms for
the end that is to be avoided.15
All our actions ought to be teleologically oriented
toward the end of producing pleasure and avoiding pain.
Bentham insists that this is the only sense in which the
terms ought, right and wrong can be properly used. These
moral terms of value have meaning only when they are used
within a teleological context. "When thus interpreted the
words 'ought,' and 'right' and 'wrong' and others of that
stamp [for example, duty and obligation], have meaning, when
otherwise, they have none.16
Bentham explains that on the surface the principle of
whatsoever" is intended to include both the private actions
of individuals as well as the public actions of governments.
Ibid.
14Ibid., 2.
15Ibid., 1-2.
16Ibid., 2.

66
asceticism seems to oppose utility. For the ascetics do not
seek that which augments their pleasure. Quite to the
contrary, they insist on seeking those interests and activities that enhance their pain. However, they do not disprove
the principle of utility by their actions, because their
conflict with utilitarianism is only superficial. For the
ascetics pain is their pleasure. They seek out their
pleasure by means of pain. Thus, "Even this [asceticism] we
see is at bottom but the principle of utility misapplied."17
The other theory that occasionally conflicts with the
principle of utility is "sympathy and antipathy." "By the
principle of sympathy and antipathy, I mean that principle
which approves or disapproves of certain actions, . . .
merely because a man finds himself disposed to approve or
disapprove of them."18 With the principle of sympathy and
antipathy a judge would pronounce a punishment upon a
criminal the severity of which would be in direct proportion
to how much the judge disliked the crime. "If you hate much
punish much: if you hate little punish little: punish as you
hate. If you hate not at all punish not at all."19
17Ibid., 6.
18Ibid., 7-8
18Ibid., 8.
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Bentham explains that the problem with this principle
of sympathy and antipathy is that there are so many different
reasons (many of which are conflicting) why a person would
hate a certain act. One might claim to have a "moral sense"
that tells him what is wrong. Another might make the same
claim using "common sense." Another might use "rational
understanding." Still another might use an "eternal and
immutable Rule of Right."20
Many people also refer to the "Law of Nature" with
such phrases as "Right Reason," "Natural Justice," "Natural
Equity," or "Good Order."21 Yet, anyone can call anything
they dislike "unnatural." Since they find a certain act
repugnant, they believe it is against nature, consequently no
one else should practice it.22 "The mischief common to all
these ways of thinking and arguing . . . is their serving as
a cloke, and pretense, . . . to despotism . . • "23 These
arguments are used by people who simply want to get their own
way.
20Ibid., 8 fn.1 -4.
21Ibid., 9 fn.7.
22Ibid., 9 fn.9.
23Ibid. "The principle of sympathy and antipathy is
most apt to err on the side of severity." Bentham, 10.
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For Bentham it is no different with the use of a
theological principle. By a theological principle Bentham
means a "principle which professes to recur for the standard
of right and wrong to the will of God."24 Yet, the will of
God cannot be determined by Scripture, according to Bentham.
For Scripture does not help us to organize our political
administration,
and even before it can be applied to the details of
private conduct, it is universally allowed, by the most
eminent divines of all persuasions, to stand in need of
pretty ample interpretations; else to what use are the
works of those divines?25
According to Bentham, when the theological principle
uses the "will of God" for an argument it cannot be referring
to God's revealed will in the Scriptures, which can be interpreted in so many diverse ways; it is rather referring to a
presumptive will, "that is to say, that which is presumed to
be his will on account of the conformity of its dictates to
those of some other principle."26 This "other principle,"
then, is surely to be one of the previous three principles
mentioned above (that is, asceticism, sympathy and antipathy,
241bid.,

10.

25Ibid., 11.
26Ibid.
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or the law of nature).
According to Bentham, God's will cannot establish what
is right and wrong even though the right is in conformity
with God's will. One must first determine what is right (by
means of the principle of utility); only then does one know
God's will.27
The act teleological thrust of Bentham's utilitarianism is clearly evident not only in his insistence to determine all moral decisions in view of their consequences, but
also in his complete rejection of any deontological concept
of duty. Thus, he concludes his second chapter by writing,
"The only right ground of action that can possibly subsist
is, after all the consideration of utility . . . . The
principle of utility neither requires nor admits of any other
regulator than itself."28
Bentham admitted that it is often important to repress
some desires; however, this is only done in order to gratify
those desires that are more important. The more important
desires are determined by the amount of pleasure caused and
pain avoided when the desires are fulfilled, and also by the

27Ibid.
281bid.
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number of people who benefit from the fulfillment of a
certain desire. Bentham developed an elaborate system
cataloging the various pains and pleasures. For the main
emphasis, in the principle of utility, is to choose the
action that leads to the greatest happiness for the greatest
number of people.
In order to determine which action would produce the
greatest good for the greatest number Bentham developed a
complex method of hedonic calculus. In chapter four of the
Principles of Morals and Legislation Bentham explains the
seven different categories with which the moral agent can
measure the quality of both pain and pleasure. They are:
1.intensity 2.duration 3.certainty or uncertainty
4.propinquity or remoteness 5.fecundity (that is, the likelihood that more of the same will follow) 6.purity (that is,
the likelihood that it will not be followed by the opposite
sensation) 7.extent (that is, the number of persons
affected).29
For a crude example suppose a Benthamite is trying to
decide how to spend his recreational time on a particular
afternoon. On the one hand, he may take his little boy
fishing. The adult Benthamite despises this particular sport
29Ibid., 16.
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and estimates that the boredom he experiences spending such
an afternoon at the lake is equivalent to 4 units of pain (or
-4 units of pleasure). However, his son greatly enjoys
fishing with his father at the lake. For the son such an
afternoon would create at least 9 units of pleasure. Thus
when the 4 units of pain are subtracted from the 9 units of
pleasure, the Benthamite discovers that an afternoon of
fishing with his son would create a total balance of 5 units
of pleasure.
On the other hand, the Benthamite may spend the afternoon alone watching television. Such an afternoon, while
relaxing, still would not thrill the Benthamite as much as
fishing would thrill his son. Yet 4 units of pleasure could
be expected. However, his son would be greatly disappointed.
Such a disappointment could produce 9 units of pain (or -9
units of pleasure). Thus when the 9 units of pain are
subtracted from the 4 units of pleasure, the Benthamite
discovers that an afternoon alone watching television would
create a total balance of -5 units of pleasure (or 5 units of
pain).
Thus the choice is between fishing that produces 5
units of pleasure or watching television that produces 5
units of pain. Since the first option will produce more
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pleasure, it will be preferred as the moral option by the
Benthamite.30
In Bentham's method any use of rules is conspicuous by
its absence.31 Bentham's hedonic calculus precludes the use
of rules as a means by which the end is to be achieved. Karl
Britton writes,
Bentham is untiring and unsparing in his denunciation of
all codes or rules of morality. Their chief use, he
held, was to bind men in obedience to their masters,
whether lay or clerical/ some rules could perhaps be
interpreted as extremely vague and confused expressions
of the principle of utility; more often they expressed
nothing more than sentiments, superstitions, and interests of different groups. As moral principles they were
useless and inapplicable.32
Thus Bentham's form of utilitarianism, with his hedonic

30This fictitious example simplisticly illustrates the
principles which Bentham explicates in An Introduction to the
Principles of Morals and Legislation chapter 4 section 5.
Ibid., 16. For a more thorough analysis of Bentham's hedonic
calculus, and for a more complex example, the reader may wish
to see Everett, 47-57.
31"There is a sense in which the act utilitarian
advises us to follow a rule, but this rule ('Do all and only
those actions which lead to the greatest good for the
greatest number') is not one which is justified by appeal to
the principle of utility, for it is the principle of
utility." Richard Garner and Bernard Rosen, 70.
32Kar1 Britton, John Stuart Mill (New York: Dover
Publications, 1969), 59-60.
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calculus, serves as an excellent example of pure act teleology.
Modified Act Teleology
Modified act teleology is a middle category which lies
half way between the act teleologist (who have no use for
rules) and the rule teleologists (who insist on the use of
rules). Modified act teleologists accept a moderate use of
rules as summary rules, rules of thumb, or prima facie rules.
Often times the teleologists are only classified into
two extreme categories: the act teleologists and the rule
teleologists. When this is done the middle position of
modified act teleology is forced onto one side or the other.
For this reason the definition of act teleology is frequently
broadened to include those teleologists who accept a modified
use of rules.33 Other authors who classify the teleologists
into only two parts find it more convenient to broaden the
definition of rule teleology in order to incorporate the
middle category of modified act teleologists.34
33This type of arrangement may be noted in Beauchamp
and Childress, 25-32, Garner and Rosen, 55-82, J. J. C. Smart
"Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism."
34This type of arrangement may be noted in David
Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1965), 119. "In order to discuss the various types of
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This dissertation will follow the less common, yet
more discriminating threefold classification as it has been
developed by William Frankena. He specifically distinguishes
this middle category of modified act teleology (which he
illustrates with modified act utilitarianism) from both pure
act teleology and rule teleology. Modified act teleology
"would allow us to formulate rules as guides . . . . They
would be rules which say . . . it is always or generally for
the greatest good to act in a certain way in such a
situation."35
Although John Rawls favors the method of rule
teleology (which he calls the practice use of rules) he
offers a thorough summary of modified act teleology (which he
calls the summary use of rules) in his article "Two Concepts
of Rules."36 Rawls explains that the modified act teleologists use rules that are derived from the principle of
utility. "I have called this conception the summary view
because rules are pictured as summaries of past decisions
rule-utilitarianism . . . . I shall distinguish, . . .
between theoretical (or theory-dependent) rules and merely
cautionary rules (rules of thumb)."
35Frankena, "Love and Principle," 208.
36John Rawls, "Two Concepts of Rules," Philosophical
Quarterly 64 (January 1955): 3-32.
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arrived at by the direct application of the utilitarian
principle to particular cases."37
For the modified act teleologist consistent utilitarian decisions on a given problem must precede the formulation
of a rule.
The decisions made on particular cases are logically
prior to rules . . . . We are pictured as recognizing
particular cases prior to there being a rule which
covers them, for it is only if we meet with a number of
cases of a certain sort that we can formulate a rule.38
Such rules are not absolutely necessary in order to
achieve the desired moral end. They are merely helpful
guides or rules of thumb (prima facie rules or summary rules)
which may be ignored if the moral agent would determine to
resort to act teleology and apply the principle of utility
directly to the specific act in question.
The moral agent who is a modified act teleologist
would ignore a rule if he determined that the prior decisions
which form the basis of the rule were incorrect.
Each person is in principle always entitled to reconsider the correctness of a rule and to question whether
or not it is proper to follow it in a given case. As
rules are guides and aids, one may ask whether in past
decisions there might not have been a mistake in apply37Ibid., 19.
381bid., 22.
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ing the utilitarian principle to get the rule in question.39
One of the most prominent proponents of modified act
teleology was Henery Sidgwick, The Methods of Ethics (1874)
who maintained that the rules used by the utilitarians can be
perceived through intuition, as is the general principle of
utilitarianism itself. Another very prominent proponent of
modified act teleology is J. J. C. Smart, "An Outline of a
System of Utilitarian Ethics," (1973), whose main purpose is
"to present Sidgwick in a modern dress."40 For the purpose
of illustrating modified act teleology various portions of
Smart's work will be examined.
Smart states his version of the teleological formula
when he writes, "The only reason for performing an action A
rather than an alternative action B is that doing A will make
mankind (or, perhaps all sentient beings) happier than will
doing B."41
39Ibid., 23.
40J. J. C. Smart, "An Outline of a System of
Utilitarian Ethics," chap. in Utilitarianism For and Against
(Cambridge: University Press, 1973), 7. Smart's method of
updating Sidgwick is basically to replace Sidgwick's
cognitivist intuition with a more modern non-cognitivist
intuition.
411bid., 30.
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Smart admits that one of the main problems with
utilitarianism is the impossibility to accurately foreknow
all the consequences of one's actions. He asks his readers,
"Can we just say: 'Envisage two total situations and tell me
which you prefer'v,42 Such a simplistic question does not do
justice to the complexities that can arise from a moral
action. Smart writes, "We cannot say with certainty what
would be the various total situations which could result from
our actions. Worse still, we cannot even assign rough
probabilities to the total situations as a whole."43
This does not mean that the method of utilitarianism
is to be discarded. Even though at the present we cannot
assign probabilities to future situations such a method must
be worked out in the future. "We need a method of assigning
numbers to objective, not subjective probabilities . . . . I
do not know how to do this . . . [but] the situation may not
be hopeless."44
What provides hope for Smart is the fact that there do
appear to be some times when such rough probabilities can be

42Ibid., 35.
431bid., 38.
441bid., 41.
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made. Smart gives the example of a family who is planning to
move. Such a family may weigh the advantages and disadvantages in living in each location. In that way they are
assigning rough probabilities to future events.
As we are able to take account of probabilities in our
ordinary prudential decisions it seems idle to say that
in the field of ethics . . . we cannot do the same
thing, but must rely on some dogmatic morality, in short
on some set of rules or rigid criteria.45
For Smart the rational utilitarian will want to
determine the moral option based on that which has the
highest probability to maximize happiness. Such a rational
utilitarian may still wish to use rules for two different
reasons. In the first place the rational utilitarian may not
have the time to consider the future ramifications of a
particular act. A rule can serve as a convenient shorthand
method to help make a quick decision.
We may choose to habituate ourselves to behave in accordance with certain rules, such as to keep promises, in
the belief that behaving in accordance with these rules
is generally optimific, and in the knowledge that we
most often just do not have time to work out individual
pros and cons . . . . The [modified] act utilitarian
will, however, regard these rules as mere rules of
thumb, and will use them only as rough guides. Normally
he will act in accordance with them when he has no time

45Ibid., 40.
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for considering probable consequences.46
The second reason why the rational utilitarian would
want to use rules is to avoid the possibility of being
influenced by personal bias. "He may suspect that on some
occasions personal bias may prevent him from reasoning in a
correct utilitarian fashion."47 During such an occasion the
moral agent could depend upon the rule in an attempt to avoid
making a prejudicial decision.
For the modified act teleologist one is justified in
breaking any such rule of thumb if it was determined that
breaking the rule was necessary in order to achieve more
good.
If the goodness of the consequences to breaking a rule
is in toto [that is, short term and long term] greater
than the goodness of the consequences of keeping it,
then we must break the rule, irrespective of whether the
goodness of the consequences of everybody's obeying the
46Ibid., 42. Smart continues by adding, "There is no
inconsistency whatever in . . . [a modified] actutilitarian's schooling himself to act, in normal
circumstances, habitually and in accordance with stereotyped
rules . . . . He knows that we would go mad if we went in
detail into the probable consequences of keeping or not
keeping every trivial promise: we will do most good and
reserve our mental energies for more important matters if we
simply habituate ourselves to keep promises in all normal
situations." Ibid., 43.
47Ibid., 43.
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rule is or is not greater than the consequences of
everybody's breaking it. To put it shortly, rules do
not matter, save per accidens as rules of thumb and as
de facto social institutions with which the utilitarian
has to reckon when estimating consequences.48
Smart's use of rules aptly illustrates the modified
act teleological use of rules as guides, rules of thumb, or
as prima facie rules.
Rule Teleology
Unlike pure act teleology which has no use for rules,
and modified act teleology which uses rules only as rules of
thumb, rule teleology insists on determining the moral option
by using a set of rules. Using rule utilitarianism as an
example Frankena explains.
Pure rule-utilitarianism holds that one is to tell what
is one's right or duty in a particular situation by
appeal to some set of rules like, "Keep promises," "Tell
the Truth," etc., and not by appeal to the principle of
utility. In this respect it is like extreme deontological theories. But, as against all deontological theories, it holds that we are to determine what rules
should govern our lives by an appeal to the principle of
utility, i.e. by looking to see what rules are such that
always acting on them is for the greatest general good.
That is, we are never to ask what act will have the best
consequences in a particular situation, but either what
the rules call for or what rule it is most useful always
to follow in that kind of a situation."49
48Smart, "Extreme and Restricted Utilitarianism," 100.
49Frankena, "Love and Principle," 207-8. Frankena
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Richard Brandt notes,
"Rule-utilitarianism," in contrast [to act utilitarianism] applies to views according to which the rightness
of an act is not fixed by its relative utility, but by
conformity with general rules or principles; the utilitarian feature of these theories consists in the fact
that the correctness of these rules or principles is
fixed in some way by the utility of their general acceptance.[emphasis mine]"
John Klotz explains,
Under a rule utilitarianism individual actions stem from
moral rules which in turn have been derived from utilitarian principles . . . . The rule utilitarian asks
first "What good or evil consequences will result from
this sort of action in general under these sorts of
circumstances . . . . Rules utilitarians believe that
rules themselves have a central position in the making
of moral judgments and cannot be disregarded because of
the exigencies of a particular situation.51
There are various types of rule teleology. Each type
is determined by "how it conceives of the rules that are so
goes so far as to add, "It may even be obligatory to follow
the rule in a particular situation even if following it is
known not to have the best possible consequences in this
particular case." Ibid. Paul Ramsey disagrees that this
last comment should be an essential part of the definition of
rule teleology, see Paul Ramsey, Deeds and Rules in Christian
Ethics (New York: Scribner, 1967), 111.
50Richard Brandt, "Toward a Credible Form of
Utilitarianism," chap. in Morality and the Language of
Conduct (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963), 109.
51Klotz, 12-13.
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important to its scheme."52
The first type of rule teleology is actual rule
utilitarianism (ARU).
It [actual rule utilitarianism] holds that an action is
right if it conforms to the accepted or prevailing moral
rules and wrong if it does not, assuming that these
rules are those whose acceptance and observance is
conducive to the greatest general good.53
A second type of rule teleology is primitive rule
utilitarianism (PRU). For primitive rule utilitarianism "an
act is right if and only if, it conforms to a set of rules
conformity to which in the case in question would maximize
utility."54
A third type of rule teleology is ideal rule utilitarianism (IRU). David Lyons writes that in ideal rule utilitarianism, "An act is right if, and only if, it conforms to a
set of rules general acceptance of which would maximize
utility [emphasis mine]."55 In this case the rules are
important because of the utilitarian effect of their general
52Frankena, Ethics 2nd edition (Englewood Cliff, NJ:
Prentice-Hall, Inc, 1973), 40.
53Ibid.
54David Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 139.
55Ibid., 140. (See also Frankena, Ethics, 40.)
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acceptance.
A fourth type of rule teleology is specious rule
utilitarianism (SRU). In specious rule utilitarianism "an
act is right if, and only if, it conforms to a set of rules
general conformity to which would maximize utility."56 In

this case the rules are important because of the utilitarian
effect that is generally produced when the moral agent
conforms to them. This type of conformity in SRU is more
than the mere acceptance in IRU. IRU emphasizes the
utilitarian effect of merely accepting a particular rule
(that is, in believing that a rule is good); whereas SRU
emphasizes the utilitarian effect of generally acting on a
rule and obeying it.57
Actual rule utilitarianism (ARU) and primitive rule
utilitarianism (PRU) are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Elements of both can be found in the following two examples
of John Austin and John Mill.
It will also be shown with these two examples how the
necessary rules in rule teleology offer an opening through
which the rules of rule deontology can be used along with the

56Ibid., 137. (See also Frankena, Ethics, 40.)
57See also David Lyons, 115-23.
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principle of utility. Both Mill and Austin maintain that one
may be a utilitarian and still believe that moral laws are
given by God. In this way it will be shown that the two
methods of moral reasoning, deontology and teleology, need
not be kept separate, nor when they are brought together do
they necessarily create confusion. Rather, they can be
united into one comprehensive system within which each method
has a well defined, predetermined, and distinctive function.
The first example is from John Stuart Mill.58
In his book Utilitarianism (1861) Mill completely
accepts Bentham's definition of utility and uses it as the
foundation for his own method of moral reasoning.
"Utility" or "the greatest happiness principle" holds
that actions are right in proportion as they tend to
promote happiness; wrong as they tend to produce the
58John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) was born in London. He
was privately educated by his father, James Mill, until 1826.
"His father began teaching him Greek at an age when most
children are still learning to lisp their native tongue. At
eight, Latin and arithmetic were begun; logic at twelve, and
political economy at thirteen . . . . Until his fourteenth
year John Mill was kept from all contact with the outside
world, except for his father's own friends." Karl Britton,
John Stuart Mill (New York: Dover Publications, 1969), 11-12.
For more information on the life of John Stuart Mill the
reader may wish to see Michael St. John Packe, The Life of
John Stuart Mill (New York: Capricorn Books, 1954) or John
Stuart Mill, Autobiography (London: Oxford University Press,
1952).
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reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure
and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the
privation of pleasure.59
Mill maintains that the ideal goal of utilitarianism
is summarized by Jesus in the golden rule.
In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the
complete spirit of the ethics of utility. "To do as you
would be done by," and "to love your neighbor as
yourself," constitutes the ideal perfection of
utilitarian morality. 60
For Mill the goal expressed in utilitarianism is the same
goal Jesus teaches in the golden rule.
Mill further emphasizes that a utilitarian may hold
that God has also revealed rules or specific moral absolutes
which also lend themselves to explaining the principle of
utility.
A utilitarian who believes in the perfect goodness and
wisdom of God necessarily believes that whatever God has
thought fit to reveal on the subject of morals [rules,
specific moral absolutes, etc.] must fulfill the
requirements of utility in a supreme degree . . . . He
can use it [that is, divine revelation] as the testimony
of God to the usefulness or hurtfulness of any given
course of action.61
59John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, IN:
The Bobbs Merrill Co., Inc., 1975), 10.
60Ibid., 22.
61Ibid., 28.
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Although Mill mentions this as a possibility, he does
not put much stock in it himself.62 Yet he mentions it here
to show that such a belief would not necessarily be contrary
to utilitarianism.
Mill explains that the principle of utility is only
the first principle in ethics; whereas, the moral rules of
common sense that embody the wisdom of the ages are the
secondary principles of morality. These secondary principles, not only summarize past wisdom gained from moral
reflection and experience, but they also serve as the necessary means by which the first principle of utility is
achieved. Mill writes,
Again, defenders of utility often find themselves called
upon to reply to such objections as this — that there is
not time, previous to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct on the general
happiness [this is no doubt a reference to the frequent
criticism directed toward Bentham's complex hedonic
calculus] . . . People talk as if commencement of this
course of experience had hitherto been put off, and as
if, at the moment when some man feels tempted to meddle
with the property or life of another he had to begin
considering for the first time whether murder or theft
are injurious to human happiness . . . mankind must by
62He continues by writing that, "Christian revelation
was intended . . . to inform the hearts and minds of mankind
with a spirit which should enable them to find for themselves
what is right . . . . Rather than to tell them, except in a
very general way, what it is." Ibid.
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this time have acquired positive beliefs as to the
effect of some actions on their happiness; and the
beliefs which have thus come down are the rules of
morality for the multitude, and for the philosopher
until he has succeeded in finding better . . . . It is a
strange notion that the acknowledgment of a first principle is inconsistent with the admission of secondary
ones. To inform a traveler respecting the place of his
ultimate destination [that is, the primary principle of
utility] is not to forbid the use of landmarks and
direction-posts on the way [that is, the secondary
principle of specific moral rules]. The proposition
that happiness is the end and aim of morality does not
mean that no road ought to be laid down to that goal.63
For Mill, these secondary rules are more than mere
prima facie rules. Even though the content of such rules may
be subject to change and revision, such rules are still
necessary as the means by which the end is achieved. Such
secondary rules are not only "landmarks and direction-posts"
but they are the very "road" itself.64 Even when a new
"road" is paved and moral rules are revised or improved, the
same principle remains at work. The secondary rules are the
necessary means by which the primary goal is achieved.
Mill claims that this is not peculiar to the relationship between rules and utility. Any moral philosophy that
rests on a fundamental principle will require secondary prin63John Mill, 30-31.

641bid.
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ciples.
Whatever we adopt as the fundamental principle of morality, we require subordinate principles to apply it by;
the impossibility of doing without them, being common to
all systems, can afford no argument against any one in
particular; but gravely to argue as if no such secondary
principles could be had . . . is as high a pitch, I
think, as absurdity has ever reached in philosophical
controversy.65
For Mill the rules that comprise the secondary principles are so important that most of the time they alone would
be used in determining the moral option. The primary principle of utility is far too abstract to be directly applied in
a practical way in most situations. The main use of the
primary principle of utility is to serve as a judge to
arbitrate in the conflict of a moral dilemma, that is, when
two secondary rules conflict with one another. Mill
explains,
If utility is the ultimate source of moral obligations,
utility may be invoked to decide between them when their
demands are incompatible. Though the application of the
standard may be difficult, it is better than none at
all; while in other systems, the moral laws all claiming
independent authority, there is no common umpire entitled to interfere between them; their claims to precedence one over another rest on little better than
sophistry . . . . We must remember that only in these
cases of conflict between secondary principles is it
requisite that first principles should be appealed to
65Ibid., 32.
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[emphasis mine]. There is no case of moral obligation
in which some secondary principle is not involved; and
if only one, there can seldom be any real doubt which
one it is, in the mind of any person by whom the principle itself is recognized."
It has been shown that for Mill rules are more than
mere guidelines or rules of thumb used for convenience and
discarded at will. Rules are the necessary means by which
the goal of utility is accomplished. The only time the moral
agent applies the primary principle of utility directly is in
the rare occasions when two secondary rules conflict. For
Mill there is never a time when at least one secondary rule
is not involved.67 In this way John Mill shows himself to be
a rule utilitarian who illustrates the moral method of rule
teleology. 68
A

second rule utilitarian who illustrates the use of

rule teleology is John Austin." He provides a unique
"Ibid., 33.
67Ibid.
68For more information concerning John Mill as a rule
utilitarian see J. 0. Urmson, "The Interpretation of the
Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill," The Philosophical Quarterly
3(1953): 33-39.
"John Austin (1790-1859) was born in London. Austin
became a member of the bar in 1818. For more biographical
information on John Austin the reader may wish to see Wilfrid
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element to the method of rule teleology with his strong
emphasis on divine law. Wilfrid E. Rumble writes,
One of the most notable elements of Austin's utilitarianism is the conspicuous role of Divine Law . . . .
Austin's use of Divine law also clearly differentiates
his ethical theories from either Bentham's or J. S.
Mill's. In their interpretations the principle of utility is logically, and explicitly, independent of the law
of God. The relationship between the two concepts is
quite different if the words of John Austin are taken at
their face value.
Divine law is the stated foundation of his ethical
system.70
With his use of divine law John Austin shows that the
deontological emphasis of Scripture need not conflict with
teleology; rather, they both fit together to form a complete
method of moral analysis. John Austin does not confuse or
mix together deontology with teleology, but he works each one
in conjunction with the other, giving each one a specific
role.
Austin begins his discussion by distinguishing between
two different kinds of divine law. The revealed laws of God
are those laws which are specific commands that God has given
to mankind through the use of language. These laws revealed
E. Rumble, The Thought of John Austin (London: The Athlone
Press, 1985), 1-59.
70Ibid., 65.

91
in language either come directly from God himself or from
servants whom he has chosen. Austin writes,
With regard to the laws which God is pleased to
reveal . . . . They are express commands: portions of
the word of God: commands signified to men through the
medium of human language; and uttered by God directly,
or by servants whom he sends to announce them.71
The second category of divine law is the unrevealed
law. These are the laws which are not revealed in human
language but are available to mankind through nature. These
commonly have been referred to as natural law.
Such of the laws of God as are unrevealed are not unfrequently denoted by the following names or phrases: "the
law of nature;" "natural law;" "the law manifested to
man by the light of nature or reason;" "the laws,
precepts, or dictates of natural religion."72
Austin continues by explaining that unrevealed laws
are important because they fill up the gap left by the
revealed law.
These laws [that is, unrevealed laws of nature] are
binding upon us (who have access to the truths of
Revelation), in so far as the revealed law has left our
duties undetermined. For, though his express declarations are the clearest evidence of his will, we must
look for many of the duties, which God has imposed upon
71John Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 2 vols
(London: John Murray, 1885), 1: 104.

72Ibid.
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us, to the marks or signs of his pleasure, which are
styled the light of nature . . . . It was not the
purpose of Revelation to disclose the whole of those
duties. Some we could not know, without the help of
Revelation; and these the revealed law has stated
distinctly and precisely. The rest we may know, if we
will, by the light of nature or reason; and these the
revealed law supposes or assumes. It passes them over
in silence, or with a brief and incidental notice.73
Some people, like Joseph Butler, believe they have
access to this unrevealed revelation through their own innate
common sense or conscience. According to Austin these people
are deluding themselves. If man had a conscience that
contained some sort of "innate practical principles" of the
unrevealed law there would be no uncertainty about how one
should act. Yet it is known from experience that there are
times when the moral agent is confused. An unwed, pregnant
teenager may be confused as to whether or not she should have
an abortion. The physician and relatives of an elderly
terminally ill patient may be confused as to whether or not
they should initiate extraordinary means of treatment in
order to prolong the patient's life. Such confusion illustrates the lack of any natural moral conscience that could
determine the moral option by way of direct access to the
principles of unrevealed law.74 Concerning those who believe
731bid.

74WIlfrid E. Rumble, The Thought of John Austin, 66.
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they have a natural moral conscience Austin writes, "Their
assumption is groundless. They are battering . . . a
misconception of their own whilst they fancy they are hard at
work demolishing the theory which they hate."75
Austin believes there is only one way that man has
access to the unrevealed laws of God in nature. That is
through the principle of utility. "The benevolence of God,
with the principle of general utility, is our only index or
guide to his unrevealed law."76
Austin explains his view of the principle of utility
and how it may be used to determine the unrevealed laws of
God.
God designs the happiness of all his sentient creatures.
Some human actions forward that benevolent purpose, or
their tendencies are beneficent or useful. Other
actions are adverse to that purpose, or their tendencies
are mischievous or pernicious. The former, as promoting his purpose, God has enjoined. The latter, as
opposed to his purpose, God has forbidden. He has given
us the faculty of observing; of remembering; of reasoning; and, by duly applying those faculties, we may
collect the tendencies of our actions. Knowing the
tendencies of our actions, and knowing his benevolent
purpose, we know his tacit commands.77
75John Austin, 1: 113.
76Ibid., 1: 106.
77Ibid.
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These "tacit commands" of God's unrevealed law are not
directed to specific isolated cases. These "tacit commands"
are general rules that are to be consistently obeyed in every
applicable situation. Referring to these tacit commands of
God's unrevealed law Austin writes:
Most of his commands are general
useful acts which he enjoins, and
which he prohibits, he enjoins or
commands which are particular, or
cases; but by laws or rules which
commonly inflexible.78

or universal. The
the pernicious acts
prohibits . . . not by
directed to insulated
are general, and

In this way, for Austin, rules are necessary for the
determination of the moral option. Some rules are revealed
directly, other rules are made known indirectly by the
principle of utility, but in either case they are not just
mere rules of thumb, or helpful summary rules, or prima facie
rules. All of the moral rules, revealed and unrevealed,
serve a utilitarian purpose. "The greatest possible happiness of all his sentient creatures is the purpose . . . of
those laws."79 For this reason they are the necessary means
by which the moral option is determined. In this way John
Austin clearly illustrates the method of rule teleology. 80
78Ibid., 1: 108-109.
79Ibid., 1: 110.
80In one place (1:118-122) Austin does mention that
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For Austin these tacit rules made known to the moral
agent by means of the principle of utility work together with
the revealed rules. In a situation where one of God's
revealed laws directly applies the moral agent has a duty to
obey God's revealed law. However, if the moral agent
encounters a situation in which no revealed moral law of God
can be directly applied, then the (teleological) principle of
utility must be used to determine God's unrevealed law (that
is, the general happiness or good for that kind of
situation).
John Austin summarizes this method with these words,
In so far as the laws of God are clearly and indisputably revealed, we are bound to guide our conduct by
the plain meaning of the terms [the deontological
element]. In so far as they are not revealed, we must
resort to another guide: namely, the probable effect of
our conduct on that general happiness or good [the
teleological element] which is the object of the Divine
Lawgiver in all his laws and commandments [that is
there may be extremely rare cases in which the moral agent
may find it necessary to break a moral rule and apply the
principle of utility directly to a specific situation if,
"the evil of observing the rule might surpass the evil of
breaking it" (John Austin, 1:118). However, he strongly
maintains that such cases are exceptions to the usual method
and are extremely rare. He also adds that, "In this
eccentric or anomalous case, the application of the principle
of utility would probably be beset with . . . difficulties
[and] . . . might well perplex and divide the wise, and the
good, and the brave." Ibid., 1:119.

96
revealed and unrevealed] .81
For Austin, God is the source of the laws be they
tacit or revealed. None of these laws are concoctions
invented by man. The unrevealed laws of God do not have
their source in the principle of utility. They have their
source in God (just as the revealed laws do). However, they
are made known to man through the principle of utility.
In each of these cases [that is revealed and unrevealed
rules] the source of our duties is the same; though the
proofs by which we know them are different. The principle of general utility is the index [that is, the means
by which they are known] to many of these duties; but
the principle of general utility is not their fountain
or source. For duties or obligations arise from
commands and sanctions. And commands, it is manifest,
proceed not from abstractions, but from living and
rational beings [emphasis his] .82
For both Austin and Mill rules are more than mere
helpful rules of thumb which explain prima facie duties.
Rules are a necessary and essential part of utilitarianism.
In this way they have shown themselves to favor a rule teleological method of moral reasoning.
Their insistence on the importance of rules illustrate
that rule deontology and rule teleology can be brought
81Ibid., 1:110.
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together to form one comprehensive system of moral analysis.
For Austin and Mill, the rules that are used in rule teleology need not be derived from the principle of utility as a
pure form of rule utilitarianism would insist. However, Mill
allows and Austin insists that the rules used in rule utilitarianism may have their source in God. In this way their
method of rule teleology is a combination of Actual Rule
Utilitarianism and Primitive Rule Utilitarianism. Their rule
teleology is then joined together with rule deontology into
one coherent hybrid system. In such a comprehensive system
each method, deontology and teleology, has its own unique
function and serves in its own peculiar way.
John Austin has shown that such a comprehensive system
may include the following four points:
1.All absolute moral rules are from God (rule deontology).
2.Their purpose is for the greatest good of all his
sentient creatures (rule teleology).
3."In so far as the laws of God are clearly and indisputably revealed, we are bound to guide our conduct
by the plain meaning of the terms [rule
deontology]."83
4."In so far as they are not revealed, we must resort
another guide: namely, the probable effect of our
conduct on that general happiness or good which is
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the object of the Divine Lawgiver in all his laws and
commandments [rule teleology]. n84
John Stuart Mill has shown that such a comprehensive
system may include the following two points.
1.Individual rules serve as the necessary means, or
road the moral agent must travel, in order to achieve
the goal of accomplishing the greatest good (rule
teleology).
2.The goal of utility (that is the greatest good for
the greatest number) can serve as the arbitrator when
two duties of rule deontology conflict with one
another and create a moral dilemma (rule teleology).
In these six points above Mill and Austin not only
demonstrate the necessary function of rules in rule teleology
(a function which sets rule teleology apart from pure act
teleology and modified act teleology) but they also show that
rule deontology and rule teleology can be brought together
and incorporated into one comprehensive system of ethical
analysis with each method performing its own special
function.
Characteristics of Rule Teleology
in the Holy Scriptures
It is the main purpose of this section of the dissertation to examine various elements of rule teleology in the
Holy Scriptures. However, characteristics of rule teleology
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from several theologians such as Luther, Chemnitz and Gerhard
will also be briefly noted, in order to show their teaching
to be consistent with Scripture. It will be shown that
Scripture combines its rule teleology with rule deontology in
a hybrid method analogous to certain elements previously
noted in John Austin and John Mill.
In the act teleology of Jeremy Bentham the teleological element is the principle of utility (that is, the greatest happiness for the greatest number). Likewise, a similar
emphasis on utility as the teleological element in moral
reasoning was also emphasized in the modified act teleology
of J. J. C. Smart, as well as in the rule teleology of John
Mill and John Austin.
However, as far as ethics is concerned, the teleological element in the Scriptures is love (or what some call
'agapism'). William Frankena writes, "Agapism is the view
which assigns to the 'law of love' the same position that
utilitarianism assigns to the principle of utility."85 Just
as the principle of utility is the final "guiding goal" or
85William Frankena, "Love and Principle in Christian
Ethics," 208. This comparison between utilitarianism and
agapism is mentioned at this point only to emphasize their
formal (that is, their structural or methodological) similarity. It is not intended to insinuate any similarity with
regard to content.
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"directive principle" for utilitarianism, so the principle of
love (or agapism) is the "guiding goal or directive
principle" for theological ethics."
Paul Ramsey asks,
But what of "salvation"? Is not "salvation" the end for
which Christians quest? What of rewards in the kingdom
of heaven? What of man's everlasting and supernatural
good, the souls life with God in the hereafter; man's
"chief end," glorifying God and enjoying him forever?
Is not "salvation" itself a supreme value which
Christians seek with earnest passion, each first of all
for himself?87
To answer his own rhetorical question Ramsey quotes
from Luther's Bondage of the Will. "Nay, if they should work
good in order to obtain the Kingdom, they would never obtain
it, but would be numbered rather with the wicked, who, with
an evil and mercenary eye, seek the things of self even in
God."88 Thus Ramsey concludes,

86Frankena continues explaining agapism by writing
that agapism "allows no basic ethical principles other than
or independent of the 'law of love.' It can take any of
three main forms: pure act-agapism, modified act agapism, and
pure rule agapism." Ibid., 208.
87Paul Ramsey, Basic Christian Ethics (New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1950), 133.
88Martin Luther, Bondage of the Will, trans. H. Cole
(London:Atherton, 1931), 192 quoted in Paul Ramsey, Basic
Christian Ethics, 134. L. W. 33:152. W. A. 18:694.

101
'Salvation' cannot be the goal or aim of Christian
endeavor, the highest good among all goods upon which
the Christian draws his sights, . . . for faith is
effective in love which seeks only the neighbor's good
(emphasis his).89
Without using the specific term (love) Luther
illustrates the use of love as the guiding principle of the
Christian life in his 1520 treatise "The Freedom of a
Christian." He writes,
Therefore he [the Christian] should be guided in all his
works by this thought and contemplate this one thing
alone, that he may serve and benefit others in all that
he does, considering nothing except the need and the
advantage of his neighbor."
The entire purpose for the Christian's life here on
this earth is to help those in need. Luther explains,
We have no other reason for living on earth than to be
of help to others. If this were not the case, it would
be best for God to kill us and let us die as soon as we
are baptized and have begun to believe.91
89Ramsey, 135-36.
"Martin Luther, L. W. 31:365. "Ideo in omnibus
operibus suis ea debet opinione esse formatus et huc solum
spectare, ut aliis serviat et prosit in omnibus quaecunque
fecerit, nihil ante oculos habens nisi necessitatem et
comoditatem proximi." Tractatus de Libertate Christiana,
1520. W. A. 7:64.
91L. W. 30:11 "Das wyr auff erden leben, das
geschicht nyrgent umb, denn das wyr ander leutten auch
helffen sollen. Sonst were es das best, das uns Gott so bald
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Luther compares the ethical life of a Christian to a
channel or a tube whose end or purpose is merely to pass
along that which has been poured into it. In his church
postil based on Titus 3:4-7, Luther writes:
A man is placed between God and his neighbor as a medium
(mittell) which receives from above and gives out again
below, and is like a vessel or tube (gefess oder rhor)
through which the stream of divine blessings must flow
without intermission to other people.92
With the analogy of the tube Luther explains that it
is the purpose or goal of Christian morality merely to pass
along to others the love that one has previously received
from God. Anders Nygren expounds further on Luther's view as
follows: To Luther,
divine love employs man as its instrument and organ.
wurgete und sterben liesse, wenn wyr getaufft weren und
hetten angefangen zu glewben." Epistel S. Petri gepredigt
und ausgelegt. Ersts Bearbeitung, 1523. W. A. 12:267. For
Luther, a good work is good only insofar as it benefits the
neighbor. See Appendix II: Luther on the Purpose of Good
Works.
92This English translation is provided by Phillip S.
Watson in, Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S.
Watson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 73435. "Der mensch Tzwischen Gott unnd seynem nehisten gesetzt
wirt alss eyn mittell, das da von oben empfehet und unten
widder aussgibt unnd gleych eyn gefess oder rhor wirt, durch
wilchs der brun gotlicher gutter on unterlass fliessen soil
ynn andere luett." Kirchenpostille 1522, Epistel in der Frue
Christmess. Tit. 3, 4-7. 10.1.1:100.
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The Christian is set between God and his neighbor. In
faith he receives God's love, in love he passes it on to
his neighbor. Christian love is, so to speak the extension of God's love . . . . The love which he can give is
only that which he has received from God. Christian
love is through and through a Divine work . . . . All
that a Christian possesses he has received from God,
from the Divine love; and all that he possesses he
passes on in love to his neighbor. He has nothing of
his own to give. He is merely the tube, the channel
through which God's love flows.93
In this way Luther is emphasizing that it is the goal,
purpose (or TiXfos.) of Christian morality to share God's love
with others. Luther especially emphasized this, when, in his
sermon on Luke 14:1-11 he explained that all of the individual moral commands (that is, what this dissertation has
labeled as deontological obligations) are established for the
sole purpose of serving the principle of love. That is, they
93Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, trans. Philip S.
Watson (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1982), 73435. Luther also stresses that in filling this function, as a
channel that passes along God's love to others, Christians
themselves become, in a sense, 'Christs' to one another. In
his 1520 treatise "The Freedom of a Christian," Luther
writes, "Hence, as our heavenly Father has in Christ freely
come to our aid, we also ought freely to help our neighbor
through our body and its works, and each one should become as
it were a Christ to the other that we may be Christs to one
another . . . . Surely we are named after Christ, not because
he is absent from us, but because he dwells in us, that is,
because we believe in him and are Christs one to another and
do to our neighbors as Christ does to us." L. W. 31:367-68.
(Wr. A. 7:66).
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help to guide and direct the Christian toward that goal of
love. Luther writes,
All laws, divine or human, bind us only as far as love
permits. For Christians, love must always make the
final decision in the interpretation of all laws . . .
It is even a principle of canon law that if any law
runs counter to love, it should be set aside as soon as
possible. This, in a word, is stated both of divine and
human commandments. The reason for this is that all
laws have been enacted for the sole purpose of setting
up the principle of love as Paul also reminds us in
Romans when he says . . . . "Love is the fulfillment of
the Law" (Romans 13:8,10) . . . .
Therefore, since all laws should help to establish
the principle of love, they must cease immediately that
they run counter to love.94
Here Luther illustrates that this teleological

94This English translation is taken from, Luther For
the Busy Man Edited and translated by P. D. Pahl. (Adelaide,
Australia: Lutheran Publishing House, 1974), 338. "Alle
Gesetze, gottliche und menschliche, nicht weiter binden, denn
die Liebe geht. Die Liebe soll sein eine Auslegung aller
Gesetze . . . . Wie denn in des Pabstes Buch auch steht: Wenn
ein Gesetz wider die Liebe laufen will, so soll es bald
aufhoren. Und das ist kurzum von glittlichen und menschlichen
Geboten gesagt. Ursache, denn alle Gesetze sind gegeben,
allein dass sie Liebe aufrichten sollen; wie Paulus Rom. 13,
8.10. sagt: 'Die Liebe ist des Gesetzes Erfullung' . . . .
Dass allein die Gesetze allzumal Liebe aufrichten, so mUssen
sie alsobald aufhoren, wenn sie wider die Liebe laufen
wollen." Martin Luther, "Am Siebenzehnten Sonntage nach
Trinitatis (Lk. 14: 1-11)" Luthers Sammtliche Schriften, St.
Louis Edition 23 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing
House, 1882), 11:1677-78. This sermon was preached on the
Seventeenth Sunday after Trinity 1522.
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principle of love is to be the final determining factor for
the Christian's moral decisions. Luther does not eliminate
the deontological emphasis on the individual commandments.
Rather he emphasizes that they are important, because their
sole purpose (ursache) is to set up or establish (aufrichten)
the way love behaves in specific situations. Any law, divine
or human, that does not serve this purpose or lead to this
goal is to be set aside as soon as possible (so soil es bald
aufhoren).
Luther stresses this same idea in his 1523 "Prefaces
to the Old Testament" where he writes,
Therefore faith and love are always to be mistress of
the law and to have all laws in their power. For since
all laws aim at faith and love, none of them can be
valid, or be a law if it conflicts with faith or
love . . . .
Christ also says in Matthew 12:13, that one might
break the sabbath if an ox had fallen into a
pit . . . How much more ought one boldly to break all
kinds of laws when bodily necessity demands it, provided
that nothing is done against faith and love. Christ
says that David did this very thing when he ate the holy
bread, Mark 3 [2:25-26].95
95L. W. 35:240-41. "Denn syntemal alle gesetz auff
den glauben and liebe treyben, sol keyns nicht mehr gelten
noch eyn gesetze seyn, wo es dem glauben odder der liebe will
zu widder geratten.
. . . Denn also sagt auch Christus Matth. 12. das man
den Sabbath brechen mocht, wo eyn ochs ynn eyn gruben
gefallen war . . . . Wie viel mehr sol man frisch allerley
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For Luther, love determines how, when, and which
divine laws are to be applied to a specific situation. In a
sermon based on Matthew 22 Luther wrote,
This commandment of
must be implemented
and mistress of all
selves according to

love pervades all law and all law
by love. Because love is the rule
law. All the laws must guide themlove.96

Again Luther writes,
When the law contradicts love, it ceases and must not be
a law any longer . . . . For this is why one uses the
law so that love can be shown. But wherever the keeping
of the law cannot be done without injury to one's
neighbor, then God would have us abolish the law and
take it away.97
gesetz brechen, wo es leybs nott foddert, so anders dem
glauben und der liebe nichts zu widder geschicht. Wie
Christus sagt, das David than hat, da er die heyligen brod
ass Marci. 3." W. A. (Deutsche Bibel) 8:18.
%This is my own translation from Luther's sermon for
September 30, 1526. "Dis gebot liebe ist gezogen durch alle
gesetz und alle gesetz mussen gehen durch die liebe. Denn
sie ist ein regel und meisterin aller gesetz; welche sich
alle mussen lencken nach der liebe." W.A. 20:510. This
sermon was preached on September 30, 1526.
97My translation of Luther's Summerpostille,
Evangelium am 18. Sonntag nach Trinitatis. Matth. 22, 3436. "Wenn das gesass wider die liebe tringet, so horet es
auff unnd soil kain gesass mer sein . . . Denn darumb
gebraucht man der gesasse, auff das die liebe an inen
beweiset were, wenn sie aber one verlessung des nechsten
nicht kiiden gehalten werden, so wil Got, man soil sie
auffheben und wegnemen." W. A. 10.1.2:403. In his
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Luther also found that St. Paul emphasizes this
teleological element of love when he writes, "The goal (Taos.)
of this command is love (dyciv)" (1 Timothy 1:5). In his
lectures on Timothy (1527-1528) Luther explains,
The aim of our charge looks to this goal [in order] that
you do not doubt, etc. This is the aim of all charges
and laws-of God as well as of man-in all the
world . . . . were a Carthusian monk to wear a hair
shirt for a hundred years, he would not realize his aim,
he would not know how to please God . . . . If a
Carthusian keeps his rule, he still is afraid it is not
enough, that is, it is not the be-all-and-end-all of
certainty, that the rule does not have an end, that the
rule does not mean what he is striving for and what he
stands in, and that the law thus does not come to an end
and make no further demands.
What is the "aim of our charge"? Love. This is
the full thunder clap against a human doctrine that
cannot reflect love from a pure heart, etc. Paul gives
a beautiful description: a faith from an unpretending
heart is the tree, or root. Its fruit is love.98
Churchpostil for the 4th Sunday after Epiphany, based on
Romans 13:8-10, Luther discussed, at length, the relationship
between love and the other numerous commands of the law. See
Appendix III: Luther on the Relationship Between Love and the
Law.
98Luther, L.w. 28:224-25. "Huc spectat 'finis
praecepti', ut non dubites u. Omnium praeceptorum et legum,
quae sunt in orbe terrarum quam dei quam hominis. . . .
Carthusianus si centum annos gestaret cilicium, non novit
finem, non scit deo placere. . . . Si vero Carthusianus
servat regulam, tamen timet, ne satis i.e. summa summarum et
certitudo, das ein end hat praeceptum and das das praeceptum
meint hoc, quod quaerit, in quo stat, finitur lex ita, quod

108
With this explanation, Luther is stressing that all of the
individual moral commands (that is, what this study has
labeled as the rule deontological duty of the Christian moral
agent) have love as their fruit, that is, goal, or purpose.
Martin Chemnitz viewed the teleological element of
this passage in a similar way. In his Loci Theologici
Chemnitz writes,
In order that by a sure and certain method we can set up
a list of the sins as well as the good works included
under each of the commandments, we must first determine
the definite and general goal for each of God's
precepts. Then we must consider of what things this
goal consists, and what things are joined with it and
appointed for it. Likewise [to be considered are] the
contraries, which are in conflict with this purpose or
impede it . . . . For Paul says of the entire Decalog in
I Tim. 1:5, "The purpose of the commandment is love
which comes from a pure heart and a good conscience and
a sincere faith." He adds, v.7 " . . . teachers of the
Law who do not draw their lectures from this purpose and
direct them to this end have turned aside and do not
understand either what they are talking about or what
they are affirming."99
non ultra exigit. Quid est? 'Charitas.' Das sind mol
tonitrua contra doctrinam humanam quae non potest praestare
charitatem de corde puro u. Paulus pulchre describit: fides
non simulata ex corde arbor vel radix est, fructus illius
charitas." W.A. 26:9-10.
99Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, trans. J. A. 0. Preus 3
vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1989), 2:359.
"Ut autem expedita + certa methodo institui possit catalogus,
quae turn peccata tum bona opera sub quolibet praecept compre-
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John Gerhard affirms that love is the Tehos- of the law
when he comments on this same passage.
It is particularly beneficial to consider the end and
goal of each [commandment], for from the end one can
easily pass judgment about the middle. The whole goal
of the Law "is love that issues from a pure heart and a
good conscience." I Tim. 1:5.100
Walter Bauer lists three ways in which Taos may be
used to mean end.101 The first definition is end in the
hendantur, constituendus est primo certus aliquis + generalis
finis, cuiusliber praecepti. Deinde consideretur in quibus
rebus finis iste consistat, quae cum illo sint coniuncta + ad
eum ordinata: Item contraria quae cum illo fine pugnant, vel
eum impediunt . . . . Paulus enim de toto Decalogo I Timoth.
1 v.5.6. +7, iniquit: finis praecepti est charitas, de corde
puro, + conscientia bona, + fide non ficta. Et addit,
Doctores Legis, qui non ex hoc fine deducunt suas
enarrationes, + eo dirigunt, non intelligere nec de quibus
loquantur, nec de quibus affirment." Martin Chemnitz, Loci
Theologici, 3 vols. Editi Nomine Haeredum, (Opera Et Studio
Polycarpi Lesieri: Francoforti ad Moenum excudebat Ioannes
Spies, 1591-1595), 2:306.
100John Gerhard, The Theological Commonplaces of John
Gerhard trans. Richard Dinda, 1971. Unpublished. Located in
the Concordia Seminary library St. Louis, MO. MFCH 81-1:
G12-102. "Ad veram cujusque praecepti sententiam
investigandam valde prodest finem ac mediis facile potest
fieri judicium. Totus legis finis est caritas de corde puro
et concsientia bona et fide non ficta. I Tim. 1, v. 7."
John Gerhard, Loci Theologici, Ed Preuss ed. 10 vols.
(Berolini: Sumtibus Gust. Schlawltz, 1863), 3:24.
101Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon, 2d ed.,
trans. William Arndt and F. Wilber Gingrich (Chicago: The
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sense of "termination" or "cessation." The second definition
is end in the sense of the "last part, close" or
"conclusion." The third definition is end in the sense of
"goal" or "outcome." Of these three ways of understanding
TAW this third definition as "goal" or "outcome" best

expresses the idea of TEXCG as it is used with respect to the
teleological method of moral reasoning. It was noted above
that the emphasis in teleological reasoning is on the goal or
outcome of one's moral action. It is under this third
definition of T6Wg as "goal" or "outcome" that Walter Bauer
has listed 1 Timothy 1:5 as an example. In this way Bauer is
also emphasizing that this passage uses the concept of love
in a teleological way.
Likewise St. Paul emphasizes that love is the moral
T6kog after which Christians should strive when he writes,
"Follow the way of love (AtoiKETE

. . ."

(1 Corinthians 14:1).
For the definition of 81.4Kw Walter Bauer lists four

University of Chicago Press, 1979), 811. This following
discussion concerning TEXIDS' is also in agreement with Walter
Bauer, Griechisch-deutsches WOrterbuch 6ed. edited by Kurt
Aland and Barbara Aland (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1988),
1617-18. This discussion excludes the use of TAOS as an
adverbial expression as well as the more rare usages such as
"rest," "remainder," "tax," or "custom duties."
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possibilities.102 The first definition listed is "hasten,
run, press on." The second definition listed is "persecute."
The third definition listed is "drive away, drive out." The
fourth definition listed is "run after, pursue, strive for,
seek after, aspire to."103 Of these four possible definitions of

&dia.)

this fourth definition "run after, pursue,

strive for, seek after, aspire to," best expresses the role
of the teleological element in moral reasoning. It has been
shown that in the teleological method of moral reasoning the
moral import of a particular act is determined by the goal
which is pursued. It is under this fourth definition of Swim')
that Bauer has listed 1 Corinthians 14:1 as an example. In
this way Bauer is pointing out that he understands this
passage to mean that love (that is, a life of love, the
expediting of love, or the flowing of God's love through us)
is to be the goal for which Christians are to "pursue,"
"strive," "seek" or "aspire."
Commenting on this passage Richard Lenski emphasizes
the same interpretation.
The translation is simple and perfect. After what has
102Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon, 201. The
following discussion of &am is also in agreement with Walter
Bauer, Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament 6 Auflage (1988), 404.
103Ibid.
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been said about the value of love [in 1 Corinthians 13]
only one admonition is in place: "Pursue
love!" . . . . In the classics we have &ASKEW with
objects such as "honors," "pleasures," "the good,"
etc. . . . Paul thus very properly bids the Christian
"pursue love . . . . We pursue love when we set our
hearts earnestly to practice love. n104
Lenski stresses the teleological aspect of love when,
in writing on Matthew 22:40 ("All the Law and the prophets
hang on these two commandments.") he states,
These two [commandments of love] are the nail from which
all else written in the Old Testament [including the
individual moral laws] hang suspended. Take away this
nail, and everything would fall in a heap. It would
lose its true meaning, significance, and purpose
(emphasis mine) !105
Martin Luther, Martin Chemnitz, John Gerhard, Richard Lenski,
and Walter Bauer all held that the New Testament teaches that
love is the TOog of every individual moral command.106
104Richard Lenski, Interpretation of I and II
Corinthians (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing house,
1937), 575.
105Richard Lenski, Interpretation of St. Matthew's
Gospel (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1943),
883.
106Thomas Aquinas also emphasized that love is the end
or purpose of the ten commandments when he wrote, "Omnia
praecept decalogi ordinantur ad dilectionem Dei et proximi.
Et ideo praecepta caritatis non fuerunt connumeranda inter
praecepta decalogi, sed in omnibus includuntur." Summa
Theologie Blackfriars edition (New York: McGraw-Hill Book
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The emphasis in this section, on love being the end of
the law, does not in any way detract from St. Paul's statement that "Christ is the end (Taw) of the law" (Romans
10:4). This statement of St. Paul's holds true in several
respects.'" In this section it is merely being shown that

Co., 1964), 2a 2ae 44:1.3. He also emphasizes this same idea
in 2a 2ae 110.4 (Blackfriars 41:164) Augustine mentions that
love is the purpose of all the commandments of God when he
writes, "Omnia igitur praecepta divina referuntur ad
charitatem, de qua dicit Apostolus: Finis autem praecepts est
charitas . . . [1 Tim. 1:5] Omnis itaque praecepti finis est
charitas; id est, ad charitatem refertur omne
praecptum . . . . Charitas quippe ista Dei est et proximi: et
utique in his duobus praeceptis tota Lex pendet et Prophetae
(Matth. xxii, 40)." Augustini, "Enchiridion ad Laurentium
sive De Fide, Spe et Charitate," J. P. Migne ed. Patrologiae:
Patrum Latinorum (Paris, 1887), 40:288.
107Christ is the end of the law in at least four
different ways: 1) He is the perfect fulfillment of the law.
"Do not think that I have come to abolish the Law or the
Prophets; I have not come to abolish them but to fulfill
them" (Matthew 5:17). 2) He is the goal to which the law
directs sinners. "So the law was put in charge to lead us to
Christ that we might be justified by faith" (Galatians 3:24).
3) He brings an end to the condemnation of the law.
"Therefore, there is now no condemnation for those who are in
Christ Jesus, because . . . Christ Jesus . . .set me free
from the law of sin and death. For what the law was
powerless to do . . . God did by sending his own Son" (Romans
8:1-3). 4) He abrogated the ceremonial and political
elements of the law. "It is for freedom that Christ has set
us free. Stand firm, then, and do not let yourselves be
burdened again by a yoke of slavery . . . . I declare to
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love is the end of the law in so far as the intended
consequences, or purposeful result of fulfilling one's
deontological duties is the expedition, flowing, or manifestation of that love which God has given us.108
Nor does this emphasis, on the individual deontological duties serving as the means by which one strives to
achieve this goal, detract from the powerful role of the
Gospel in Christian living. Whereas, the Gospel is necessary
because it empowers, strengthens and motivates one to live a
truly Christian moral life; it is only by the instruction of

every man who lets himself be circumcised that he is
obligated to obey the whole law . . . . For in Christ Jesus
neither circumcision nor uncircumcision has any value. The
only thing that counts is faith expressing itself through
love" (Galatians 5:1,3,6).
108This assertion, that love is the end of the law,
does not contradict the Scriptural teaching that the goal or
purpose of the Christians life is to glorify God (Matthew
5:16; 1 Corinthians 10:31; 1 Peter 4:11). To glorify God is
the spiritual goal of the Christian life; whereas, serving
the needs of the neighbor in love is the temporal or ethical
goal of the Christian life. For more information concerning
the purposes that are served by good works see Martin
Chemnitz, Loci Theologici, Concordia 1989 edition 2:586-88;
627-30. Polycar Lyser 1591-1595 edition 3:55-58; 150-61.
John Gerhard, "Selections Translated From the Loci Theologici
by John Gerhard" trans. Charles Paulson. Unpublished, 1982
pages 30-34. This is located in the Concordia Seminary
Library, St. Louis, MO. BT736 G4213. Berolini 1863 edition
4:11-15.
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the law that the Christian learns which actions actually
constitute a God pleasing life.
For the Law says indeed that it is God's will and
command that we should walk in a new life, but it does
not give the power (Kraft/wires) and ability
(Vermogen/facultatem) to begin, and do it; but the Holy
Ghost, who is given and received, not through the Law,
but through the preaching of the Gospel, Gal. 3, 14,
renews the heart. Thereafter the Holy Ghost employs the
Law so as to teach the regenerate from it, and to point
out and show them in the Ten Commandments what is the
[good and] acceptable will of God, Rom. 12,2, in what
good works God hath before ordained that they should
walk, Eph. 2, 10.109
109Concordia Triglotta, "Thorough Declaration of the
Formula of Concord," VI, 11-12. Martin Chemnitz also emphasizes the ongoing importance of the law for the life of the
Christian when he writes, "There is a use for the Law in the
regenerate. It is threefold: (1) It pertains to doctrine
and obedience that the regenerate should know . . . what
kinds of works are pleasing to God, so that they do not
devise new forms of worship . . . (2) The Law shows the
imperfection and uncleanness which still clings to their good
works . . . (3) There is also a use for the Law in the
regenerate that it may contend against and coerce their old
man . . . Therefore these weak beginnings [of the new
obedience of the regenerate] must not only be encouraged by
the earnest entreaties of the Gospel, but also fostered by
the precepts, exhortations, warnings, and promises of the
Law. For we experience that the new obedience is not so
voluntary a thing as a good tree which brings forth its new
fruit without any command or exhortation." Chemnitz, Loci
Theologici, trans. J. A. 0. Preuss, II: 441 (Polycarpi
Leiseri: Francoforti ad Moenum, II:272-73.)
Likewise, John Gerhard also stresses the didactic use
of the law for Christians when he writes, "As to the fact
that the Holy Spirit controls and leads the reborn, He does
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The Scriptural method of moral analysis contains
characteristics of both deontology and teleology. The
teleological element emphasizes that the expedition of Divine
love is to be the final goal or result of all moral
activity.110 The deontological element emphasizes the means
by which this Taoc is to be achieved in a particular
situation. In this way both methods fit together in a hybrid
method that joins rule deontology and rule teleology.
Together these methods serve an instructional function and
comprise the didactic (that is, the third) use of the law.
The teleological element of moral reasoning in the
Scriptures, may be classified as a form of rule teleology
which incorporates the individual deontological duties (that
is, rule deontology) as the means by which one strives for
not do this immediately but uses the Word as the means.
Therefore one must seek from the Law the norm for good works
in which the reborn walk. All of Ps. 119 relates to this."
Gerhard, Theological Commonplaces, trans. Richard Dinda.
Concordia Seminary Library G12-435. (Loci Theologici
11:106).
110This didactic function of the teleological element
which comprises part of the third use of the law is an
example of the positive use of the teleological element.
There would also be a negative use of this teleological
element which comprises part of the second use of the law.
In this second use of the law the teleological element of
love stands to accuse and condemn the Christian for his
failure to achieve this goal.
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the Teikos. of love. In this way Scripture combines a form of
rule teleology (which is analogous to the Actual Rule
Utilitarianism and Primitive Rule Utilitarianism of John Mill
and John Austin) with a form of rule deontology. At least
three parallels can be drawn.
First, all the individual absolute moral rules are
from God. John Austin mentions this in his emphasis that God
is the source of both the tacit and revealed absolute moral
commands. Likewise, Scripture stresses this point in its
emphasis that all the various deontological duties, which
humankind is obligated to obey, come from God.
Second, these individual absolute moral rules are not
an end in themselves. They are the indispensable means, the
road or the way by which the end is accomplished. John Mill
mentions this in his explanation of the essential role of
secondary principles. John Austin also mentions this when he
explains that the purpose of all God's laws is the happiness
of his sentient creatures. Likewise, Scripture also makes
this point when it declares that the end of the law is love.
Third, this teleological principle is applied to serve
as an arbitrator when two absolute rules conflict within a
moral dilemma. John Mill emphasizes this when he specifically writes that only when secondary principles conflict
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should the first principle of utility be used. Likewise,
Scripture illustrates this point when it states that love is
to be the moral end after which Christians should strive.
Thus, in a conflict situation the greater evil is that which
least expedites love.111
This emphasis on rule teleology in Scriptures merely
attempts to show that Scripture uses a hybrid form of rule
teleology and rule deontology. In this way Scripture does
not limit itself to only one method of moral reasoning;
rather, it joins rule deontology together with rule teleology
to form a unique, and comprehensive method of moral analysis.

Summary and Conclusion of Part One
It has been the purpose of this first chapter to
define and illustrate both deontology and teleology and
thereby show that the Scriptural method of moral reasoning is
a unique hybrid combination of both forms of moral reasoning.
Deontology was defined as that method of moral reasoning which determines the moral option in view of certain
duties which the moral agent is obligated to fulfill. It was
noted that there are three different forms of deontology.
111A more detailed examination of "the lesser evil" in
conflict situations will be given below in Part Two.
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Pure act deontology does not use pre-established rules. The
duty of the moral agent is determined anew in each specific
situation through such immediate ways as conscience or
intuition. Modified act deontology accepts the use of preestablished rules only to a certain qualified extent. They
relate one's prima facie duties. These do not express
absolute duties, but are mere helpful summaries of the wisdom
of the ages. Such rules may be used and obeyed in so far as
they are helpful to the moral agent. Rule deontology insists
that moral rules must be used, because they express the
absolute duty of the moral agent. It was shown that
Scripture uses rule deontology in its emphasis on one's
absolute duty to obey all of the moral commandments of God.
Teleology was defined as that method of moral reasoning which determines the moral option in view of a specific
goal or result that the moral agent is trying to achieve. It
was also noted that there are three different forms of
teleology which parallel the use of rules in deontology.
Pure act teleology does not use pre-established rules. The
moral agent is to determine the moral option simply by
deciding what action is most conducive to accomplish the
desired end. Modified act teleology accepts a qualified use
of rules. Rules used in this way are prima facie or summary
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rules which can be used by the moral agent only in so far as
they are helpful in accomplishing the desired goal. Rule
teleology insists on the use of rules. Rules are essential
because they are the necessary means, the road or the way, in
which the goal can be achieved.
It was shown that Scripture uses a hybrid form of rule
teleology and rule deontology when it teaches that love is
the end of the law (1 Timothy 1:5). The absolute moral rules
that Scripture uses for its rule teleology are the very moral
rules it obligates humankind to obey in its rule deontology.
These rules are not an end in and of themselves, but are used
as a means to incarnate or practice love in specific situations. Thus does Scripture join together rule deontology and
rule teleology into a unique, hybrid, comprehensive system
which contains at least three points.
1.All individual moral rules in the Scriptures are
from God. Humankind has an absolute duty to obey each and
every one.
2.These individual moral rules are not an end in
themselves; rather, they are the indispensable means by which
the love of God flows through a Christian and into a specific
situation.
3.Only in a situation of a moral dilemma, when two of
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God's absolute moral laws come into conflict with one
another, can the principle of love be applied directly in
order to determine the lesser of two evils.112
This Scriptural method of moral analysis has been
identified (as a hybrid form of rule deontology and rule
teleology). It will be the task of part two to compare and
contrast various methods of current theological ethics with
this method that has been derived from Scripture.

112To this list of three, a hypothetical fourth point
may be added. 4. If there should ever be an occasion when
there is no revealed moral law that can be applied directly
to a situation, then the moral option must be determined by
directly choosing which action best expedites love. However,
due to the broad range of God's moral laws and due to their
extensive application to life that Luther illustrated in his
explanations to the ten commandments in his Large Catechism
and in his 1520 "Treatise of Good Works," the author of this
dissertation is inclined to agree with John Mill who stated
that there is never a situation in which some moral rule does
not apply. John Mill, Utilitarianism 33. Utilitarian
calculations should not be confused with quantitative
agapistic analysis. See Appendix IV: Utilitarian
Calculations Versus Quantitative Agapistic Analysis.

PART 2
A Case For Conflicting Absolutism
The purpose of this section is to examine, from
another perspective, the role of deontology and teleology in
theological ethics. The previous examination, in part one
above, was developed within the conceptual framework provided
by William Frankena. The investigation in this part uses the
insights from the previous chapter; however, it takes place
within the context of the current debate among three
contrasting, and mutually exclusive, ethical methodologies,
non-conflicting absolutism, hierarchicalism, and conflicting
absolutism.' These methods are similar in some respects.
All three methods accept that Holy Scriptures contain
absolute moral commands which reveal God's holy will,
establish the deontological duties of the Christian, and
guide the Christian in his daily life. However, they differ
extensively in their understanding of how these
deontological duties are to be used. This difference becomes
'This debate is currently underway among various
members of the Evangelical Theological Society.
122
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especially evident when these three methodologies explain
their interpretation of a moral dilemma.
The term "moral dilemma" can be used in a number of
ways.2 In this dissertation the phrase "moral dilemma"
refers to any situation in which the moral agent is confronted with contradictory and mutually exclusive obligations. This definition is given by Terrance C. McConnell
when he writes that,
A genuine moral dilemma is a situation in which an agent
ought to do each of two acts, both of which he cannot
do. That is, he ought to do A and he ought to do B, but
he cannot do both A and B.3
2See E. J. Lemmon, "Moral Dilemmas," Philosophical
Review 71 (1962): 139-58. Lemmon explains that there are at
least three different types of moral dilemmas. The first
type is present when the moral agent "both ought to do
something and ought not to do that thing." Ibid., 148. The
second type of moral dilemma may be recognized when "there is
some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought to do
something, and there is some, but not conclusive, evidence,
that one ought not to do that thing." Ibid., 152. The third
type of moral dilemma is "the kind of situation in which the
agent has to make a decision of a recognizably moral
character though he is completely unprepared for the
situation by his present moral outlook. This case differs
from the last in that there the question was rather of the
applicability of his moral outlook to his present situation,
while here the question is rather how to create a new moral
outlook to meet unprecedented moral needs." Ibid., 156.
3Terrance C. McConnell, "Utilitarianism and Conflict
Resolutions," Logique and Analyse 24 (1981): 245.
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In a Christian context this would involve a situation in
which the moral agent is confronted with two absolute moral
commands (that is, two deontological duties) from God in such
a way that compliance to one moral absolute necessitates noncompliance or disobedience to the other moral absolute.4 In
this way there is an existential conflict between two commands.
Non-conflicting absolutists deny that any genuine
moral conflict can actually exist within the life of the
Christian. They maintain that such apparent conflicts actually dissolve under proper investigation.
Hierarchicalists accept the existence of genuine moral
conflicts; however, they believe that the absolute moral
commands of God (that is, the numerous deontological duties)
can be prearranged in a hierarchical order. In a conflict
situation the moral agent is to choose the greater good. In
such a dilemma the moral agent is inculpable for not doing
4The term "absolute" is used in this dissertation to
refer to any moral law that is more than merely prima facie.
Obedience is not optional. It is required. It is not, "obey
this if you like," It is rather, "Obey this or you will die"
(confer Ezekiel 18:20). An absolute law is a universally
obligatory moral norm. It is "free from conditions or
reservations; unreserved, unqualified [and] unconditional."
The Oxford English Dictionary second edition 20 vols (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1989), 1:48 definition 12a.
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the lesser good.
Conflicting absolutists also accept the existence of
genuine moral conflicts. They believe that, within a given
situation, the absolute moral commands of God must be arranged in a hierarchical order. In a conflict situation the
Christian is to do the lesser evil, incur the culpability,
and then look to Christ for forgiveness.5
Each one of these three models are defined and illustrated by their most current proponents. It will be shown
that, of these three options, conflicting absolutism offers
the most Scriptural approach to understanding and using the
deontological and the teleological elements in theological
ethics.6
5The first one to define, label and contrast these
different methodologies was Norman Geisler, Ethics:
Alternatives and Issues (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan
Publishing House, 1971), 1-270.
60ne may be inclined to think that moral dilemmas are
mere insignificant abnormalities and any extensive discussion
of them in a prolegomenon exaggerates their importance.
However, Helmut Thielicke writes, "Theological ethics usually
makes the mistake of taking the 'Normal case' as its standard
for measuring reality. The result is the illusion that by
providing certain Christian directives we have actually
solved the problems. In ethics, however, the situation is
similar to that in medicine. The problems do not arise with
the ordinary cases, but with the borderline cases (Grenzfalle), those involving transitions or complications. It is
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the abnormal rather than the normal case which brings us up
against the real problems. Hence the real test even in
respect of foundational principles, is whether an ethics has
been proved in the crucible of the borderline situation
(Grenzsituation) and emerged with even deeper insights."
Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics; 3 vols. trans. John
Doberstein (Grand Rapids: Eerdmanns, 1979), 1:578. The
German references are from Theologische Ethik, 3 Bdnde
(Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1955-1964), 2.1:202. "An example
will show how correct Thielicke is in this regard. Seldom,
if ever, is a pastor consulted concerning an ethical issue
that is a clear-cut choice between right and wrong. Thus,
probably no one has ever seriously approached his pastor to
ask, 'My neighbor insists on playing his stereo loudly late
into the night; may I shoot him?" Frank, Morgret, "The Law
and the Gospel in Ethical Decision-Making," Consensus 10
(October 1984), 19.

CHAPTER THREE
Non-conflicting Absolutism'
The numerous absolute moral commands, which were shown
in chapter one above to compose the deontological element in
theological ethics, are often understood as "non-conflicting
absolutes." According to this view the moral commandments
are absolute in that they admit no exceptions. They are all
to be enforced in every applicable situation. They are also
"non-conflicting" in that there is never a situation wherein
the Christian moral agent is forced to break one absolute
command in order to keep another.
In the situation of a so called "moral dilemma" two
'This view has also been called "unqualified
absolutism" or "the third alternative view." The most
detailed presentation of this position is Robert Rakestraw,
"Ethical Choices: A Case For Non-Conflicting Absolutism,
Criswell Theological Review 2 no. 2 (Spring 1988): 237-67.
Modified forms of this view are also promoted in: John M.
Frame, Medical Ethics: Principles, Persons and Problems
(Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co.,
1988), 7-32. William Luck, "Moral Conflicts and Evangelical
Ethics: A Second Look at the Salvaging Operations," Grace
Theological Journal 8 no. 1 (Spring 1987), C. Gordon Olson,
"Norman Geisler's Hierarchical Ethics Revisited," Evangelical
Journal 4 no. 1 (Summer 1986): 3-14.
127
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absolute commands may seem to conflict, but this in only an
outward, superficial, appearance. They do not conflict in
actuality. The moral agent may be misled into thinking that
it is necessary to break one of the absolute moral commands
in order to keep another, but, in reality, that is never
truly the case. There is no such thing as a genuine moral
dilemma. There is always a third alternative out of every
apparent dilemma, which does not involve breaking one of
God's absolute moral commands. The alternative might not be
readily apparent. It might not be easy or painless.
However, there is always a way to avoid sin.
One of the most complete and systematic presentations
of non-conflicting absolutism has been given by Robert
Rakestraw in his article "Ethical Choice: A Case For Non
Conflicting Absolutism."2 In this article Rakestraw mentions
at least seven major tenets that are important to nonconflicting absolutism. The following critical examination
of these seven tenets reveals both the strengths and the
2Rakestraw, 239-67. Robert Rakestraw was born in
1943. He was ordained in 1967 and served as a pastor in the
Southern Baptist Convention. He received his Ph.D. in
Theology from Drew University in 1985. He currently teaches
theology and Christian ethics at Bethel Theological Seminary
in St. Paul, Minnesota. Edmund Santurri has also held this
view. See Appendix V: Edmund Santurri amd Helmut Thielicke
on the Question of Genuine Moral Dilemmas.
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weaknesses of this particular ethical methodology.
The first tenet of non-conflicting absolutism emphasizes that the moral absolutes which God has given to
humankind in the Scriptures are extensions of the one all
encompassing absolute of love. Rakestraw explains,
NCA [Non-Conflicting Absolutism] builds its entire
structure upon the foundational principle that there are
numerous absolutes given by God. . . . These absolutes
are derived from the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures after
careful exegesis and interpretation. . . . All moral
absolutes are extensions of the one all-encompassing
absolute: love for God with all one's being and love for
neighbor as oneself (Matt 22: 34-40).3
This first tenet of non-conflicting absolutism agrees
with the analysis of the deontological element of theological
ethics given above, in chapter one. In chapter two it is
also emphasized that the numerous absolute moral commands
which God reveals in the Scriptures are used to bring the
love of God into a specific situation. In this first tenet
the non-conflicting absolutists are emphasizing the same
points, by saying that all of the moral absolutes in
Scripture are extensions of the one all-encompassing absolute
of love.
The second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism
stresses that the numerous absolute moral commandments,
3Rakestraw, 247-48.
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mentioned in tenet number one above, never actually come into
direct conflict with one another.
Divinely given moral absolutes never truly conflict,
although there are occasions when they appear to
conflict. NCA holds that there will never be a situation in which obedience to one absolute will entail disobedience to or the setting aside of another absolute.4
This second tenet is unique to the non-conflicting absolutists. Representing the hierarchicalists, Norman Geisler
has gone to great lengths in his attempt to prove the falsehood of this tenet. In 1981 Norman Geisler wrote Options in
Contemporary Christian Ethics,5 wherein he attempted to point
out that moral dilemmas are illustrated in the Scriptures on
at least six different occasions. In the summer of 1986 Carl
Gordon Olson, seeking to support this second tenet of nonconflicting absolutism, responded to Geisler's criticism in
his article "Norman Geisler's Hierarchical Ethics
Revisited."6 In the fall of 1986 Geisler defended his views
4lbid., 248.
5Norman Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian
Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1981), 1-121.
Norman Geisler was born in 1932. He was ordained into the
ministry of the Independent Church in 1956. He is presently
director of Quest Ministries, Lynchburg, Virginia.
6C. Gordon Olson, "Norman Geisler's Hierarchical
Ethics Revisited," Evangelical Journal 4(1986): 3-14. Carl
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against Olson in "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical
Hierarchicalism."7 Then again in 1989 Geisler also published
Christian Ethics: Options and Issues.8 Part of this book
continues his criticism of Olson and again seeks to refute
this second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. The following examination of the discussion between Geisler and Olson,
given below, helps to explain this second tenet.
The first illustration, with which Geisler attempts to
show a conflict between two moral absolutes in the Scripture,
is Abraham's near sacrifice of Isaac (Genesis 22). Geisler
maintains that in this account one can clearly note a
conflict between murder and obedience to God.
First, the Abraham and Isaac story (Gen. 22), contains a
real moral conflict. "Thou shalt not kill" is a divine
moral command, and yet God commanded Abraham to kill his
son, Isaac."9
Gordon Olson was born in 1930, received his Th.M. from Dallas
Theological Seminary in 1955. He was ordained into the
ministry of the Reinhart Bible Church of Dallas, Texas, in
1955. He has served as a missionary to Pakistan and pastor
of Mansfield Baptist Church, New Jersey.
7Norman Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of
Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4(1986): 82-87.
8Norman Geisler, Christian Ethics Options and Issues
(Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1989), 1-335.
9Geisler, Options, 84. One might be inclined to
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Olson responds that this conflict is only apparent and
not real at al1.10 Olson maintains that there are many
places in Scripture, this story being one of them, where
killing is not immoral because it is in compliance with a
command from God. Olson lists other examples such as killing
in a just war against an evil aggressor (Genesis 14:14-16)
and capital punishment (Genesis 9:6 and Deuteronomy 19:21) .11
Olson concludes that, "The cause of the offering of
Isaac . . . was also a justifiable life-taking since it was
by a direct command of God. Hence there was no conflict of
absolutes."12

object to Geisler's insistence that this story contains a
moral dilemma on the grounds that God graciously called a
halt to the sacrifice before it was actually committed. Thus
the dilemma in sacrificing Isaac never actually took place.
However, Geisler answers that objection. "The fact that
Abraham was not required to go through with the act does not
eliminate the reality of the moral conflict, since the
intention to perform an act with moral implications is itself
a morally responsible act (cf. Matt. 5:28)." Ibid. 85.
1001son, 6.
111bid.
12Ibid. This argument, which emphasizes that God can
renounce a previously given command and give a contrary
command in an exceptional situation is not new to Olson. It
is also mentioned by the following: Bernard of Clairvaux
(1090-1153), "Necessarium deinde, quod inviolabile nominavi,
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illud intelligo, quod non ab homine traditum, sed divinitus
promulgatum, nisi a Deo qui tradidit, mutari omnino non
patitur: ut, exempli causa, Non occides, Non moechaberis, Non
furtum facies (Exod. XX, 13-15), et reliqua illius tabulae
legiscita: quae, etsi nullam prorsus humanam dispensationem
admittunt, nec cuiquam hominum ex his aliquid alique modo
solvere, aut licuit, aut licebit; Dominus tamen horum quod
voluit, quando voluit solvit, sive cum ab Hebraeis Aegyptios
spoliari (Exod. III, 22), sive quando prophetam cum muliere
fornicaria misceri praecepit (Ose. I, 2)." J. P. Migne, ed.
Patrologiae: Patrum Latinorum, 221 vol. (Parisiis, 18551881), 182:864. Hereafter this is abbreviated as Migne P. L.
Duns Scotus (1266-1308), "Haec strictissime dicuntur
de lege naturae. . . . non potest esse dispensatio et de
istis. . . .
Et non est sic loquendo universaliter de omnibus
praeceptis secundae Tabulae . . . . Non enim est necessaria
bonitas in his quae ibi praecipiuntur ad bonitatem finis
ultimi . . . .
De praeceptis autem primae tabulae secus est, quia
illa immediate respiciunt Deum pro obiecto . . . .Et per
consequens in istis non poterit Deus dispensare." Allen B.
Wolter, ed. Duns Scotus on the Will and Morality (Washington
D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1986), 276.
William of Ockham (circa 1280-1349), "Et ideo ipso
quod Deus vult hoc, (hoc) est iustum fieri . . . . Unde si
Deus causaret odium in voluntate alicuius sicut causa
totalis, sicut semper causat sicut causa partialis, neuter
peccaret: nec Deus, quia ad nihil obligatur; nec alius, quia
actus ille non esset in potestate sua." Guillelmi de ockham,
Opera Philosophica et Theologica, Rega Wood ed. Editions
Instituti Franciscani 7 vols. (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.:
Universitatis S. Bonaventurae, 1984), 7:198.
Martin Luther (1483-1546) "Also kan und pflegt auch
der geyst zu weylen werck zu thun, die an zusehen sind, als
seyen sie widder alle gottis gepott. Aber sie sind nur
widder die gepott der andern taffelln, die uns zum nehisten
weysen und nach den ersten dreyen gepotten ynn der ersten
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Geisler defends his first illustration against Olson
by pointing out that it will not suffice simply to say that
the sacrifice of Isaac was an exception to the command
against murder (as is a just war and capital punishment).
The mere fact that an exception has to be made shows that
there is a conflict.13 Geisler makes a compelling point in
his answer to Olson. Olson is begging the question when he
tries to remove the tension between two conflicting commands
simply by asserting that there can be no tension since they
are both commanded by God. Olson is attempting to support
this second tenet by basing it on the unity and simplicity of
taffeln, die uns zu Gott weysen." D. Martin Luther's Werke,
Rritisch Gesamtausgabe, 64 Bande (Weimar, 1883 -), 17.2: 54,
hereafter abreviated as W. A.
This line of thought is contrary to that of Thomas
Aquinas who emphasized that, "Praecepta autem decalogi
continent ipsam intentionem legislatoris, scilicet Dei. Nam
praecepta primae tabulae, quae ordinant ad Deum, continent
ipsum ordinem ad bonum commune et finale, quod Deus est;
praecepta autem secundae Tabulae continent ipsum ordinem
justitiae inter homines observandae, ut scilicet nulli fiat
indebitum, et cuilibet reddatur debitum; secundum hanc enim
rationem sunt intelligenda praecepta decalogi. Et ideo
praecepta decalogi sunt omnino indispensabilia." Thomas
Aquinas Summa Theologiae Blackfrairs edition 60 vols. (New
York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), 29: 90-92.
13Norman Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of
Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4 (Fall, 1986):
86. Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1989), 117-118.
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God's essential will (that is, God's will as it exists in and
of itself). However, such a task is not possible for two
reasons.
In the first place the essential will of God has not
been completely revealed to man. Insofar as it remains
hidden (voluntas abscondita) it is far beyond the realm of
human comprehension. It cannot be used by Christians to
define doctrine or determine practice. St. Paul emphasizes
this when he exclaims,
Oh, the depth of the riches of wisdom and knowledge of
God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths
beyond tracing out! Who has known the mind of the Lord?
Or who has been his counselor (Romans 11:33-34) .14
God's will can only be studied and applied insofar as
he has revealed it to humanity (that is, in the voluntas
revelata).

That which is not revealed must remain a mystery.

Luther writes,
God must therefore be left to himself in his own
majesty, for in this regard we have nothing to do with
him, nor has he willed that we should have anything to
do with him. But we have something to do with him insofar as he is clothed and set forth in his Word,
through which he offers himself to us. . . . It is our
business, however, to pay attention to the word and
leave that inscrutable will alone, for we must be guided
14A1l scripture passages in English are from the New
International Version, unless otherwise noted.
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by the word and not by that inscrutable will. After
all, who can direct himself by a will completely inscrutable and unknowable? It is enough to know simply
that there is a certain inscrutable will in God, and as
to what, why, and how far it wills, that is something we
have no right whatever to inquire into, hanker after,
care about, or meddle with, but only to fear and
adore.15
In the second place, humans are incapable of understanding the unity and simplicity of God's essential will because even that which has been revealed (voluntas revelata)
has been revealed in parts in order to accommodate the temporal limitations of human thought. Franz Pieper explains,
There can be no division and classification of God's
will as far as God's essence is concerned. In Him there
is only one will, and this is identical with his
15Luther's Works, 55 vols., edd. J. Pelikan and H. T.
Lehmann, American Edition in English Translation
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press and St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1958-1986), 33:139-40. Hereafter this is
abbreviated as L. W. "Relinquendus est igitur Deus in
maiestate et natura sua, sic enim nihil nos cum illo habemus
agere, nec sic voluit a nobis agi cum eo. Sed quatenus
indutus et proditus est verbo suo, quo nobis sese obtulit,
cum eo agimus. . . .
Nunc autem nobis spectandum est verbum relinquendaque
illa voluntas imperscrutabilis. Verbo enim nos dirigi, non
voluntate illa inscrutabili oportet. Atque adeo quis sese
dirigere queat ad voluntatem prorsus imperscrutabilem et
incognoscibilem? Satis est, nosse tantum, quod sit quaedam
in Deo voluntas imperscrutabilis. Quid vero, Cur et quatenus
illa velit, hoc prorsus non licet quaerere, optare, curare
aut tangere, sed tantum timere et adorare." Luther, W. A.
18:685-86.
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essence. But because of our finite comprehension Scripture itself teaches us to . . . . distinguish between
God's first, or antecedent, and second, or consequent,
will (voluntas prima, sive antecedens, et voluntas
secunda, sive consequens).16
16Franz Pieper, Christian Dogmatics Trans. Theodore
Engelder, 4 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1950), 1: 454. "Was die Einteilungen des Ottlichen Willens
betrifft, so ist auch hier wieder darah zu erinnern, dass sie
ihren Grund in dem beschrankten menschlichen Auffassungs vermogen haben. In Gott ist der Wille einer und mit Gottes
Wesen identisch. Aber nach Gottes Selbstoffenbarung in
seinem Wort Kamen wir unterscheiden: 1. Gottes ersten und
zweiten Willen (voluntas prima oder antecedens und voluntas
secunda oder consequens)." Franz Pieper, Christliche
Dogmatik 4 vol. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House,
1917), 1: 558-59. Others also emphasized this distinction:
St. Chrysostom, "Mow Trp6.1Tov TO µii throVaOat hp.apripaiTas.
Oelmga BeliTepov, TO yevog6/oug mmoOserfroX&FOaL." J. P. Migne, ed.
Patrologiae: Patrum Graecorum, 161 vols. (Paris, 1857-1866),
62:13. Hereafter this is abbreviated as Migne P. G.
John of Damascus (347?-407), " '0 0e6; wpowyoug4vws °Au
mcivTas ow0Avat, Kai T11s Oaaaeiac airra Tuvftv. . . . 'ApapvivcwTag Si
OAEL KoXigEaeat, (.5s. 8iKatos. A4y€Tat dm, TO giv ipitrrov, Trpomyatip.evov
Oelmµa, Kai iigkwia, it abTa V. TO Si 6E1/TEpOV iirtigevov OATiga, Kai
.11µtv, Ta giv dyalkt
wapaxoSpriats, if 1figeT4pas al.TLaS . . . . T(I)v Si
Ta
SE
Kai
O'VTWS'
KaKa, 01/TE
novripa,
irporlyouµ4vws eau, Kal eiZoKei.
wpo11youµ4vtos., ATE kw oitiOws• °act. napavapel Si TW airretovaif). "

Migne, P.G. 94:968-69.
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225?-1274), "Unde potest dici
quod judex justus antecedenter vult omnem hominem vivere, sed
consequenter vult homicidam suspendi. Similiter Deus
antecedenter vult omnem hominem salvari, sed consequenter
vult quosdam damnari secundum exigentiam suae justitiae."
Summa Theologiae, la.19,6.
Leonard Hutter (1563-1616), "Est vero Distinctio hec
Voluntatis Dei in Antecedentem + Consequentem introducta in
Ecclesiam, propter ae Scripturae locaquae Voluntatem Dei non
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Semper fieri aut impleri testantur. Exempli gratia: Matth.
23,37. Quoties volui congregare filios tuos, sicut gallina
pullos suos sub alis, + noluistis. Et I. Tim. 2,4. Deus
vult omnes homines salvari. . . .
Tandem consideratione fidei. Nam in Voluntate
npariyoutavri Fides attenditur, tanquam pars ordinis, quern Deus,
quantum quidem in se est, observatum cupit. In Voluntate
kimp4v0 eadem attenditur, non hoc solum modo, quo Deus ordinem
suum ab hominibus observatum cupit. sed quatenus ordo iste
actu ipso observatur credendo, vel non observatur, non
credendo: Qud licet ratione hominum in tempore demum fiat:
Deo tamen. Praescientiae ratione, suit praesentis simum,
quippe cui per naturam, aeternitatis, nihil est futurism, sed
in, simplicissimo Ty vilsv omnia, ab aeterno sunt
praesentissima. Ultmae hujus differentiae respectu, Voluntas
consequens, finem suum, semper assequitur, vel ad salutem,
vel ad damnationem: Voluntas vero Antecedens non item."
Leonharto HUttero, Loci Communes Theologici (Wittenbergae,
1619), 783, 794-95.
John Gerhard (1582-1637), "Distinguit autem haec
divisio non ipsam per se voluntatem, quae in Deo una et
indivisa est, sicut et una essentia; sed geminum istius
respectum. In antecedente voluntate respectus habetur
mediorum ad salutem, prout ex parte Dei ordinates sunt et
omnibus offeruntur. In consequente voluntate respectus
habetur eorundem mediorum, sed prout ab hominibus acceptantur
vel negliguntur." Ioannis Gerhardi, Loci Theologici, 10
vols. (1609-1622 repr., Berolini: Sumtibus Gust. Schlawitz,
1865), 2:61.
David Hollaz (1648-1713), "Voluntas DEI dictur
Antecedens + consequens non (1) ratione temporis . . . . (2)
Nec ex parte ipsius voluntatis divina. . . . (3) Dicitur
voluntas DEI antecedens + consequens ab ordine rationis
nostrae diversos volendi actus in DEO pro diversa objector=
consideratione distinguentis." M. Davidis Hollazii, Examen
Theologicum (Stargardiae Pomeranorum, 1707), 4.
John Quenstedt (1617-1688), "Antecedens fertur in
hominem, qua miser est, non habita ratione circumstantiarum
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John Bair explains further that,
The free will of God is distinguished as . . . first or
antecedent, by which He wills something from Himself
alone, or entirely from His own inclination, without any
regard being had to the circumstances; and second or
consequent, by which He wills something with a consideration of the circumstances, or in consideration of a
cause or condition.17
Millard J. Erickson gives the following example.
God's will in the ultimate sense (W 1) would be the
fully good. Yet God's will (W 2) is that man should do
what most nearly approximates that complete good.
For example, it may be God's will [W 1 primary
will] that no human life should ever have to be taken.
This would be the good. Yet, given our world in which
men are characterized by greed, avarice, hatred, and
fear, I may find myself called upon to take the life of
another to defend myself or to protect the lives of my
children. It may, in this case, be God's will (W 2)
that I kill this man. . . . This distinction between
in Objecto: Consequens vero versatur circa hominem cum certis
circumstantiis, quatenus scil. is fidelis vel incredulus
est." Johann Quenstedt, Theologia Didactico-Polemica 4
vols. (Wittenbergae, 1685), 3:2.
17Heinrich Schmid, Doctrinal Theology of the
Evangelical Lutheran Church Third Edition trans. C. A. Hay
and H. E. Jacobs (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House,
1961), 127-28, citing John Baier, Compendium Theologiae
Positivae (Lipsiae: Apud Thomas Fritsch, 1717), 194.
"Voluntas DEI libra distinguitur . . . . in primam seu
antecedentem, qua vult aliquid ex se solo, seu ex nativa sua
inclinatione praecise, necdum habita ratione
circumstantiarum: + secundam, seu consequentem, qua aliquid
vult, consideratis circumstantiis, seu intuitu alicujus
causae aut conditionis." Ibid.
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God's will (W 1) and (W 2) is an important one. For a
Christian to discuss the morality of war, for instance,
without observing this distinction invites confusion.18
According to God's primary will, he wills that there
would be no sin, nor suffering, nor death. God's primary
will is best exemplified when one considers the perfect
blessedness of the lives of Adam and Eve in the garden of
Eden prior to the fall.
However, since sin and death have now come into the
world they present circumstances and conditions which God
takes into consideration when he wills specific deeds in the
daily lives of individuals. This secondary will of God may
conflict with his primary will, as in the case of Abraham's
offering of Isaac.
According to God's primary will there is to be no
murder. Yet, within the temporary situation of the testing
of Abraham, God, according to his secondary will, commanded
that murder should be done. Thus Geisler is correct in
pointing out that this story does illustrate a conflict
between two commands of God. It is a conflict between his
primary and secondary will.

18Millard J. Erickson, Relativism in Contemporary
Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Book House, 1974),
143-44.
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However, this does not necessarily mean that this
story can be used, as Geisler attempts, to prove that such
conflicts still confront Christians today. Geisler fails to
take into consideration the uniqueness of this particular
event. For here was the spiritual father of all believers.19
He was living at a time when God revealed his will directly
to people of his choosing.20 He was undergoing a special
trial to test his faith.21 There is no justification for
using this particular, unique, event to substantiate the
existence of moral conflicts today.
On the one hand, there are elements in the lives of
the prophets and the apostles that are worthy of imitation.
They serve as examples to be followed.22 Yet on the other
19"So, then, he is the father of all who believe but
have not been circumcised, in order that righteousness might
be credited to them. And he is also the father of the
circumcised who not only are circumcised but who also walk in
the footsteps of the faith that our father Abraham had before
he was circumcised" Romans 4:11-12. "Understand, then, that
those who believe are children of Abraham" Galatians 3:7.
20"In the past God spoke to our forefathers through
the prophets at many times and in various ways, but these
last days he has spoken to us by his Son" Hebrews 1:1-2.
21"Some time later God tested Abraham" Genesis 22:1a.
"By faith Abraham, when God tested him, offered Isaac as a
sacrifice" Hebrews 11:17a.
22"We do not want you to become lazy, but to imitate
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hand, there are certain elements which are unique to the
lives of the prophets and apostles. Insofar as their uniqueness is concerned they do not serve as examples to be
imitated. They establish no precedent upon which to base any
future action. Least of all do they constitute a foundation
for theological ethics. Luther explains,
Whatever the case may be, one must adhere to the rule
that the deeds of the saints should not be imitated or
taken as examples. It is not logical to say that
because Abraham, Augustine and Peter did this, "I must
do it." But this is a valid argument: God says and
commands this; therefore, it must be done. For the Word
is a reliable rule which cannot deceive. Thus the
jurists, too, say that an action is not a law, just as a
law is not an action.23
Luther also explains that,
In order to reveal His power and wisdom, God does many
things contrary to the rule; He does so through heroes,
whom He himself calls in a special way, although these
heroes are rare and few. Others must adhere to the norm
and rule, because, if they want to imitate those heroes,
those who through faith and patience inherit what has been
promised" Hebrews 6:12.
23Luther, L. W. 3:259-60. "Caeterum, ut ut sit,
regula tenenda est, quod sanctorum facta non imitanda, nec
trahenda sunt in exemplum. Non enim sequitur: Abraham,
Augustinus, Petrus hoc fecit, ergo mihi quoque faciendum est.
Haec autem consequentia valet: Deus hos dicit et iubet, ergo
faciendum est. Verbum enim est regula certa, quae fallere
non potent. Sic Iure consulti quoque dicunt, factum non esse
ius, sicut nec ius est factum." Luther, W.A. 43:61.
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who deviate from the rule, they stumble disgracefully.
Such deeds are praised because they are done by heroes
and "wonder men," but nobody can successfully imitate
them.24
The uniqueness of the story of Abraham's near sacrifice of Isaac sets it apart from all other stories. Abraham
is a "wonder man." Abraham cannot be used as an example to
completely imitate. Nor can one expect the circumstances of
the story (that is, a conflict between a command of God's
primary will and a command of his secondary will) to
necessarily be repeated. Even though this story contains a
conflict between two of God's commands, as Geisler maintains,
it nevertheless, cannot show that such conflicts necessarily
exist today. It therefore does not serve Geisler's intended
purpose. It does not refute the second tenet of nonconflicting absolutism, which maintains that in this day
moral absolutes do not conflict.25
24L.W. 3:262. "Deus ut ostendat potentiam ct
sapientiam saum, multa facit contra regulam per homines
Heroicos, quos ipse singulariter vocat, quanquam rani et
pauci sunt. Reliqui arte et regula utantur necesse est, quod
si heroicos illos, qui a regula discedunt, imitari volent,
turpiter impingent. Laudantur igitur talia, quia ab heroicis
et miraculosis fiunt, sed nemo ea foeliciter potest imitari."
Luther, W. A. 43:62-63.
25Although this particular example of Abraham's near
sacrifice of Isaac fails to show that there are still
conflicts between the commands of God's primary will and

144
Geisler's second illustration with which he attempts
to show a conflict between two of God's absolute moral
commands, and thereby refute the second tenet of nonconflicting absolutism, is the suicide of Samson (Judges
16:23-31). Geisler maintains that Samson had divine approval
for his self inflicted death.26 Since such approval is
contrary to the commandment against murder, this story would
illustrate a conflict between two divine commands.
Olson responds by saying that the story of Samson's
suicide contains no actual conflict. For in this case there
was no explicit command from God for Samson to kill himself.
This suicide was a decision Samson made completely on his
own. Scripture does not say that Samson did a God-pleasing

those of his secondary will today, there are other examples
below which illustrate that such conflicts do still occur.
The contention here against Geisler is not that such
conflicts do not exist today. It is rather, that he has not
chosen a good example to prove his point.
26Geisler, Options, 85. Augustine also believed that
Samson had divine approval for his suicide. In De Civitate
Dei 1:21 he writes "Nec Samson aliter excusatur, quod se
ipsum cum hostibus ruina domus oppressit, nisi quia spirtus
latenter hoc jusserat, qui per illum miracula faciebat."
Migne, P. L. 41:35. Martin Luther also seemed to hold the
same view. "[Samson] qui Spiritus instinctu et impulsu fecit
omnia, etiam in ipsa morte." Luther, W. A. 44:785. (L. W.
8:281).
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thing when he committed suicide.27
In Geisler's "Response to Olson" he does not answer
this criticism. Likewise, in his later work, Christian
Ethics, Geisler makes no effort to respond to Olson's point.
He simply repeats this same argument concerning the divine
approval of Samson's death.28
Olson makes a compelling point here. Although Olson
did not mention it, he could also have pointed out that in
order to understand the ethical implications in the suicide
of Samson it is helpful to distinguish, as Geisler has failed
to do, between God's general concurrence (concursus
generalis), which enables all acts to occur regardless of
their morality, and his moral will (voluntas moralis) which
expresses the specific moral actions which he demands of
humanity. Just because God gave Samson the power to commit
suicide does not mean that God agreed with, or was pleased
by, this act. God also gives to all criminals their power to
burglarize, maim, or kill (that is, his concursus generalis);
yet, he certainly disproves of their actions according to his
moral will (voluntas moralis).

Thus the account of Samson's

2701son, 6.
28Geisler, Christian Ethics, 118.
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suicide does not help Geisler prove the existence of divine
conflicts, because it does not contain a conflict between two
of God's absolute moral commands. This story does not help
him in his attempt to disprove the second tenet of nonconflicting absolutism.
Geisler's third illustration with which he attempts to
show a conflict between two of God's moral commands is the
case of Jephthah and his daughter (Judges 11:30-40). In this
passage Jephthah vows to God,
If you give the Ammonites into my hands, whatever comes
out of the door of my house to meet me when I return in
triumph from the Ammonites will be the Lord's, and I
will sacrifice it as a burnt offering. Judges 11:30-31
After his victory he returned home and "who should
come out to meet him but his daughter. . . . She was an only
child" (Judges 11:34). Geisler maintains that in this story
Jephthah is torn between keeping a vow to God (Ecclesiastes
5:1-4) and obeying the commandment against murder (Exodus
20:13).29
Olson responds that once again, as in the case of
Samson, there is no explicit command from God here. God does
not tell Jephthah to sacrifice his daughter (as he told
Abraham to sacrifice his son). Nor did God command Jephthah
29Geisler, Options, 85.
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to make such a careless vow. There is no conflict here
because neither the vow nor the sacrifice was commanded.
Olson could also have pointed out that there is no
conflict in this story because the vow which Jephthah made,
was in fact, sinful, and contrary to God's will from the very
beginning. Through Moses God had already established the
details of an elaborate sacrificial system.30 God had
specifically commanded that burnt offerings were to be either
a bull a sheep a goat or a bird.31 According to God's
command, these were the only animals that were to be offered
in burnt sacrifices. The Israelites had no authority to
change this. Moses specifically told them, that with respect
to God's law, they were not to "add to it or take away from
it" (Deuteronomy 12:32).32
However, in the days of the judges, the Israelites
were not careful to be so faithful to God's laws. Twice the
author of the book of Judges states that it was a time when
"everyone did as he saw fit" (Judges 17:6; 21:25). When
Jephthah made his foolish vow, to offer "whatever comes out
of the door of my house as a burnt offering" (Judges 11:31),
30See Leviticus 1-7.
31Leviticus 1:5-14
32This same emphasis is in Deuteronomy 4:2.
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he was not obeying a command from God. He was doing "as he
saw fit." He was breaking away from the sacrificial system
which God had given them, and inventing his own good works
contrary to the will of God.33 Since this vow was a human
invention, unauthorized by God, it cannot be construed as a
divine command that conflicts with the fifth commandment.
The same can be said with regard to the fulfilling of
this vow. The sacrifice of the daughter was also without
33This is not unlike the fictitious good works
practiced by the monks of the middle ages which Luther so
strongly condemned in his "Von Den Guten Werken" (W. A.
6:202-76) and "De Votis Monasticis Martini Lutheri Iudicium,"
(W. A. 8:573-669). In the "Praefatio Martini Lutheri Vetus
Testamentum" he also wrote, "Praeter haec autem hoc quoque
observandum est, Mosen adeo diligenter hunc populum legibus
circumscripsisse, ut prorsus nullum locum relinqueret, aut
novi cuiusdam operis, aut alterius religionis excogitandae. . . .
. . . Sic igitur omnia instituit, ut certum verbum
haberent, Deum omnia ipsorum opera probare. Non enim Deus
illa opera probat, quae sine certo suo verbo et mandato a
nobis fiunt. Nam in .IIII. et .XIII. Deuteronomii capite sic
inquit, vos nihil neque addetis neque detrahetis legi maeae,
et in .XII. monet eos, ne faciant, quae ipsis recta videntur.
David preterea in psal., item prophetae omnes de hac una re
queruntur, quod populus se talibus operibus Deo commendare
studeat, quae ipsi excogitassent, non quae dei verbum
prescripsisset, Neque enim ferre hoc Deus potest, ut quidquam
instituamus, quantumvis bonum in speciem, quod ipse non ante
mandaverit. Nam opera nihil aeque commendat atque
obedientia, si quis verbum sequatur." D. Martin Luthers
Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Die Deutsch Bibel 12 vols.
(Wiemar, 1906-1961), 5:5, hereafter refered to as W. A. D. B.
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divine authorization. It was also directly contrary to God's
law which prohibited child sacrifices. Moses wrote
You must not worship the Lord your God in their way,
because in worshipping their gods, they do all kinds of
detestable things the Lord hates. They even burn their
sons and daughters in the fire as sacrifices to their
gods" (Deuteronomy 12:30).34
Both Jephthah's vow and his sacrifice were made without divine authorization. They were both sinful human inventions contrary to God's will. Geisler claims that, "The
Scripture appears to approve of Jephthah keeping the oath to
kill."35 However, this is completely unsubstantiated by
Scripture. There is nothing in the text that even remotely
hints at such an idea.
Thus Olson is correct when he states that this story
contains no conflict of divine moral absolutes. This text
cannot be used to refute the second tenet of non-conflicting
absolutism.
Geisler's fourth illustration with which he attempts
to show a conflict between two moral absolutes, is the case

34This point is repeated. "Let no one be found among
you who sacrifices his son or daughter in the fire. . . .
Anyone who does . . . is detestable to the Lord."
Deuteronomy 18: 10-12.
35Geisler, Options, 85; idem, Christian Ethics, 118.
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of the Hebrew midwives (Exodus 1) and the case of Rahab
(Joshua 2). In both of these stories, Geisler maintains, one
can note a conflict between lying and showing mercy.
In the case of the Hebrew midwives Pharaoh commanded
the midwives, Shiphrah and Puah, to kill all of the newborn
male Israelites (Exodus 1:15-16). However, they refused to
obey. They let the children live. When they were asked why,
they responded by lying, "Hebrew women are not like Egyptian
women, they are vigorous and give birth before the midwives
arrive" (Exodus 1:19). Geisler maintains that the midwives
were confronted with a conflict of moral absolutes.36
Because of their similarity, Geisler discusses the
case of the Hebrew midwives together with the case of Rahab
the prostitute (Joshua 2). Rahab hid two Israelite spies on
the roof of her house in Jericho. When asked concerning
their whereabouts she protected them by lying. "Yes, the men
came to me, but. . . . I do not know which way they went. Go
after them quickly. You may catch up with them" (Joshua 2:45). In both of these cases Geisler maintains one can note an
absolute conflict between "lying and not helping to save a
life (that is, not showing mercy)."37 Thus, Geisler claims
36Geisler, Options, 86.

371bid.
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that these examples refute the second tenet of the nonconflicting absolutists which holds that moral absolutes
never truly conflict.
Olson responds by separating the two stories and
discussing them individually.38 With respect to the Hebrew
midwives, Olson points out that one must carefully distinguish between two different actions. The first action of the
midwives was to disobey the Egyptian government. In this
case the government was commanding something contrary to the
law of God (that is, the death of the innocent male
Israelites). The midwives were placed in a situation where
they had to obey God rather than man.39 For this brave act
they were commended by God. "So God was kind to the midwives. . . . And because the midwives feared God, he gave
them families of their own" (Exodus 1:20-21).
3801son, 6-7.
39Scripture teaches that, "Everyone must submit
himself to the governing authorities, for there is no
authority except that which God has established. The
authorities that exist have been established by God.
Consequently, he who rebels against the authority is
rebelling against what God has instituted, and those who do
so will bring judgment on themselves" (Romans 13:1-2).
However, when the government misuses this delegated authority
by commanding something contrary to God's will, then
Scriptures also plainly teach that "We must obey God rather
than men" (Acts 5:29).
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The second action of the midwives was to lie when they
were called to give an account of their actions. Olson says
this lie was unnecessary. He explains,
The commendation was for disobeying Pharaoh's command,
which was a delegated authority misused by him. There
are two separate actions here which must be distinguished. They disobeyed Pharaoh and were blessed for
it. When called to account, they could (and possibly
should) have acknowledged their disobedience (as Daniel
and his companions did centuries later) .40
Geisler attempts to answer this by writing,
Olson wrongly concludes that the Bible does not commend
the Hebrew midwives for deceiving Pharaoh when the text
explicitly says following their deception that "because
the midwives feared God, that He (God) established
households for them (Ex. 1:21). It is sheer isogesis to
claim that God blessed them in spite of their lie.41
Once again in his latter work Geisler also reemphasizes that, "Nowhere in the text does God ever say they were
blessed only for their mercy and in spite of their lie.
Indeed, the lie was part of the mercy shown."42
Contrary to what Geisler claims, the Biblical text
clearly shows that there were at least two separate actions.
17The midwives, however, feared God

(rettplirroi

40O1son, 7.
41Geisler, "Response to Olson," 85.
42Geisler, Christian Ethics, 122.
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trrilltirriltfi) and did not do what the king of Egypt had
told them to do; they let the boys live. 18Then the king
of Egypt summoned the midwives and asked them, "Why have
you done this? Why have you let the boys live?"
19The midwives answered Pharaoh, "Hebrew women are
not like Egyptian women; they are vigorous and give
birth before the midwives arrive."
"So God was kind to the midwives and the people
increased and became more numerous. 21And because the
midwives feared God, (ntnrrnm r11hrn INT") he gave
them families of their own. (Exodus 1:17-20)43
The first action, along with the rationale for doing
it, is stated in verse seventeen, "The midwives, however,
feared God

ontwrilti ciltrprr rrol,

and . . . they let the

boys live." In verse eighteen Pharaoh calls on the midwives
to give an account of their actions. "Why have you done
this? Why have you let the boys live?"
The second action of the midwives is then related in
verse nineteen. They lie to the king in an attempt to
justify their previous disobedience.44 "Hebrew women are not

43A11 Hebrew references are taken from the Biblia

Hebraica Stuttgartensia W. Rudolph et H. P. RUger et alii
eds., Editio secunda emendata (Stuttgart: Deutsche
Bibelgesellschaft, 1984).
44It is possible that this might not have been a lie.

If this statement by the midwives is true, then, there is no
conflict of moral absolutes, see John Murray, Principles of
Conduct (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co.k 1957), 141,
and Olson, 6.
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like Egyptian women: they are vigorous and give birth before
the midwives arrive." The midwives did not say this because
they feared God. They said this because they feared the
wrath of Pharaoh.
God's response, and the reason for his response, is
then given in verses twenty and twenty-one. "So God was kind
to the midwives. . . . And because the midwives feared God
(

rthx-rrnt rlYrbn wilv-s)

he gave them families of their

own."
Verses seventeen and twenty-one both contain the
phrase "The midwives feared God." That specific phrase, in
verse seventeen relates the reason for the first action of
the midwives, (that is, their saving the male children).
That same phrase used in verse twenty-one explains why God
blessed them with families. This identical phrase, used
twice, clearly links God's blessings in verse twenty-one back
with the saving of the male Israelite children in verse
seventeen. It is the fear of God and the consequent saving
of the children, (that is, their faith expressing itself
through love45), that is commended. There is no commenda-

45"For in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor
uncircumcision has any value. The only thing that counts is
faith expressing itself through love" Galatians 5:6.
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tion for the lie that they told to Pharaoh. This lie seems
to have been a weakness on their part. Walter Kaiser writes,
They (the midwives) are praised for outright refusal to
snuff out male infant lives. Their reverence for life
reflected a reverence for God. . . . The juxtaposition
of the account of their lie to Pharaoh in Exodus 1:19
with the statement that God dealt well with them in
verse 20 might appear to imply an endorsement of their
lie. But this suspicion cannot be sustained in the
text, for twice it attributes the reason for God's
blessing them to the fact that they feared ["believed"]
God [vv. 17 and 21] .46
Thomas Aquinas similarly notes that,
The midwives were not in fact rewarded for their lie,
but for the fear of God and the good-heartedness behind
it; notice that Exodus says pointedly, "And because the
midwives feared God he built them houses." The ensuing
lie, however, was not deserving of reward.47
Augustine also emphasizes this point when he writes that, "It
was not their lie but their faith and fear of God as well as
their mercy toward the Israelite babies which pleased the
Lord."48
"Walter Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics (Grand
Rapids, MI: Zondervan Corporation, 1983), 273.
47Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae 60 vols. Blackfriars edition. (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1964), 2a
2ae.110,3. "Ad secundum dicendum quod obstetrices non sunt
remuneratae pro mendacio, sed pro timore Dei et benevolentia
ex qua processit mendacium. Unde signanter dicitur Exod. I,
Et quia timuerunt obstetrices Deum, aedificavit illis domos.
Mendacium vero postea sequens non fuit meritorium." Ibid.
48John Gerhard, Theological Commonplaces Trans.
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Thus Olson is correct in insisting that there are two
separate actions. Contrary to Geisler's claim, the duty to
be merciful, which was fulfilled in the first action, in no
way conflicted with the duty to tell the truth, which was
left unfulfilled in the second action. This story does not
disprove the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism.
With respect to Rahab (Joshua 2) Olson believes that
the situation is somewhat different. In this case Joshua had
sent two spies into Jericho. Rahab hid these two men on the
roof of her house. When the king of Jericho asked for the
spies she protected them by lying. "I don't know which way
they went. Go after them quickly. You may catch up with
them" (Joshua 2:5). Here it seems that Rahab did indeed show
mercy to the spies by means of her lie.
However, Olson suggests that there are two possible
answers.49 In the first place it is possible that the king

Richard Dinda page 332. Unpublished. Located in the
Concordia Seminary library, St. Louis, Missouri MFCH 81-1.
This is a translation of Ioannis Gerhardi, Loci Theologici
Ed. Preuss edition 10 vols. (Berolini: Gustav Schlawitz,
1863), 3:79. We have been unable to determine the specific
location from which this quote was taken. "Non mendacium
ipsarum, sed fidem et timorem Dei ac misericordiam erga
Isradliticos infantes Domino placuisse." Gerhardi, 3:79.
4901son, 7.
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was misusing the authority that had been delegated to him by
God. If this were the case then Rahab would have been under
no obligation to comply with his command, to reveal the
location of the spies. She, like the midwives, would be
obligated to obey God, and show mercy, rather than to obey
man, and be an accessory to murder.50 Olson maintains that
if the Jericho government lost the legitimacy of its rule it
had no right to the truth. In this way there would have been
no moral conflict for Rahab. For delegated authority is not
absolute. It cannot bind the moral agent in a dilemma of
absolute obligations, when it contradicts the will of God.
Secondly, Olson suggests that, if the Jericho government was not misusing its delegated authority then Rahab
should not have lied. She could have protected the spies by
some other means.
There certainly were other options. She could have
asked a question, "Do you think that I would hide
Israelite spies?" This might have been an adequate
diversion without lying.51
Olson claims that if this were the case, then Scripture's
commendation of Rahab was only for her faithfulness and fear

50See footnote thirty-nine above.
5101son, 7.
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of God, and not for her lie.52
Walter Kaiser stresses a similar point when he writes,
But the areas of Rahab's faith must be strictly
observed. It was not her lying that won her this divine
recognition; rather it was her faith — she "believed in"
the Lord God of the Hebrews. . . . The evidence of her
faith was seen in the works of receiving the spies and
sending them out another way. . . . But her lying was an
unnecessary accouterment to both of the above approved
responses.53
John Murray also emphasizes that one should not
confuse the lying of Rahab with her good deeds. These must
be distinguished. He explains,
It is strange theology that will insist that the
approval of her faith and works in receiving the spies
and helping them to escape must embrace the approval of
all the actions associated with her praiseworthy
conduct.54
Augustine also points out that Rahab performed good
works that were not part of the lie.
Rahab in Jericho received hospitably the men of God who
were strangers, because she ran a risk in receiving
them, because she believed in their God, because she hid
52Ibid. Rahab's words do contain a beautiful
confession of faith when she says "For the Lord your God is
God in heaven above and on the earth below" Joshua 2:11b.
53Walter Kaiser, Toward Old Testament Ethics, 272.
54John Murray, Principles of Conduct (Grand Rapids,
MI: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1957), 138.
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them carefully where she could, because she gave them
most reliable counsel about another way of going back—
for all these reasons may she be praised and
But, the fact that she lied is not
imitated
wisely proposed for imitation, even if . . . God was
mindful to reward those good deeds of hers and clement
in pardoning this bad one.55
The New Testament seems to support this same
argument. It also separates Rahab's lie from the other
actions of love which proceeded from her faith. The New
Testament makes no mention of her lie. However, the letter to
the Hebrews specifically commends her for her faith and for
welcoming the spies. "By faith the prostitute Rahab, because
she welcomed the spies, was not killed with those who were
disobedient" Hebrews 11:31. James commends Rahab for giving
lodging to the spies and for sending them off in another
direction. "In the same way, was not even Rahab the

55Augustine, "Against Lying," The Fathers of the
Church 85 vols. edited by Roy J. Deferrari et alii.,
translated by Harold B. Jaffee it alii (New York: Fathers of
the Church Inc., 1947-1991), 16:170. "Proinde Raab in
Jericho, quia peregrinos homines Dei suscepit hospitio, quia
in eorum susceptione periclitata est, quia in eorum Deum
credidit, quia diligiter eos ubi potuit occultavit, quia per
aliam viam remeandiconsilium fidelissimum
dedit, . . . imitanda laudetur. Quad autem mentita
est . . . non tamen imitandum sapienter proponitur: quamvis
Deus illa bona memorabiliter honoraverit, hoc malum clementer
ignoverit." Augustine, "Contra Mendacium," Migne P. L.
40:542-43.
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prostitute considered righteous for what she did when she
gave lodging to the spies and sent them off in a different
direction?" James 2:25. In these two verses any reference to
Rahab's lie is conspicuously absent. Thus the New Testament
distinguishes her lie from her commendable faith and consequent good works.
In his initial response to Olson, Geisler does not
respond to Olson's first suggestion, that the Jericho government may have lost the legitimacy of its authority and consequently was not entitled to the truth. Nor does he consider
the possibility, that one might distinguish between Rahab's
lie and her faith active in her other works of love. In his
initial response to Olson there is no discussion of Rahab at
all. Such an omission is rather conspicuous by its
absence.56
In Geisler's latter book he writes,
It was by means of the lie that Rahab's mercy was
expressed and the spies were saved. . . . There was no
formal separation between the lie and the act of mercy.
And a mere formal distinction will not suffice as an
explanation, since in actuality there was only one
act.57

56Geisler, "Response to Olson."
57Geisler, Christian Ethics, 88-89.
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Here again the possibility that there was no dilemma, because
the Jericho government may have lost the legitimacy of its
authority is completely ignored. His response to Olson is
inadequate. Olson suggested that even if the government had
not lost its divine legitimacy there is still no dilemma.
Rahab's duty to be merciful to the spies did not conflict
with her duty to tell the truth; since these were separate
actions. Geisler responds simply with, "And a mere formal
distinction will not suffice as an explanation since in
actually there was only one act."58 The quotes given above
from the New Testament, Augustine, John Murray and Walter
Kaiser all show that there is much more here than a mere
superficial distinction.
For Rahab not only believed in the God of Israel, but
that faith was put into loving action in a variety of ways.
She welcomed the spies, gave them information about the mindset of the people (Joshua 2:10-11), sent the spies to her
roof, and then directed them safely out her window. All of
58Ibid. It is difficult to determine what Geisler has
against "formal distinctions" since they are essential in the
correct understanding of theology (for example, among the
persons of the Trinity as well as between the two natures of
Christ). However, in this context he seems to use the phrase
to refer to some distinction that is trivial and superficial,
such as, "Guns don't shoot people, people shoot people." For
the sake of discussion we will accept his use of this phrase.
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these can be more than merely formally distinguished from her
lie. In the first place, her faith provided the motivation
for the performance of these works of love. There is more
than a mere superficial distinction between one's motivation
and the act that is performed. In the second place, these
actions listed above are clearly temporally distinct from her
lie. Contrary to what Geisler claims there is more here than
just one act.
Once again Geisler's illustration does not serve his
intended purpose. The story of Rahab does not illustrate a
conflict between two moral absolutes. It does not refute the
second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism.
Geisler's fifth illustration with which he attempts to
show a conflict between two moral absolutes, and thereby
discredit the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism, is
the so called "moral conflict of the cross."59 Geisler
claims that at Calvary one can clearly see a moral conflict
between two absolute principles. "The two moral principles
are: (1) The innocent should not be punished for sins he
never committed (Ezek. 18:20), and yet (2) Christ was
punished for our sins (Isa. 53; I Peter 2:24;3:18; II Cor.
5:21).,60
59Geisler, Options, 86.
60Geisler, Options, 86.
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Olson responds that there is no real conflict here
because, in the first place, "Christ went voluntarily to the
cross . . . [and] the victim of injustice is in no way
violating any absolute principle of morality by voluntarily
submitting to injustice. u61 In the second place, quoting
Rakestraw, Olson adds, "The moral conflict of the cross is
'completely outside the realm of practical Christian ethics
and is unique in history. ,”62
Geisler attempts to defend this fifth illustration
against Olson's criticism by writing,
Olson sees no moral conflict in the Cross because he is
not looking deep [sic] enough. The Cross is not simply
a conflict between justice and mercy. According to the
Scripture God punished an innocent person (Christ) for
the guilty . . . . Olson seems totally unaware of this
point.63
Both Olson and Geisler miss the main point concerning
the conflict of Calvary. To be sure, from the human perspec-

6101son, 7.
62Olson, 7-8. This contains a quote from Rakestraw,
47.
63Geisler, "Response to Olson," 85. See also
Christian Ethics, 119 where he repeats this same argument
adding the following analogy, "This is like saying it was not
immoral for Jim Jones to order the Jonestown suicide because
his followers did it willingly!" Ibid.
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tive, there appears to be a conflict at Calvary within God's
will; however, it is a conflict between the law and the
gospel. It is not a conflict within the law between two
legal absolutes. Olson is incorrect when he assumes that the
conflict is resolved simply because Christ willingly submitted himself to die.64 Likewise, when Geisler says, "The two
moral principles are: (1) the innocent should not be punished
for sins he never committed . . . and yet (2) Christ was
punished for our sins,"65 he is forgetting that the second
principle he lists is not a legal moral principle at all; but
rather, it is the foundation of the Gospel. Christ's death
on Calvary cannot serve as an example of a legal conflict
between two absolute moral commands.
The sixth and final illustration Geisler gives, in an
attempt to show a conflict of moral absolutes, and thereby
refute the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism, is a
conglomeration of Bible stories which show a conflict between
obedience to civil government and obedience to God. He
writes,

"However, we would agree with his statement, from
Rakestraw, emphasizing that the uniqueness of the event
places it outside the realm of Christian ethics.
65Geisler, Options 86.
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Sixth, there are numerous cases in Scripture in which
there is a real conflict between obeying God's command
to submit to civil government and keeping one's duty to
some other (higher) moral law. For example, the Hebrew
midwives disregarded Pharaoh's command to kill all male
infants (Exod. 1); the Jewish captives disregarded
Nebuchadnezzar's command to worship the golden image of
himself (Dan. 3); Daniel disregarded Darius's [sic]
command to pray only to the king (Dan. 6). In each case
there was plainly no other alternative; those involved
had to follow one or the other of the two commandments.
Even the unqualified absolutists [that is, non-conflicting absolutists] admit the unavoidability of the
conflict, since he reduces one command (the civil one)
to a lower level. This maneuver, however, does not take
away from the fact that (1) both are commands from God
with moral implications, and (2) the situation was
personally unavoidable."
Olson does not specifically respond to this sixth
point of Geisler. Olson must have thought it was unnecessary
to explicitly respond to this since he had already discussed
that the divine command to obey delegated authorities is not
absolute. When the civil government commands one to do that
which is contrary to God's Word, one is no longer obligated
to obey that government. One must obey God rather than man
(Acts 5:29). A government which loses the legitimacy of its
rule in this fashion cannot bind a moral agent in a dilemma
of two moral absolutes.
Geisler is aware of this. He mentions in the above
"Ibid., 87.
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quote that, "The unqualified absolutist . . . reduces one
command (the civil one) to a lower level."67 Then he continues with, "This maneuver, however, does not take way from the
fact that (1) both are commands from God with moral implications, and (2) the situation was personally unavoidable. ”68
First, placing delegated authority on a secondary,
non-absolute level, is not a "maneuver" of the nonconflicting absolutists. it is plainly Scriptural. Second,
the two responses which he gives to this, while factually
true, add nothing to the discussion. Granted, the examples
he gives show situations which were "personally unavoidable."
They also contained conflicting "commands from God."
However, as long as one of the two commands is not an
absolute, there is no absolute moral dilemma. In the six
illustrations which Geisler gives, in his attempt to show the
existence of absolute moral conflicts, none of them have
succeeded.
The second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism, that
claims "Divinely given moral absolutes never truly conflict,"69 would seem to remain firmly intact. However, other
67Ibid.
681bid.
69Rakestraw, 248.
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examples show that such conflicts do indeed occur. Such conflicts may be arranged into at least two different categories, bioethical conflicts and social conflicts.
In bioethics one may note at least three different
types of absolute moral conflicts. The first type is a conflict concerning the application of the fifth commandment,
"You shall not murder" (Exodus 20:13).70 On some occasions a
"Contrary to a minimalist interpretation of the law,
which would apply each commandment in a very narrow sense,
Jesus favors a maximal interpretation of the law which
applies each commandment in the broadest possible way. This
is exemplified in his interpretation of the fifth commandment
when he says, "You have heard that it was said to the people
long ago, 'Do not murder, and anyone who murders will be
subject to judgment.' But I tell you that anyone who is
angry with his brother will be subject to judgment. Again
anyone who says to his brother, 'Raca,' is answerable to the
Sanhedrin. But anyone who says, 'You fool!' will be in
danger of the fire of hell." Matthew 5:21-22. Jesus also
exemplifies this maximal interpretation of the law in his
explanation to the sixth commandment. "You have heard that it
was said, 'Do not commit adultery.' But I tell you that
anyone who looks at a woman lustfully has already committed
adultery with her in his heart." Matthew 5:27-28.
Luther also emphasized this maximal interpretation of
the fifth commandment in his Grosser Katechismus when he
wrote, "Zum andern ist auch dieses Gepots schUldig nicht
allein, der da Bases tuet, sondern auch, wer dem Nahisten
Guts tuen, zuvorkommen, wehren, schUtzen und retten kann,
dass ihm kein Leid noch Schaden am Leibe widerfahre, und tuet
es nicht." Die Bekenntnisschriften Kirche (Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck + Ruprecht, 1986), 608.
Calvin also followed the maximal interpretation of
this commandment in his Institutes where he writes, "In summa
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conflict may occur between the lives of two individuals.
This is illustrated in the case of the therapeutic abortion.
An obstetrician who is confronted with an ectopic pregnancy
may be forced to sacrifice the life of the embryo in order to
save the life of the mother.71 Also pregnant women who have
certain kidney problems can die of uremic poisoning if the
pregnancy is not terminated.72

ergo violentia omnis et iniuria, ac omnino quaevis noxa, qua
proximi corpus laedatur, nobis interdicitur. Ac proinde
iubemur, si quid in opera nostra ad tuendam proximorum vitam
subsidii est, . . . depellendis noxis excubare; si quo in
discrimine sunt, praebere manum auxiliarem." Ioannis Calvini
Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. Guilielmus Baum, Eduardus
Cunitz, and Eduardus Reuss, vol. 30 Corpus Reformatorum
(Brunsvigae: C. A. Schwetschke et Filium, 1864), 294.
This maximal understanding of the law is accepted by
the author of this dissertation and assumed throughout this
study.
71There are approximately 75,000 ectopic pregnancies
per year in the United States. Half of these are
spontaneously aborted during the early stages of pregnancy.
Induced abortions are performed on the other half to save the
life of the mother. James Childress, "Ethics, Public Policy
and Human Fetal Tissue Transplantation Research," Kennedy
Institute of Ethics Journal 1 (June 1991): 97, citing Dorothy
Vawter, et alii. "The Use of Human Fetal Tissue: Scientific,
Ethical, and Policy Concerns." A Report of Phase 1 of an
Interdisciplinary Research Project conducted by the Center
for Biomedical Ethics, January 1990, University of Minnesota.
72Thomas Garrett, Harold Baillie, and Rosellen
Garrett, Health Care Ethics Principles + Problems (Englewood
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Those who recognize the fetus as having a serious right
to life must face and resolve not only the conflict of
rights but the emotional turmoil and anguish of being in
what is often a no-win situation . . . . No matter what
choice is made, great evil follows. . . . This seems to
be part and parcel of the human condition. . . .
Regardless of what decision has been made, she ought to
act with sorrow, knowing that a real good has been sacrificed. . . . no matter what you do, a great evil will
result.73
Due to the very structure of these situations the moral agent
finds herself in a tragic, "no-win" situation. No matter
which decision is made a life will be taken and the fifth
commandment will be broken.74
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989), 148. "In other cases, the
pregnancy might not lead to death but could threaten serious
and permanent impairment of the woman's health. Thus, a
woman with diabetes might lose her sight if the fetus is
carried to term." Ibid.
73Ibid., 149. "When something less than the woman's
life is at stake, it seems simple to resolve the conflict
since a serious right to life ought to take precedence over a
right to some lesser good, such as one's eyesight . . . .
This may be true in many cases, but in other cases such as
analysis is simplistic . . . . the woman must consider the
good of the family who might have a blind . . . mother if the
fetus is carried to term." Ibid.
74This conflict, and the others mentioned below, will
evoke questions concerning the distinction between actions
that are intended and actions that are unintended. This
distinction is discussed below with respect to the theory of
double effect in tenet number six of non-conflicting absolutism. The reader may wish to consult that at this point.
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The second bioethical conflict is between telling the
truth and showing mercy. Scripture demands truthfulness.75
Yet it also demands that we show mercy.76 If a merciful
action is understood as that type of action exemplified by
the good Samaritan,77 and if lying is understood as an intentional deception,78 then there are situations when such
merciful promotions of healing conflict with telling the
truth. Such a conflict is especially prevalent in the

75"You shall not give false testimony against your
neighbor." Exodus 20:16. "Do not lie. Do not deceive one
another." Leviticus 19:11. "Do not lie to each other."
Colossians 3:9. "Therefore each of you must put off
falsehood and speak truthfully to his neighbor." Ephesians
4:25.
76"For I desire mercy, not sacrifice." Hosea 6:6.
"And what does the Lord require of you? To act justly and to
love mercy and to walk humbly with your God." Micah 6:8.
"Blessed are the merciful for they will be shown mercy."
Matthew 5:7. "Be merciful, just as your Father is merciful."
Luke 6:36.
77After telling this parable Jesus asked, "'Which of
these three do you think was a neighbor to the man who fell
into the hands of robbers?'
The expert in the law replied, 'The one who had mercy
on him.
Jesus told him, 'Go and do likewise.'" Luke 10:36-37.
78Qua propter ille mentitur, qui aliud habet in animo,
et aliud verbis vel quibuslibet significationibus enuntiat."
Augustine "De Mendacio" Migne P. L. 40:488.
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medical use of placebos.79 This is illustrated in the following example.
A sixty-five-year-old retired army officer had several
abdominal operations for gallstones, postoperative adhesions, and bowel obstructions. Because of chronic
abdominal pain, loss of weight, and social withdrawal,
he voluntarily entered a psychiatric ward. Although he
had had a very productive military, teaching, and
research career, he was now somewhat depressed and
unkept and had poor hygiene. Furthermore, he and his
wife had curtailed their social activities because he
could not control his pain without assuming awkward and
embarrassing postures. He relied on six self-administered injections each day of Talwin (Pentazocine), which
he believed to be essential to control his pain. He
quoted the early literature to support his claim that
Talwin is nonaddictive; later studies, however, indicated that it is addictive. Having used this medication
for more than two years, he had so much tissue and
muscle damage that he had difficulty finding injection
sites. His goal for therapy was to "get more out of
79"The therapeutic use of placebos merits special
attention because it is common in medicine and usually
involves deception or incomplete disclosure of information.
A placebo (from the Latin for "I shall please") is a
substance or procedure that the health-care professional
believes to be pharmacologically or biomedically inert for
the condition being treated. Studies indicate that placebos
relieve some symptoms of approximately thirty-five percent of
patients who suffer from such conditions as angina pectoris,
cough, anxiety, depression, hypertension, headache, and the
common cold . . . . Fundamental moral questions appear in the
use of placebos without the patient's knowledge or consent,
where the physician engages in nondisclosure, incomplete
disclosure, or deception." Tom L. Beauchamp and James F.
Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 3d ed., (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989), 93.
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life in spite of my pain."
This psychiatric ward included behavior therapy
programs, daily group therapy, ward government, and
social activities, and the staff ignored pain behaviors
in order to avoid reinforcing them. Their positive
procedures included relaxation techniques, covert
imagery, and cognitive relabeling. Although the patient
had voluntarily admitted himself to this ward, where
adjustment in medication was a clear expectation, he
refused to allow direct modification of his Talwin
dosage levels on the grounds that his experience showed
that the level of medication was indispensable to
controlling his pain. After considerable discussion
with colleagues, the therapists decided to withdraw the
Talwin over time without the patient's knowledge by
diluting it with increasing proportions of normal
saline. Although the patient experienced nausea,
diarrhea, and cramps, he thought that these withdrawal
symptoms were actually the result of Elavil
(Amitriptyline), which the therapists had introduced to
relieve the withdrawal symptoms. While the therapists
did not use Elavil to deceive the patient, it served
that purpose, for he blamed it for his discomfort. The
staff had informed the patient that his medication
regime would be modified but had not given him the
details.
After three weeks of saline injections, the therapists explained what had been done. At first, the
patient was incredulous and angry, but he asked that the
saline be discontinued and the self-control techniques
continued. When he was discharged three weeks later, he
reported that he experienced some abdominal pain but
that he could control it more effectively with the selfcontrol techniques than previously with the Talwin. A
follow-up six months later showed that he was still
using the relaxation techniques and had resumed social
activities and part-time teaching. 80
80Ibid., 406-407. The conflict between truth and
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In this case study the physicians knew that it was in
the best interest of the patient to gradually withdraw him
from the use of the pain killer, Talwin (Pentazocine), to
which he had become addicted. They mercifully sought a way
whereby he could control his pain and resume a more active
life. However, they realized that intentional deception was
necessary if they were to succeed. In this way they were
confined within a dilemmatic situation. Either they would
show mercy and help the patient, in which case it would be
necessary to break God's absolute command against lying; or
they would speak the truth to the patient and thereby fail to
comply with God's absolute command to show mercy. There is
no third alternative. There is no way to avoid sin in such a
conflict situation.81

mercy is not confined to the use of placebos. For an example
of such a conflict that is not caused by placebos the reader
may see case six in Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of
Biomedical Ethics, 407-408.
81In the field of bioethics the conflict between truth
and mercy is often discussed in terms of patient autonomy
(especially with respect to disclosure and consent)
conflicting with beneficence, occasioning the problem of
paternalism. For more information concerning this conflict,
particularly with respect to the use of placebos the reader
may wish to see A. Shapiro, "Attitudes Toward the Use of
Placebos in Treatment," Journal of Nervous and Mental
Disease, 130 (1960): 200-211, H. Brady, "The Lie that Heals:
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A third type of bioethical conflict occurs when there
is opposition between God's absolute law to show mercy and
his absolute law not to kill. This may occur with the terminally ill patient who is suffering unbearable pain. This is
illustrated in the following case that came before the
English courts in 1989. In this case "Baby C" had become a
ward of the court. The judge asked one of the nation's foremost pediatricians to examine "Baby C." Below is an excerpt
from his report.
The records revealed that at birth she had a much more
serious condition than the usual type of hydrocephalus.
The detailed investigations which were done showed that
there was not merely a blockage of cerebro-spinal fluid
within the brain, but that the brain structure itself
was poorly formed. . . . [C's] appearance is of a tiny
baby. Although she is 16 weeks old, she is the size of
a 4 week baby apart from her head, which is unusually
large by way of being tall and thin-squashed because of
sleeping on her side. She lies quiet until handled and
then she cries as if irritated. Her eyes move wildly in
an uncoordinated way and she does not appear to see.
(Her pupils do not respond to light so it is most unlikely that the mechanism for vision is present). She
The Ethics of Giving Placebos," Annals of Internal Medicine
97 (1982): 112-118, U. Knapp, and R. J. Michock;, "Placebos:
Who's Being Fooled?" American Pharmacy 24 (1984): 4-5, Mary
C. Rawlinson, "Truth-Telling and Paternalism in the Clinic:
Philosophical Reflections on The Use of Placebos in Medical
Practice," chap. in Placebo: Theory, Research and Mechanisms
(New York: Guilford Press, 1985). Carol A. VanKirk and
Edward D. Schreck, "Truth-Telling and Placebos: A Conflict of
Duties," Listening 22 (Winter 1987): 52-64.
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did not respond to very loud noises that I made, though
the nurses said that she sometimes seems startled to
their loud noises. However, my impression was that she
did not hear, or had very poor hearing. She holds her
limbs in a stiff flexed position. More detailed examination suggested that she had generalized spasticity of
all her limbs as a result of the brain damage. The only
social response she makes is the irritable crying when
handled, though sometimes she can be pacified by stroking her face. She does not smile and does not respond in
any other way. The only certain evidence of her feeling
or appreciating events is the report of her quietening
when her face is stroked. Thus she does not have the
developmental skills and abilities of a normal new born
baby. It is inconceivable that appreciable skills will
develop, bearing in mind that there had been no progress
during the past four months. She has severe brain
damage. She is very thin and has not gained weight
despite devoted nursing care at [the hospital]. She is
receiving regular small doses of the sedative Chloral.
If she does not receive that she cries "as if in pain",
though the carers are unsure where the pain originates.
I do not believe that there is any treatment which will
alter the ultimate prognosis, which appears to be
hopeless. She has massive handicap as a result of a
permanent brain lesion. Her handicap appears to be a
mixture of severe mental handicap, blindness, probably
deafness and spastic cerebral palsy of all four limbs.
In addition, although given a normal amount of food, her
body is not absorbing or using it in the normal way so
that she is not growing. . . . In the event of her
acquiring a serious infection, or being unable to take
feeds normally by mouth I do not think it would be correct to give antibiotics, to set up intravenous fusions
or nasal-gastric feedings regimes. Such action would be
prolonging a life which has no future . . . . [One must
bear] in mind the balance between short-term gain and
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needless prolongation of suffering.82
In this case study the pediatrician mercifully
suggests that the dying of baby C not be prolonged. He
writes,
In the event of her acquiring a serious infection, or
being unable to take feeds normally by mouth I do not
think it would be correct to give antibiotics, to set up
intravenous fusions or nasal-gastric feeding regimes.
Such action would be prolonging a life which has no
future.83
However, such a merciful action, which refuses to prolong the
suffering of this terminally ill infant, also fails to "do
him [her] good, prevent, resist evil, defend and save him
[her], so that no bodily harm or hurt happen to him [her], ”84
and is thus guilty of breaking the fifth commandment.
On the other hand the physicians could obey the fifth
commandment and "defend and save him [her] so that no bodily

82A11 England Law Reports, Peter Hutchesson, ed.
(London: Butterworths, 1989), 2: 785.
831bid.

84Luther, Concordia Triglotta "The Large Catechism"
(St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921), 635. Luther
adds, "Darumb heisset auch Gott billich die alle Murder, so
in NOten und Fahr Leibs und Lebens nicht raten noch helfen,
und wird gar schrecklich Urteil fiber sie gehen lassen am
jUngsten Tage." Die Bekenntnisschriften 608-609.
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harm or hurt happen to him [her]..85 However, they would
then fail to show mercy and would be prolonging the suffering
of this terminally ill child." Once again, as with the
other two examples given above, there is no third alternative. There is no way to avoid sin. Thus the Christian is
confronted with an insoluble moral dilemma.
Upon examining society at large, one may note at least
two different ethical problems which often involve moral
dilemmas. These are the problems of divorce and the just
war. Helmut Thielicke discusses these problems within the
context of "God's compromises with the world" and the
distinction between God's proper will and his alien will
('der aliena and der propria voluntas).87
85Luther, Concordia Triglotta, 635.
86This conflict between mercy and murder is usually
discussed in bioethics in terms of withdrawing or withholding
ordinary or extraordinary care and occasions the problem of
euthanasia. For more bibliographical information on the
bioethical problems discussed in this section the reader may
wish to see, The Hastings Center's Bibliography of Ethics,
Biomedicine, and Professional Responsibility (Frederick, MD:
university Publications of America, Inc., 1984), and LeRoy
Walters and Tamer Joy Kahn, eds., Bibliography of Bioethics
published annually by the Kennedy Institute of Ethics
Samuel
(Washington DC: Georgetown University, 1975,
Southard, ed., Death and Dying: A Bibliography Survey (New
York: Greenwood Press, 1991).
87Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics trans. John w.
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Thielicke's distinction, between the proper will and
the alien will of God, corresponds to the distinction,
between God's primary will and his secondary will, that was
made above. Thielicke identifies the primary will of God as
being his proper will. That was the original "true will of
God" ("eigentlichen" Willen Gottes).88 However, due to the
present sinful state of the world, it cannot tolerate this
proper will of God.
The world would be broken and consumed by the "true"
will of God represented in the plan of creation. It
would wither before the immediacy of the divine majesty.
Hence God relativizes his own demand in order that man
may live, in order that man may be granted the kairos of
God's ongoing salvation history.89
Thielicke explains that the motive behind this
relativization of God's law is not a weakness on the part of
God. This alien or secondary will of God is not improper
Doberstein, vol. 1., Foundations (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1979), 567-77, 655-660. Theologische Ethik
vol. 2. 1. (Tlibingen: J. C. B. Mohr, 1955), 190-201, 314-320.
88Thielicke, Ethics, 1:567.

Ethik, 2.1:190.

89Thielicke, Ethics 1:569. "Die Welt wiirde am
'eigentlichen' Willen Gottes, wie ihn der SchOpfungsentwurf
reprasentiert, zerbrechen und verbrennen. Sie mUsste an der
Unmittelbarkeit der gottlichen Majestat sterben. So
relativiert Gott seine eigene Forderung, um den Menschen
leben zu lassen und ihm den Rairos seiner weiterlaufenden
Heilsgeschichte zu gonnen." Ethik, 2.1:192.
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(uneigentlichen) in the sense of being depraved
(depravierten). Nor does it essentially contradict the
divine motive of the primary will.
The motive behind the alien will of God is rather that
of his condescending love. . . . For this reason the
alien will cannot be regarded dynamically as compromise.
It must rather be understood soteriologically as divine
condescension. . . .
Consequently, when we have to do with God's alien
will, we are not dealing with an impropriety stemming
from weakness. On the contrary, we are dealing with an
expression of God's true being, with his patience and
grace."
In this way the distinction between the proper and the
alien will of God does not present a division or a dichotomy
within the essence of the divine nature itself. Thielicke
explains that this distinction is analogous to the distinction between law and gospel.
It is a movement like that between the Law and the
Gospel, where again I cannot objectively see and fix the
unity. Theologically I cannot make the unity of God an
"Thielicke, Ethics, 1:657. "Das Motiv der voluntas
Dei aliena ist vielmehr seine sich herabneigende, auf den
Fortbestand, auf den Kairos des Emporers bedachte Liebe. Die
voluntas aliena darf darum nicht dynamisch als Kompromiss,
sondern sie muss soteriologisch als Kondeszendenz Gottes
verstanden werden. . . .
Es geht folglich in dem alienum des gottlichen Willens
nicht um eine Uneigentlichkeit aus Schwache, sondern es geht
um eine Ausserungsform seines eigentlichen Wesens, namlich um
Geduld and Gnade." Ethik, 2.1:316.
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objective matter in which the author of the Law and the
author of the Gospel are seen to be identical; I can
only believe in this unity.91
One example of the condescension of God's secondary
will may be noted in the divine attitude change concerning
divorce. It is God's primary will that husband and wife live
together.92 However, in an adulterous situation, God's
secondary will graciously allows for divorce.93 In an
abusive case where one's life is in danger, or where the
lives of one's children are at stake, God's secondary will
91Thielicke, Ethics, 658-59. "Es ist mit dieser
Bewegung ahnlich wie mit der Bewegung zwischen Gesetz und
Evangelium: auch hier kann ich die Einheit von beidem nicht
gegenstandlich sehen und fixiern. Ich kann Gott theologisch
nicht als eine Einheit konstruieren und gegenstandlich
machen, in welcher der auctor des Gesetzes und des
Evangeliums in seiner Identitat sichtbar ist; aber ich glaube
ihn als diese Einheit." Ethik, 2.1:318.
92"But at the beginning of creation God 'made them
male and female.' For this reason a man will leave his
father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will
become one flesh.' So they are no longer two, but one.
Therefore what God has joined together, let man not separate.
. . . Anyone who divorces his wife and marries another
woman commits adultery against her. And if she divorces her
husband and marries another man, she commits adultery" Mark
10:6-9,11. "A wife must not separate from her husband" 1
Corinthians 7:10b.
93"I tell you that anyone who divorces his wife,
except for marital unfaithfulness, and marries another woman
commits adultery" Matthew 19:9.
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may even demand a divorce. Thielicke explains,
This alteration [in God's will] is most clearly seen
when Jesus sets aside the divine permission of Mosaic
divorce (Matt. 19:7; Mark 10:4). He points out that
"from the beginning" of creation it was not so. Divorce
does not correspond to the true [that is, primary] will
of God or the true plan of creation but is simply a concession of the divine patience to the "hardness" of
men's hearts which sometimes makes divorce indispensable
(Matt. 19:8: Mark 10:6).94
God's secondary will may allow, or even require, a
woman to get a divorce in order to save her life from an
abusive husband; yet, at the same time his primary will

94Thielicke, Ethics, 571. "Am deutlichsten tritt
diese Alteration zutage, wenn Jesus zwar die gottliche
Erlaubtheit des mosaischen Scheidebriefes einraumt, wenn er
aber gleichzeitig darauf hinweist, dass "von Anfang der
Schopfung" so nicht gewesen sei, dass es darum auch dem
eigentlichen Willen Gottes und dem eigentlichen
Schopfungsentwurf nicht entspreche, sondern nur eine
Konzession der gOttlichen Geduld an die menschliche
"Herzenshartigkeit" sei, die unter bestimmten Umstanden der
Ehescheidung eben nicht entraten konne." Ethik 2.1:194.
Thieliche continues by adding, "Warde aber das
Schopfungsgebot, gemass dem Mann und Weib einander endgultig
zugeordnet sind, ungebrochen aufrechterhalten, so wurde das
in der Welt der Schwache und der aKkripwcapaia zu unertraglichen
Zustanden fahren. Das radikale SchOpfungsgebot wiirde in
dieser Welt und auf dieser Ebene nur Schrecken und Chaos
stiften. Die Welt ist dem gottlichen Entwurf so entfremdet,
dass sie an ihm zerbrechen und zugrunde gehen masste, wenn
Gott nicht die Gnade seines sich akkommodierenden Eingehens
aber das Recht seines urspriinglichen Anspruches triumphieren
liesse." Thielicke, Ethik, 2.1:194.
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condemns such action, because divorce, no matter how necessary it may be, is still less than the perfection which God's
primary will desires. She too must repent. For her divorce
illustrates that she, by her very action of divorce, is
participating in (and thereby sharing the guilt of) a
marriage which is less than what God's primary will demands.
The second example of a social problem that involves a
moral dilemma is the problem of the just war. This also may
be analyzed in terms of a conflict between the primary and
secondary will of God.
It is God's primary will that humankind live together
in peace and harmony.95 Yet, God's secondary will may allow
or even demand one to participate in a just war.96
95The pacifists emphasize God's primary will when they
mention such passages as, "Blessed are the peacemakers for
they will be called sons of God" Matthew 5:9. "If it is
possible, as far as it depends on you, live at peace with
everyone (Ircirrow avepoinow)" Romans 12:18. "Finally my
brothers, good-by. Aim for perfection, listen to my appeal,
be of one mind, live at peace (dwrivekTe). And the God of
love and peace will be with you" 2 Corinthians 13:11. "Make
every effort to live in peace with all men Minim 61ASKETE yeTi
Trcivrwv)" Hebrews 12:14a. All Greek references are taken from
the Novum Testamentum Graece, Eberhard Nestle and Kurt Aland,
eds. 26 edition (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft,
1979).
96Luther and the other advocates of the just war
theory emphasize God's secondary will when they point out
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With this duality in mind a Christian soldier may
serve in the military with a clear conscience. For in this
sinful world the vocation of the soldier is needed. It is an
important service of love.97 However, that cannot be the

that participation in a just war is not contrary to God's
will. Luther writes, "Auff die weysse haben das schwerd
gefuret alle heyligen von anfang der willt, Adam mit seynen
nachkomen. Alsso furet es Abraham, da er Lot, seynes bruders
son, erredtet und schlug die vier konige, Gen. 14. so er doch
gantz und gar eyn Euangelisch man war. Also schlug Samuel,
der heylige prophet den konig Hagag, .1. Reg: .15. Unnd
Elias die propheten Baal, 3. Reg: .18. Alsso habens gefurt
Mose, Josua, die kinder Israel, Samson, David und alle konige
und fursten ym allten testament. Item Daniel und seyne
gesellen Ananias, Asarias und Misael zu Babylonen. Item
Joseph ynn Egypten und so furt an.
Ob aber yemand wollt furgeben, das allte testament
sey auff gehaben und gelt nicht mehr, darumb kunde man den
Christen solch exempel nicht furtragen, Antwort ich: das ist
nicht also. Denn S. Paulus .1. Cor: .10. spricht: "sie haben
die selbige geystliche speysse essen unnd tranck getruncken
von dem felss, der Christus ist, wie wyr, das ist, sie haben
eben den selben geyst und glawben an Christum gehabt, den wyr
haben, und eben so wol Christen gewessen als wyr. Darumb,
woran sie recht than haben, dar thun alle Christen recht von
anfang der wellt biss ans ende." Luther, W. A. 11:255-56.
(L. W. 45:96-97.)
97Luther writes, "Obs nu wol nicht scheinet, das
wurgen und rauben ein werck der liebe ist, derhalben ein
einfeltiger denckt, Es sey night ein Christlich werck, zyme
auch eym Christen nicht zy thun: So ists doch ynn der warheit
auch ein werck der liebe. Denn gleich wie ein guter artzt,
wenn die seuche so bose und gros ist, das er mus hand, fus,
ohr odder augen lassen abhawen odder verderben, auff das er
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last word. For the soldier, by his very action in battle, is
culpable and stands accused of participating in a situation
that is less than what God's primary will demands. Thielicke
writes,
What is involved is that will of God which has voluntarily restricted itself in face of the fallen world. This
is why a Christian in the armed forces, while he may
with a "good conscience" champion his cause so far as
this is possible, risking his life for his country and
den leib errette, so man an sihet das gelied, das er abhewet,
scheinet es, er sey ein grewlicher, unbarmhertziger mensch.
So man aber den leib ansihet, den er wil damit erretten, so
findet sichs ynn der warheit, das er ein trefflicher, trewer
mensch ist und ein gut, Christlich (so veil es an yhm selber
ist) werck thut. Also auch wenn ich dem krige ampt zu sehe,
wie es die bosen strafft, die unrechten wurget und solchen
jamer anrichtet, scheinet es gar ein unchristlich werck sein
und alley dinge widder die Christliche liebe. Sihe ich aber
an, wie es die frumen schutzt, weib und kind, haus und hoff,
gut und ehre und friede damit erhelt und bewaret, so sind
sichs, wie kostlich und Gottlich das werck ist, und wercke,
das es auch ein bein odder hand abhewet, auff das der gantze
leib nicht vergehe. Denn wo das schwerd nicht werete und
fride hielte, so muste es alles durch unfride verderben, was
ynn der welt ist. Derhalben ist ein solcher krieg nicht
anders denn ein kleiner, kurtzer unfriede, der eym ewigen
unmeslichem unfriede weret, Ein klein ungluck, das eym
grossen ungluck weret." Luther, W. A. 19:625-26. (L. W.
46:96).
"Denn das ist auch ein beruff, der aus dem gesetz der
liebe her quillet." Luther, W. A. 19:657. (L. W. 46:131).
"Und ynn solchem krieg ist es Christlich und eyn werck
der liebe, die feynde getrost wurgen, rauben und brennen und
alles thun, was schedlich ist, biss man sie uberwinde nach
kriegs leufften." Luther, W. A. 11:277. (L. W. 45:125).
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for his wife and children, can never simply "approve" of
war. He knows that even a war which — given things as
they are — is "just," must always stand in need of forgiveness.98
The social problems of divorce and the just war, as
well as the bioethical conflicts examined above, illustrate
that actual moral dilemmas do occur in modern society. There
are times when the moral agent is confronted with two opposing laws of God in such a way that he must break one in order
to keep the other. Contrary to the second tenet of nonconflicting absolutism there are times when there is no third
alternative and sin becomes unavoidable.
The third tenet of non-conflicting absolutism stresses
that there may be exceptions and qualifications to God's
absolute commands, but such exceptions or qualifications are
always part of the command itself. They are not projected
onto the absolute command from the outside. Robert Rakestraw
writes, "NCA does recognize qualifications and even exceptions, but these are always within the absolute itselfl

They

98Thielicke, Ethics, 655. "bass es namlich um den
sich beschrankenden Willen Gottes angesichts der gefallen
Welt geht. Darum kann auch der christliche Soldat, der im
Rahmen des Moglichen mit gutem Gewissen seine Sache vertritt
und der mit seinem Leben fur Vaterland, Weib und Kind
einsteht, den Krieg nie einfach "bejahen." Er wird vielmehr
um die VergebungsbedUrftigkeit selbst des rebus sic stantibus
"gerechten" Krieges wissen." Thielicke, Ethik, 2.1:314.
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are part of the absolute and are therefore not exceptions to
the absolute."99
Rakestraw illustrates this with the example that
children are to obey their parents. He claims that built
into this absolute principle is the exceptional clause,
"except when they command that which is known to be contrary
to God's revealed truth..100 Rakestraw emphasizes that the
moral agent must distinguish between two different
"categories or kinds (not 'levels') of absolutes..101 The
first category concerns direct obedience to God; whereas, the
second category concerns obedience to those "whose authority
has been delegated to them by God..102 This distinction is
of the utmost importance.
Examples of the first category include prohibitions
against lying, murder, adultery, and the commands to be
patient and kind to others. The second category
99Rakestraw, 249. See also Olson, 8-9.
100Rakestraw, 249.
101Ibid. In order to avoid leaning toward
hierarchicalism Rakestraw intentionally points out that these
are not to be considered "levels"; however Olson, a modified
non-conflicting absolutist has no problem using that term,
see Olson 8. This is their main distinguishing
characteristic.
102Rakestraw, 249.
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includes such matters as obedience to parents, governmental officials, and local church leaders.103
At this point non-conflicting absolutism emphasizes
that there can never be moral conflicts between these two
categories of authority because, "The absolute is defined in
such a way that obedience is to be rendered [to the secondary
category] only when human demands do not violate clear
Scriptural prohibitions and instructions.'404 In this way
any apparent conflict is easily resolved by simply remembering that one is to obey God rather than man (Acts 5:29).
Geisler criticizes this tenet by refusing to accept
the fact that the absolute laws of Scripture can contain
their own qualifications and exceptions. He maintains that
any law ceases to be absolute if it has any kind of qualification or exception whatsoever. Geisler writes,
Unqualified absolutism does not need a thousand qualifications to kill it; it can die "a death by one qualification." As Rant acknowledged, even one exception to a
rule proves the rule is not genuinely universa1.105
It is theoretically possible for an absolute rule to
contain a qualification and still remain absolute. Such a
103Rakestraw, 249-50.
104Rakestraw, 250.
105Geisler, Christian Ethics (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker
Book House, 1989), 91.
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qualification would only be a clarification of the absolute
rule. In the example given above the absolute rule would not
be "children obey your parents." The absolute rule would be
"children obey your parents, unless they command that which
is contrary to God's Word." Contrary to Geisler's claim,
there is no reason to presume that this latter rule, that
contains the exceptional clause, cannot be absolute.106 It
would simply mean that there are to be no exceptions to the
rule that "children are to obey their parents, unless their
parents command that which is contrary to God's Word."
Geisler's criticism does not negate this third tenet.
There are, however, two major problems with this third
tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. On the one hand, if the
laws concerning obedience to God, and obedience to those with
delegated authority, are both considered to be absolute, then
non-conflicting absolutism dissolves into a kind of hierarchicalism as soon as it gives precedence to the former over
the latter. It does not matter that Rakestraw goes out of
his way to call them "categories" rather than "levels." When
he gives precedence to one category over the other he has
106It was mentioned above that by the term "absolute"
we mean a rule that is more than prima facie. An absolute
law (or rule) demands universal obedience in all times and in
all places, without exceptions.
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developed a hierarchy. As Geisler writes,
The only way one can know which moral law should be
qualified is if he has knowledge of which is higher and
which is lower. But this is a form of graded absolutism
[or hierarchicalism], not unqualified absolutism [or
non-conflicting absolutism] .107
On the other hand, non-conflicting absolutism could
resolve the dilemma by reclassifying the laws concerning
obedience to delegated authorities. If such laws were no
longer viewed as absolute, but merely prima facie, then they
could not create a moral dilemma with any absolute law. For
the prima facie law would give way to any absolute law. If
this option were chosen, then they would have to choose a
different example with which to emphasize the role of qualifications and exceptions within absolute laws. This is
precisely what Olson has done. He writes, "The qualifications (or better definitions) of murder . . . exclude capital
punishment, self defense, and killing in war. N108
However, the non-conflicting absolutists will look in
vain for any Scripture passages (that is, any clear sedes
doctrinae) where the fifth commandment is clearly revoked or
suspended for the sake of capital punishment, self-defense or
107Ibid., 92.
10801son, 8.
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killing in a just war. These three situations may be allowed
by God. In some cases they may even be commanded by God,
according to his secondary will. However, no where in
Scripture is there ever the remotest reference that the fifth
commandment is revoked or suspended because God, according to
his secondary will, allowed or commanded capital punishment,
self-defense, or a just war. It is an unscriptural human
assumption to take for granted that such a suspension or
revocation consistently occurs, or has ever occurred, in such
situations. This third tenet, in the form it is presented by
Rakestraw and Olson cannot be maintained without becoming
hierarchical, or unscriptural.
The fourth tenet in non-conflicting absolutism is that
the moral agent is not responsible for whatever evil may come
as a result of his obedience to the law. Rakestraw explains
that, "The person who obeys a clear ethical absolute in a
situation of apparent conflict is not morally accountable for
whatever evil may be done by others in response to such
obedience."109 Rakestraw gives the example of lying to save
a person's life. He claims that in order to save a life one
may speak a half-truth or deceive by speaking unrelated
truths, but the moral agent must not lie. He explains the
109Rakestraw, 251.
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rationale behind this by quoting Erwin Lutzer.
The Christian believes that his responsibility is obedience and that the consequences of moral action are then
in the hands of God. If refusing to commit adultery or
even telling the truth . . . causes others to die, this
also is within the providence of God.110
Geisler criticizes this point by emphasizing its
failure to be concerned about sins of omission. Geisler
writes,
Unqualified absolutists believe there is no real moral
dilemma in the case of lying or permitting murder. They
believe there is only one moral obligation in this situation - to tell the truth. The only other duty, they
say belongs to the person threatening to do the killing.
He is responsible for what he does with the truth we
give him. But is this over-looking the fact that there
is also a duty to save innocent lives, to show mercy?
In short is there a real conflict between truthfulness
and mercifulness? In other words, the choice is really
between an act of commission and one of omission. And a
sin of omission can be just as much a sin as a sin of
commission (James 4:17) .111
Geisler makes a compelling point here. He could also
have mentioned Luther's explanation to the fifth commandment
in the Large Catechism, wherein he writes, "Therefore God

110Rakestraw, 251-52, citing Erwin Lutzer, The
Morality Gap (Chicago: Moody Press, 1972), 110.
111Geisler, Christian Ethics, 89-90. "Anyone, then
who knows the good he ought to do and doesn't do it, sins."
James 4:17.
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also rightly calls all those murderers who do not afford
counsel and help in distress and danger of body and life, and
will pass a most terrible sentence upon them in the last
day.'412 In view of the importance of sins of omission, this
fourth tenet of non-conflicting absolutism cannot be maintained. For the moral agent is not only responsible for his
actions, but he is responsible for his inactions as well.
The following tenet is directly related to this.
The fifth tenet in non-conflicting absolutism can be
viewed as the direct cause of the fourth tenet above. It
holds that Christian ethics must be deontological. Rakestraw
writes,
NCA is primarily and essentially deontological. . . .
NCA stresses duties rather than results. We follow a
given norm first of all because it is good in itself to
do so, not primarily because it appears that it will
produce good effects.113
Likewise, Olson also explains, "It is an absolute not
to murder; but it is not an absolute to save a life. . . . We

112Luther, Concordia Triglotta, 635. "Darumb heisset
auch Gott billich die alle Murder, so in Noten und Fahr Leibs
und Lebens nicht raten noch helfen, und wird gar schrecklich
Urteil fiber sie gehen lassen am jungsten Tage." Die
Bekenntnisschriften, 608-609.
113Rakestraw, 252.
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must not decide ethical matters on a teleological basis. '414
This fifth tenet is mistaken on two accounts. In the
first place, just as in the fourth tenet above, it minimizes
the importance of sins of omission. Geisler observes,
Olson contends that "it is an absolute not to commit
murder; [yet adds in the same sentence!] but it is not
an absolute to save a life" (p. 12). What significant
moral difference is there between a sin of commission
(which takes an innocent life), and one of omission
(which willfully allows that life to be taken) ?115
In the second place, this overemphasis on the deontological element does not give adequate attention to the teleological element in Christian ethics that was noted to be so
important in chapter two above. For these two reasons this
fifth tenet must be rejected.116

11401son, 12.
115Geisler, "Response to Olson," 83, citing Olson, 12.
In some cases, there may be a "significant moral difference"
between actively taking a life and passively allowing a life
to die (for example, when extraordinary treatment is withheld
from the terminally ill); however, the difference does not
lie in that the former action breaks an absolute law,
whereas, the latter inaction does not. The entire fifth
commandment is absolute, both in what it forbids and in what
it commands. The difference lies in the degree, or in the
extent, to which the moral agent is involved in the death.
116The fourth and fifth tenets seem to illustrate that
a lack of teleological awareness in ethics leads to a failure
to recognize sins of omission.
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The sixth and final tenet in non-conflicting absolutism is the principle of double effect.
In cases of ethical conflict where it appears that a
given action will produce two effects, one desirable and
one undesirable, it may be permissible to perform the
action as long as the undesirable effect is not directly
intended. Such matters as wounding or killing a person
in self-defense and surgery to save the life of an
expectant mother, when the fetus will surely die as a
result of the surgery, are typical cases in which the
principle of double effect may be applicable.117
Traditionally, the principle of double effect emphasizes that an act is morally justified if it meets four
criteria. First, the action which causes the evil must be
morally good. Second, the intention must be focused toward
the performance of the good effect and not the evil effect.
Third, "The good effect must precede or at least be simultaneous with the evil effect.418 Fourth, the good effect must
proportionately outweigh the evil effect.
The importance of the intention of the moral agent,
noted by Rakestraw and emphasized as the second of the four
criteria of the theory of double effect mentioned above, was
also stressed by Peter Abelard. He refers to the morality of
the same act performed at two different times, with different
117Rakestraw, 252.
118Rakestraw, 252.
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intentions.
In fact we say that an intention is good, that is, right
in itself, but that an action does not bear anything
good in itself but proceeds from a good intention.
Whence when the same thing is done by the same man at
different times, by the diversity of his intention,
however, his action is now said to be good, now bad.119
Thomas Aquinas discusses the intentions of the moral
agent who effects two separate results from one causative
action.
A single act may have two effects, of which one alone is
intended, whilst the other is incidental to that intention. But the way a moral act is to be classified
depends on what is intended, not on what goes beyond
such an intention, since this is merely incidental
thereto.120
This distinction later became one of the basic principles in
the theory of double effect.121
119D. E. Luscombe, ed. Peter Abelard's Ethics (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1971), 53. "Bonam quippe intentionem, hoc
est, rectum in se dicimus, operationem uero non quod boni
aliquid in se suscipiant, sed quod ex bona intentione
procedat. Vnde et ab eodem homine cum in diuersis temporibus
idem fiat, pro diuersitate tamen intentionis eius operatio
modo bona modo mala dicitur." Ibid., 52.
120Aqu inas, Summa 2a2ae 64.7. "Dicendum quod nihil
prohibet unius actus esse duos effectus, quorum alter solum
sit in intentione, alius vero sit praeter intentionem.
Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem secundum id quod
intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum
sit per accidens." Ibid.,40-42.
121See Joseph Mangan, "An Historical Analysis of the
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Principle of Double Effect," Theological Studies 10(1949):
41-61. In traditional Roman Catholic moral theology the evil
that is unintended in a conflict situation may be classified
as part of the physical evil of nature (malum naturae sive
physicum) if it meets the other criteria traditionally
delineated in the theory of double effect. This category of
physical evils also contains such evils as error, poverty,
sickness, pain and death. This is distinguished from any
evil that is intended. Such intended evil is a moral evil or
sin (malum moral sive peccatum). The application of this
distinction and the reevaluation of its place within the
theory of double effect has lead to a very lengthy (25 year)
and extremely complex debate between the "traditionalists"
and the "proportionalists." The debate has its origin in
Peter Knauer, "La determination du bein et du mal moral par
le principe du double effet," Nouvelle reuvelle theologique
87 (1965): 356-76. Put very simply, at the risk of
distorting the position, the proportionalists, which include
Lisa Cahill, Charles Curran, Joseph Fuchs, Louis Janssens,
Richard McCormick, Franz Scholz, Bruno SchUller, Edward
Vacek, redefine the malum naturae as a "premoral evil"
(Fuchs), "nonmoral evil" (SchUller), or an "ontic evil or
premoral disvalue" (Janssens). In the event of a moral
conflict, they are willing to place an action in this
category as long as the fourth and final criteria of the
theory of double effect is met. That is, as long as there is
"proportionate" (McCormick) or "commensurate" (Knauer) reason
to substantiate the act. If the good effect outweighs the
evil effect an action is considered justified. It need not
meet the other three criteria of the principle of double
effect. The Traditionalists, which included John Finnis,
Germain Grisez, Paul Ramsey and Paul Quay emphasize the
importance of all four criteria in the theory of double
effect. They accuse the proportionalists of dissolving the
theory of double effect into nothing more than an end
justifies the means doctrine. For a more complete analysis
of this debate the reader may wish to see the following: Lisa
Cahill, "Teleology, Utilitarianism and Christian Ethics,"
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However, contrary to the Roman Catholic tradition, and
the claims of the non-conflicting absolutists, the distinctions made in the theory of double effect do not help resolve
moral conflicts. Nor do they absolve the moral agent from
culpability. For any infraction of God's law is a sin,
regardless of whether or not it meets any humanly devised

Theological Studies 42 (1982): 601-629. Charles E. Curran
and Richard A. McCormick, eds. Readings in Moral Theology No.
1: Moral Norms and Catholic Tradition (New York: Paulist
Press, 1979). Germain Grisez, "Critique of the
Proportionalists Method of Moral Judgment," chap in The Way
of the Lord Jesus vol. 1. (Chicago, Franciscan Herald Press,
1983), 141-71. Bernard Hoose, Proportionalism: The American
Debate and Its European Roots (Washington DC: Georgetown
University Press, 1987. Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and
Moral Evil," Louvain Studies 4 (1972): 115-56. Richard A.
McCormick, Notes on Moral Theology 1965 through 1980
(Washington DC: University Press of America, 1981), 1-13,
305-32, 529-44, 638-52, 648-723. Richard A. McCormick, Notes
on Moral Theology 1981 through 1984 (Washington DC:
University Press of America, 1985), 1-16, 49-71, 110-113,
165-73. Richard McCormick "Notes on Moral Theology,"
Theological Studies 46 (1985): 55-64. 47 (1989): 76-88. 50
(1989): 9-11. Richard McCormick and Paul Ramsey eds. Doing
Evil to Achieve Good: Moral Choice in Conflict Situations
(Chicago, Loyola University Press, 1978). Ronald H.
McKinney, "The Quest For an Adequate Proportionalist Theory
of Value," Thomist 53 (January 1989): 56-73. Jean Porter,
"Moral Rules and Moral Actions: A Comparison of Aquinas and
Modern Moral Theology," The Journal of Religious Ethics 17
(Spring 1989): 123-49. Paul M. Quay, "The Disvalue of Ontic
Evil," Theological Studies 46 (1985): 262-86. Edward V.
Vacek, "Proportionalism: One View of the Debate," Theological
Studies 46 (1985): 287-314.
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pre-established conditions. There are no conditions enumerated in the Scriptures whereby an infraction of God's law
need not be considered a sin. The invention of such
preconditions is merely a human attempt to avoid the condemnation of the law.122
God expects all of his moral laws to be fully obeyed.
This point is made throughout the Scriptures. "You have laid
down precepts that are to be fully obeyed" Psalm 119:4. By
using the word "fully" (1W?) the psalmist stresses that each
command is to be "exceedingly, greatly" or "very" much
obeyed.123 Our Lord emphasized that even the smallest of the
commandments were to be taught and obeyed. "Anyone who
breaks one of the least (piay . . . TiaviXa&Twv) of these
commandments and teaches others to do the same will be called

122The history of this method of attempting to excuse
ourselves from the condemnation of the law goes all the way
back to the garden of Eden. When God asked Adam, "Have you
eaten from the tree that I commanded you not to eat from?"
The man said, "The woman you put here with me — she gave me
some fruit from the tree, and I ate it." (Genesis 3:11-12).
Here Adam attempts to avoid culpability by emphasizing
certain aspects of the situation. For God, however, there
were no excuses.
123Francis Brown, S. R. Driver, and Charles A. Briggs,
eds. Hebrew and English Lexicon of the Old Testament
Corrected Impression edition (Oxford: The Clarendon Press,
1952), 547.
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least in the kingdom of heaven." Matthew 5:19a. The smallest
of commandments are not to be ignored for the sake of more
important issues.
Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you
hypocrites! You give a tenth of your spices — mint,
dill and cummin. But you have neglected the more important matters of the law — justice, mercy and faithfulness. You should have practiced the latter, without
neglecting ( ril euWvat) the former (emphasis mine).
Matthew 23:23.
St. Paul also emphasized that condemnation comes as a
result of breaking any of God's laws. "Cursed (hrmanipaTos)
is everyone who does not continue to do everything (idatv)
written in the Book of the Law" Galatians 3:10. James
stresses that to violate one commandment is the same as
violating all the commandments "For whoever keeps the whole
law and yet stumbles at just one point (b'4300 is guilty of
breaking all of it" James 2:10.
Scripture offers no excuses for the violation of God's
laws. The law does not contain such comfort. It stands firm
in its absolute uncompromising demands. It threatens
complete condemnation for all who disobey. This point is
repeatedly made in the Lutheran Confessions when it emphasizes that "Lex semper accusat nos, semper ostendit iratum
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Deum..124 Luther also made this point when he wrote,
No. What is demanded in God's commandments, whether it
is small or great, must be observed. We must not judge
importance according to works, but by the commandment.
You must not determine whether the work . . . must be
observed or relaxed, but only whether it is commanded.
If it is commanded, there can be no relaxation, no
matter what the situation may be, for Christ says: "Not
an iota, not a dot, will pass from the law" [Matt.
5:18]; it must all be accomplished. (emphasis mine)125
Augustine also emphasizes that there can be no such
thing as a "just sin" when, with respect to lying, he writes.
He who says that there are some just lies must be
regarded as saying nothing else than that there are some
just sins, and consequently that some things which are
unjust are just. What could be more absurd? . . .
Therefore, let some be called great sins and others
small sins, for such is the case, and not as the Stoics
would have us think, who maintain that all are alike.
to say that certain sins are unjust and certain ones
just is equivalent to saying that certain iniquities are
unjust and certain ones just. Yet, John the Apostle
124Die Bekenntnisschriften, 218. Confer pages 167,
185, 194, 199. 217, 221, 270.
125Luther, "The Gospel For the Festival of The
Epiphany," (1522) L. W. 52:265. "Nit alsso, lieber mensch.
Es sey kleyn oder gross, was yn gottis gepotten ist
begriffen, soll and muss gehallten werden. Man muss hie nit
nach den wercken, sondern nach dem gepott richten; nitt mustu
sehen, ob das werck . . . gahalten oder ungehalten ist,
ssondern nur darauff, obs gepotten sey. Ists gepotten, sso
ist keyn nachlassen mehr da, es sey wie es wolle, denn
Christus sagt: Nit eyn iota odder tuttel sol von dem gesetz
vorgehen, es muss alles geschehen." W. A. 10.1.1: 699.
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says, "Everyone who commits sin commits iniquity also;
and sin is iniquity [1 John 3:4]." Therefore sin cannot
be just.126
The use of the principle of double effect by the nonconflicting absolutists, is a tacit recognition of the existence of conflict situations. Within a moral dilemma this
theory may be helpful, if used correctly; however, it can not
dissolve the conflict, excuse the lesser evil, or remove the
culpability from the moral agent. This sixth and final tenet
of non-conflicting absolutism cannot be maintained by anyone
who wishes their doctrine to be Scripturally based.
In conclusion, this examination of non-conflicting
absolutism has shown that five of its six tenets are untenable. The first tenet, that is, the only one which is firmly
grounded in Scripture, stressed that God has given many absolute laws that are extensions of love. The second tenet
126 Augustine, "Against Lying" vol. 16 The Fathers of
the Church 15.31.
"Nihil autem judicandus est dicere, qui dicit aliqua
justa esse mendacia, nisi aliqua justa esse peccata, ac per
hoc aliqua justa esse quae injusta sunt: quo quid absurdius
dici potest? Unde enim est peccatum, nisi quia justitiae
contrarium est? Dicantur ergo alia magna, alia parva esse
peccata; quia verumest, nec auscultandum Stoicis qui omnia
paria esse contendunt: dicere autem quaedam injusta, quaedam
justa esse peccata, quid est aliud quam dicere quasdam esse
injustas, quasdam justas iniquitates? cum dicat apostolus
Joannes, Omnis qui facit peccatum, facit et iniquitatem; et
peccatum iniquitas est. (I Joan. III, 4)?" Migne 40:539.
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emphasized that these absolute laws never conflict. It was
pointed out that, while Norman Geisler's criticism of this
tenet is insufficient, other examples from bioethics and
society do illustrate that such moral conflicts do occur.
The third tenet emphasized that exceptions or qualifications
may be contained within God's absolute commands. However, it
was shown that such qualifications either turn non-conflicting absolutism into hierarchicalism or rely on unscriptural
assumptions concerning divine revocation of lesser evils.
The fourth tenet held that the moral agent is not responsible
for whatever evil may come as a result of his obedience.
However, it was pointed out that this ignores the gravity of
sins of omission. The fifth tenet stressed that ethics must
be deontological. It was shown that this ignores the essential teleological aspect of ethics emphasized in chapter two.
The sixth and final tenet of non-conflicting absolutism uses
the principle of double effect. This was shown to contradict
the Scriptural principle that the law always accuses.
Therefore, non-conflicting absolutism must be rejected as a
Biblical method of theological ethics.

CHAPTER FOUR
Hierarchicalisml
The numerous absolute moral commands, that compose the
deontological element in Christian ethics, are arranged by
the hierarchicalists in a specific hierarchical order. They
believe it is inevitable that there will be conflicts between
higher and lower ranking commandments. When such conflicts
occur the moral agent is to follow the higher law. In such a
'This view is also called "graded absolutism," or "the
theory of the greater good." Its major proponents are
Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology reprint edition 3 vols.
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989), 3:437-44, and Norman
Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1971), 114-36. Geisler, The
Christian Ethic of Love (Grand Rapids: Zondervon Publishing
House, 1973), 73-75. Geisler, "Biblical Absolutes and Moral
Conflicts," Bibliotheca Sacra 131 no. 523 (July - September
1974): 219-28. Geisler, "In Defense of Hierarchical Ethics,"
The Trinity Journal 4(September 1975): 82-87. Geisler,
"Conflicting Absolutism," Bulletin of the Evangelical
Philosophical Society 2(1979): 1-7. Geisler and Feinberg,
Introduction to Philosophy (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House,
1980), 413-27. Geisler, Options in Contemporary Christian
Ethics (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1981), 81-101.
Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of Ethical
Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4(Fall, 1986): 82-87.
Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1989), 113-132.
203

204
situation, the hierarchicalists claim that, the moral agent
incurs no guilt for not having performed the lesser good. He
is inculpable and need not repent. A closer examination of
the four basic tenets of hierarchicalism will show both its
strengths and its weaknesses.
The first tenet of hierarchicalism is the same as for
non-conflicting absolutism. There are many absolute moral
commandments in the Scripture. Each one is an expression of
love. Geisler writes,
The law of love summarized but does not antiquate the
many moral laws contained in the Old Testament and which
are restated in the New Testament. . . . In brief the
love commandments do not replace the Ten Commandments;
they only reduce them to their common essence, love.
The two commandments of love merely summarize the many
moral laws. . . . The laws spell out love in its many
spheres. Each commandment is love put into operation in
a given sphere of human relationship.2
The hierarchicalists understand that the Biblical
command to love does not contradict or replace the many other
individual moral commandments that constitute the deontological element in Christian ethics. The individual moral
commandments in Scripture are just as authoritative and as
absolute today as ever before. This tenet is in basic agreement with the first part of this dissertation insofar as both
2Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 50-51.
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agree that, love is a summary of the moral law.
The second tenet of hierarchicalism is a direct
contradiction of the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. Hierarchicalism holds that there are inevitable
conflicts that arise between the different absolute commands.
The great length to which Geisler goes in order to illustrate
this tenet, was examined above within the discussion concerning the second tenet of non-conflicting absolutism. Although
it was shown above that his examples were insufficient, other
examples were given which adequately illustrate the validity
of this tenet. Thus this tenet may be approved without
repeating the discussion here.
The third tenet of hierarchicalism emphasizes that
God's moral laws can be ranked in a specific hierarchical
order in which the higher laws take precedence over the lower
laws. Geisler explains,
Not all moral laws are of equal weight. Jesus spoke of
the "weightier" matters of the law (Matt. 23:23) and of
the "least" (Matt. 5:19) and the "greatest" commandments
(Matt. 22:36). He told Pilate that Judas had committed
the "greater sin" (John 19:11).3
In one of his early works Geisler maintained that
"both other Christian options [that is, non-conflicting abso-

3lbid., 82.
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lutism and conflicting absolutism] admit the truth of this
same point."4 However, such unity was short lived. Later
Olson criticized this tenet when he wrote,
Geisler Does Not Show the Scriptural Basis for Putting
All Absolutes in an Ordered Sequence. . . . Although he
claims that a hierarchy of God's attributes is not
essential to his system, such a hierarchy would be
necessary to avoid the charge that his listing of norms
is merely arbitrary.
In God's acts of interventions in the world, no
such hierarchy of attributes is discernible. Sometimes
we see God's mercy coming to the fore; at other times we
see God's holiness and justice . . . . How can a system
be built upon such a dubious hierarchy? And we must
insist that there be a parallel between such a dubious
hierarchy of divine attributes and a hierarchy of norms—
otherwise it can be shown that those norms are not
rooted in God's attributes. Then we are reduced to a
subjective man-ordered hierarchy as critics of Geisler
have pointed out.5
Geisler makes a valid point in his initial explanation
of a hierarchical ordering of the moral commands in
Scripture. The following Scripture passages indicate the
presence of some type of hierarchy:
Anyone who breaks one of the least (µiow. . . TaV
VaXiCITIOV) of these commandments and teaches others to do
the same will be called least in the kingdom of heaven.
(Matthew 5:19a)
4Ibid., 83.
5C. Gordon Olson "Norman Geisler's Hierarchical Ethics
Revisited," Evangelical Journal 4 (Summer 1986): 9-10.

207
One of them, an expert in the law, tested him with
this question: "Teacher, which is the greatest (µcAikri)
commandment in the law?" Jesus replied, "Love the Lord
your God with all your heart and with all your soul and
with all your mind." This is the first (rrpoirn) and
greatest (µcyck) commandment. (Matthew 22:35-38)
Woe to you, teachers of the law and Pharisees, you
hypocrites! You give a tenth of your spices — mint,
dill and cummin. But you have neglected the more important (Paputepa) matters of the law — justice mercy and
faithfulness. (Matthew 23:23)
Therefore the one who handed me over to you is
guilty of a greater (Ratova) sin. (John 19:11)6
Augustine also writes of some sins being worse than
others.
Some will ask whether in view of what we have been saying any thief at all is to be ranked on a par with one
who steals for the sake of mercy. Who would maintain
this? But, of the two, the latter is not good because
the former is worse. He who steals for lust is worse
than he who steals for mercy. . . . But both are sins,
although the one is so much less serious and the other
so much more serious that theft committed for lust is
considered less serious than debauchery committed to
help someone. Within a given class, to be sure, those
sins are less serious which appear to be committed with
good intent. Nevertheless, they may be found to be more
serious than the graver sins of another class. For
example, avarice is more serious than stealing for mercy
and debauchery than being wanton for mercy; yet, to
commit adultery for mercy is more serious than to steal
for avarice.?
6Neither Olson nor Rakestraw discuss these passages.
7Augustine, "Against Lying," The Fathers of the Church
85 vols. edited by Roy J. Deferrari et alii translated by
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Luther also emphasizes a hierarchy of God's laws when
he writes about greater and lesser sins.
This is why disobedience is a sin worse than murder,
unchastity, theft, dishonesty, all that goes with them.
There is no better way we can learn the difference
between greater and lesser sins than from the order of
God's commandments, although there are also distinctions
within the works of each individual commandment. Who
does not know that it is a greater sin to curse than to
be angry, that to strike is worse than cursing, and that
to strike father and mother is worse than striking anyone else?8
Harold B. Jaffee et alii (New York: Fathers of the Church
Inc., 1947-1991), 16:145-46. "Dicet aliquis: Ergo aequandus
est fur quilibet ei furi qui misericordiae voluntate furatur?
Quis hoc dixerit? Sed horum duorum non ideo est quisquam
bonus, quia pejor est unus. Pejor est enim qui
concupiscendo, quam qui miserando furatur. . . . Sunt autem
utraque peccata, quamvis alia leviora, alia graviora; ita ut
levius habeatur furtum guod concupiscendo, quam stuprum quod
subveniendo committitur. In suo quippe genere aliis ejusdem
generis peccatis leviora fiunt, quae bono animo videntur
admitti; cum tamen ipsa alterius generis peccatis ipso suo
genere levioribus inveniantur esse graviora. Gravius est
enim avaritia, quam misericordia furtum facere; itemque
stuprum gravius est laxuria, quam misericordia perpetrare: et
tamen gravius est adulterare misericordia, quam furari
avaritia." Augustine "De Mendacio" J. P. Migne, ed.
Patrologiae: Patrum Latinorum, 221 vols. (Parisiis, 18551881), 40:529-30. Hereafter this work will be abbreviated as
Migne P. L.
8Luther, "Treatise on Good Works," 1520 L. W. 44:81.
"Darumb auch ungehorsam grosser sund ist dan todschlag,
unkeuscheit, stelen, betriegen, and was darinnen mag
begriffen werden. Dan der sund unterscheidt, wilch grosser
sey dan die ander, kundenn wir nit basz erkennen, dan ausz
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Luther stressed this same point again when he wrote,
"The first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh
commandments follow each other in a precise order. It is a
greater sin to kill than to fornicate or to commit adultery.
It is worse to commit adultery than it is to steal."9
One another occasion Luther also wrote,
Now, the six [commandments] following, refer to our
neighbor. See the wonderful and appropriate order. The
prohibitions begin with the greatest and continue to the
least. For the greatest offense is to kill a human.
Then next is the violation of a spouse. Third, is to
steal one's belongings. Those who are unable to be
harmful in this way, harm with their speech. Thus, the
fourth offense is to harm one's good reputation. If
they cannot do any of these, they at least damage their
neighbor in their heart, by coveting his possessions.10
der ordnung der gebot gottis, wie wol ein iglich gebot fur
sich selb auch unterscheidt in seinen wercken hat: dan wer
weysz nit, das fluchen grosser ist dan zurnen, schlahen mehr
dan fluchen, vatter unnd mutter schlahen mehr dan einen
gemeinen menschen?" W. A. 6:250.
9This is my own translation. "Das erste, ander,
dritte, vierte, fUnfte, sechste und siebente Gebot gehen fein
ordentlich auf einander. Grosser Sande ists todten denn
huren und ehebrechen: schwerer ists ehebrechen denn stehlen."
D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische Gesamtausgabe, Tischreden
G. Sande (Wiemar, 1912-1921), 1 no.88.
'
0This is my own translation. "Iam sex sequentia
respiciunt proximum. Et vide mirum et aptum ordinem.
Incipit enim prohibitio a maiori usque ad minimum. Nam
maximum damnum est occisio hominis: deinde proximum violatio
coniugis, Tercium ablatio facultatis. Quod qui in its nocere
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Franz Pieper makes this same point from a different
perspective.
As to their degree, Scripture itself distinguishes
between grievous and less grievous sin . . . . Scripture
clearly distinguishes degrees in sinning. . . .
When we divide sins into peccata cordis, oris,
operis (thoughts, words, deeds), we classify them, as a
rule, according to degree. But that is not always the
case. A secretly harbored implacability may be a more
grievous sin than a word or deed prompted by a sudden
burst of passion.11
Thielicke emphasizes the importance of distinguishing
different degrees of sin when he writes,
He [the Christian] knows that here in this world there
non possunt, saltem lingua nocent: ideo quartum est laesio
famae. Quod si in its non prevalent omnibus, saltem corde
ledunt proximum cupiendo quae eius sunt, in quo et invidia
proprie consistit, de quibus videbimus." Luther, "Decem
Praecepta Wittenbergensi Predicata Populo," 1518. W. A.
1:461.
"Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols., Trans.
Theodore Engelder et al., (St. Louis, Mo: Concordia
Publishing House, 1950-1953), 1:567-68. "Auf den Grad
gesehen, unterschiedet die Schrift selbst zwischen schweren
and weniger schweren SUnden. . . . Unterscheidet die Schrift
klar Grade im SUndigen. . . . Die Einteilung der Stinden in
peccata cordis, oris, operis ist in der Regel, aber nich in
jedem einzelnen Fall eine Gradeinteilung. Eine im Herzen
still gehegte Unversohnlichkeit kann eine schwerere SUnde
sein als ein in plotzlich aufwallender Leidenschaft
ausgestossenes looses Wort oder auch vollbrachtes Werk."
Franz Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, 4 vol. (St. Louis, MO:
Concordia Publishing House, 1924), 1:678-80.

211
is no perfect righteousness, but he does not therefore
draw the conclusion that everything is under the same
condemnation and that everything is thus equally permissible, as though there were no quantitative distinction
between reprehensible and less reprehensible, between
good and less good possibilities. . . . [the] ethical
decision has in fact a great deal to do with the quantitative problem and that scale of value cannot be eliminated in the name of some abstract ("qualitative")
alternative. The weighing of quantitative distinctions
is certainly demanded.12
12Thielicke, Ethics, 1:501. "Er weiss, dass hier
keine Gerechtigkeitsgestalt zu haben ist — auch wenn er
daraus night die Folgerung ziehen kann: also sei alles in
gleicher Verdammnis und alles auch gleichermassen erlaubt,
also gebe es auch kein quantitatives Abwagen zwischen
verwerflichen und weniger verwerflichen, zwischen guten und
weniger guten Moglichkeiten mehr fur ihn. . . . Dass die
ethische Entscheidung es sehr wohl mit dem QuantitatenProblem zu tun hat und dass ihr eine Eliminierung der WerteSkala im Namen abstrakter ('qualitativer') Alternativen
verboten ist. Darum ist das erwahnte 'Abwagen' sehr wohl
gefordert." Thielicke, Ethik, 2.1:82
This "abstract ('qualitative') alternative" to which
Thielicke is referring is the justitia imputativa which is
the believer's through faith in Christ. This must not be
confused with the justitia effectiva. Thielicke explains the
difference. "Wir sind erloste Kinder Gottes, aber es gibt
unerloste Bereiche in uns.
"Der Schein des Widerspruchs ergibt sich nur daraus,
dass in beiden Satzteilen eine andere Optik gebraucht ist.
Wenn ich namlich sage: 'Wir sind erloste Kinder Gottes', dann
spreche ich von Gottes gnadigem Annehmen und von der wirklich
Ereignis gewordenen Gemeinschaft mit ihm (justitia
imputativa). Spreche ich aber von den unerlosten Bereichen
in mir, so denke ich daran, dass ich nun meinserseits-indem
ich den Blick von dem Handeln Gottes auf mein eigenes Handeln
und Nachvollziehen zurlickwende, also auf die justitia
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God's absolute laws are equal in their absolute demand
for obedience and in their threat of complete condemnation
for disobedience; yet, this equality does not preclude the
existence of a hierarchy. Luther explains,
Looked at from the point of view of the character of
substance (which is not susceptible of degrees) one sin
is no more a sin.than is another. However, one may be
greater or stronger than another, just as one substance
may be larger than another; and yet a fly is just as
much a substance as is a man, and a weak man as a strong
man.13
In this third tenet the hierarchicalists make a
compelling point when they insist on the possibility of
ordering God's absolute commands. However, Geisler makes a
false distinction when, in his response to Olson, he claims
that the hierarchy of moral absolutes must stem from God's
attributes and not from his essence. There is no such distinction. God's attributes constitute his essence. There is
only one divine unity. Pieper explains,
effectiva richte-noch im Verzuage damit bin, alle mein
Lebensbereiche and ich-Sektoren auf diese Tatsache zu
beziehen." Thielicke, Etik 1:220-21.
13Luther, "Against Latomus" 1521 L. W. 32:202. "Nec
unum magis peccatum quam aliud iuxta proprietatem
substantiae, quae non suscipit magis neque minus, licet unum
sit maius et fortius alio, sicut et substantia una maior quam
altera, non enim minus substantia est musca quam homo, nec
minus homo infirmus quam robustus." W. A. 8:88.
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In God, essence and attributes are not separate, but the
divine essence and the divine attributes are absolutely
identical, because God is infinite and above space (I
Rings 8:27) and time (Ps. 90:2, 4). Were we to assume
that there are parts to God, we would ascribe finitude
to the infinite God and thereby erase the difference
between God and man. Therefore the Augsburg confession
says: God is "without parts' (Trigl. 43, I, 3). On the
basis of Scripture the Lutheran dogmaticians have maintained that objectively, that is, in God, essence and
attributes are absolutely identical.14
Yet, in spite of Geisler's confusion here, his point
is still well taken when he states that the hierarchy does
not exist in God, but only in his laws. The criticism of
Olson does not refute this third tenet of hierarchicalism.
The fourth and final tenet of hierarchicalism stresses
that in a conflict situation the moral agent is to observe
the hierarchical ordering of God's absolute moral commands
and do the greater good. In performing the greater good, the
moral agent incurs no guilt for failing to do the lesser
good. Geisler explains,

14Pieper, Christian Dogmatics 1:428. "In Gott sind
Wesen und Eigenschaften nicht StUcke oder Teile, sondern
schlechthin eins, weil Gott unendlich ist, erhaben fiber Raum
(I Ron. 8, 27) und Zeit (Ps. 90, 2,4). Wollten wir StUcke
oder Teile in Gott annehmen, so warden wir den unendlichen
Gott verendlichen und so den Unterschied zwischen Gott und
den kreaturen aufheben. Die Augsburgische Konfession sagt im
ersten Artikel Von Gott (De Deo): 'ohne StUck." Pieper,
Christliche Dogmatik 1:524.
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God does not hold the individual responsible for personally unavoidable moral conflicts, providing they keep
the higher law. There are a number of ways of seeing
the truth of this point.
First, logic dictates that a just God will not hold
a person responsible for [not?] [sic] doing what is
actually impossible. And it is actually impossible to
avoid the unavoidable. . . .
Second, one is not morally culpable if he fails to
keep an obligation he could not possibly keep without
breaking a higher obligation. . . .
Third, the Bible included many examples of persons
who were praised by God for following their duty in
conflict situations.15
Here Geisler attempts to offer three ways of seeing
the truth of this fourth tenet. However, none of these is
convincing. The first way, which emphasizes logic, overlooks
the fact that human logic does not "dictate" to God what he
will or will not do. God's ways far surpass the ways of
human understanding. As God explains through the prophet
Isaiah, "For my thoughts are not your thoughts neither are
your ways my ways, declares the Lord. As the heavens are
higher than the earth, so are my ways higher than your ways
and my thoughts than your thoughts." Isaiah 55:8-9. The
second way Geisler mentions is merely a restating of his
position and proves nothing. The third way Geisler mentions
is an overstatement, relying on examples that have already

15Geisler, Options, 87-88.
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been examined and rejected above. It was shown that even
though God is pleased insofar as a moral agent fulfilled a
higher duty, God can also be simultaneously displeased insofar as the moral agent failed to fulfill a lesser duty.
Geisler also attempts to explain that, because of the
hierarchy, all the absolute moral commands of God are absolute in a qualified sense. Geisler writes,
If lower ethical norms can be transcended by higher ones
without incurring guilt for not following the lower
ones, then it follows that these lower norms are not
universal in the broadest sense of the word. They are
universal only in their context. They are valid on
their particular relationship but not on all relationships. . . . [Therefore] not all absolutes are absolutely absolute. . . . In fact . . . ethical hierarchicalism is, a form of contextual absolutism.16
Rakestraw answers that, with the above explanation,
Geisler must not actually believe that moral absolutes are
truly absolute. It makes no sense to say an absolute is not
absolutely absolute. Rakestraw explains,
If as we believe, an absolute is a universally-binding
moral norm . . . then we must maintain that . . . we
cannot disobey, lay aside, or transcend any of these
divine absolutes. To say that an absolute is to be
followed only within its own context or sphere, as H
[hierarchicalism] does, is a way of [merely] theoretically retaining the absolute status of the moral
norm. . . . The statement . . . "not all absolutes are
16Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives and Issues, 132.
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absolutely absolute" fatally weakens the binding character of God's ethical norms and, in practice, shifts the
locus of authority from the divine lawgiver to the moral
agent.17
Geisler responds to this criticism by explaining that
these absolutes are still absolute in three ways, even though
they are not universally binding.
First, the lower command is not really broken when the
higher command is followed. Just as a magnet does not
break the law of gravity in attracting a nail . . . .
The overriding duty to keep the higher law simply renders it unnecessary for us to perform the demands of the
lesser command.
Second . . . there are no exceptions to absolute
moral laws, only exemptions from obeying them in view of
higher ones. So its universalness is not contradicted
by an exception.
Third, the command remains absolute even when it is
not followed. . . . God never ceases to manifest absolutely what is absolutely right. However, in unavoidable clashes, God does not demand obedience to lower
laws, nor does he exact personal culpability for failing
to do so.18
Geisler's response does not adequately answer the
problem suggested by Rakestraw. In the first place, the analogy with the magnet misses the point, because the point of
comparison lies in the nail, not in the magnet. When the
nail is attracted upward by a magnet the nail certainly is
17Rakestraw, 255, citing Geisler, Ethics: Alternatives
and Issues, 132.
18Geisler, Christian Ethics, 129.
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breaking or violating (that is, failing to conform to) the
law of gravity. Similarly, whenever God's laws are violated,
or whenever the moral agent fails to conform to them, they
are broken. Geisler cannot rightly claim that "the lower
commandment is not really broken."19
In the second place it does not help Geisler to insist
on exemptions rather than exceptions. For Geisler,
an exception would violate the universality and absoluteness of a moral law, whereas an exemption does not.
If there is an exception, then the law is not absolute. . . . An exception means that lying as such is
sometimes right, under certain circumstances. Not so
with an exemption. Lying as such is always wrong. . . .
In an exception, the general rule is not binding on that
particular case, and so there is no real conflict. . . .
[Whereas] an exemption only eliminates the individual's
culpability in not performing the demands of that lower
law; it in no way changes either the basis or the nature
of the law as an absolute in its domain.20
In a certain sense this distinction is valid. Given
these definitions it appears that non-conflicting absolutists
would be more inclined to employ exceptions (that attempts to
dissolve the conflict); whereas, hierarchicalists would
utilize exemptions (that attempts to remove the culpability).
It has been pointed out above that it may be possible
19Ibid.
20Geisler, Christian Ethics, 127-28.
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for an absolute law to contain on "exceptional" phrase as a
clarification.21 However, it has also been shown that there
can be no exemptions from culpability. The moral agent bears
the guilt for any violation of God's law, regardless of the
circumstances.
In the third place it has also been emphasized above
that God demands obedience to all his moral laws, even the
"lesser" ones.22
With respect to this fourth and final tenet Geisler
also appeals to the principle of double effect.
Graded absolutism [hierarchialism] is similar to the
principle of double effect, which states that when two
results — a good result and an evil result — emerge from
one act, the individual is held responsible only for the
good one he intended, and not the evil one which necessarily resulted from the good intention.23
It was shown above, with respect to the sixth tenet of nonconflicting absolutism, that any use of the principle of
double effect, which attempts to remove culpability from the
21The example given above was "children obey your
parents, unless they command that which is contrary to God's
Word."
22This point was made above by emphasizing Psalm
119:4, Matthew 5:19; 22:36; 23:23 and John 19:11.
23Geisler, Christian Ethics, 126-27. See also
Options, 96-97.
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moral agent, contradicts the Scriptural principle that the
law always accuses (lex semper accusat).

This misuse of the

principle of double effect was a major weakness in nonconflicting absolutism. As Geisler uses it here, it is also a
major weakness in hierarchicalism. Thus because of Geisler's
non-absolute understanding of moral absolutes (that erringly
allows for exemptions) and because of the misuse of the
principle of double effect, this fourth and final tenet of
hierarchicalism cannot be maintained.
In order to summarize the discussion of hierarchicalism it is helpful to recall the following points. The first
tenet is Scriptural in that it points out that God has given
many absolute laws that are extensions of love. The second
tenet of hierarchicalism stated that conflicts do occur
between God's absolute moral demands. This tenet was examined in conjunction with the second tenet of non-conflicting
absolutism. This second tenet of hierarchicalism was shown
to be valid, in spite of the fact that Geisler did not choose
the best examples to prove his point. The third tenet emphasized that God's moral absolutes can be ordered in a hierarchical fashion. This tenet was also shown to be in agreement
with Scripture. The fourth tenet stressed that no guilt is
incurred when a lower law is broken in order to keep a higher
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law. This was shown to be incongruous with Scripture because
it was a misuse of the principle of double effect. Therefore
hierarchicalism is found to be in error in one of its four
major tenets. It too must be rejected as a Biblical method
of theological ethics.

CHAPTER FIVE
Conflicting Absolutism'
The conflicting absolutists recognize that the numerous moral commandments that compose the deontological element

'This view has also been called "ideal absolutism" and
"the lesser of two evils view." Its major proponents
include: Edward J. Carnell, Christian Commitment (New York,
NY: The Macmillan Co., 1957), 223-30. James Childs, "The
Third Use of the Law and Constructive Ethics," Currents in
Theology and Mission 2 (Fall 1975): 35-40. Walter Kaiser,
"The Weightier and Lighter Matters of the Law: Moses, Jesus
and Paul," chapter in Current Issues in Biblical and
Patristic Interpretation, ed. Gerald F. Hawthorne (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1975), 176-92. Erwin W. Lutzer, The
Morality Gap (Chicago, IL: Moody Press, 1972), 98-113.
According to his later writings Lutzer no longer holds this
view. John W. Montgomery in John W. Montgomery and Joseph
Fletcher, Situation Ethics True of False? (Minneapolis, MN:
Bethany Fellowship, 1972). James I. Packer, "Situations and
Principles," chapter, in Law, Morality and the Bible, eds.,
Bruce Kaye and Gordon Wenham (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity
Press, 1978), 151-67. Franklin E. Payne Jr., Biblical/
Medical Ethics: The Christian and the Practice of Medicine
Milford, MI: Mott Media, Inc., Publishers, 1985), 54-69.
However, it is noted by Frame, 9 fn 2, that Payne no longer
holds this view. Helmut Thielicke, Theological Ethics: 3
vols. ed., William Lazareth, trans. John Doberstein (Grand
Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979) 1:482-667. Translated and
abridged from Theologische Ethik; 3 Bande (Tlibingen: J. C. B.
Mohr, 1951-1964), 2.1:56-327.
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in theological ethics can be arranged in a hierarchical
order. They also insist that there will be times when there
are conflicts between the higher and lower ranking
commandments. When such conflicts occur the moral agent is
to break the lesser of the two commandments, that is, do the
lesser of the two evils. In such a situation the moral agent
accepts his culpability, confesses his sin and looks to
Christ for forgiveness.
The main tenets of conflicting absolutism have already
been implicitly mentioned in the criticisms of the other two
methods above. It remains for this section merely to explicitly list them and to answer some of the more frequent objections which they evoke.
The first tenet of conflicting absolutism is the same
as that for non-conflicting absolutism and hierarchicalism.
There are many absolute moral commands in the Scripture.
Each one is an expression of love. James Childs writes,
"They are absolutes that lay claim on me as definitions of
how love behaves in various circumstances of life. . . . They
are expressions of obligations which embody love definitively."2 These numerous moral commands are important
2Childs, 38. Childs prefers not to call the moral
laws of Scripture "prescriptive absolutes." He fears
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because they "inform agape and give expression to it."3 This
is the only tenet that is held in common by all three methods
under discussion.
The second tenet of conflicting absolutism coincides
with hierarchicalism in its fundamental disagreement with
non-conflicting absolutism. Conflicting absolutism insists
that unavoidable conflicts will exist among moral absolutes.
This point was discussed under the second tenet of non(without due cause) that such a label will lead to legalism
and turn the Scriptures into a rule book. He would rather
understand the moral laws of Scripture as "general absolutes"
that require "prima facie" duties. However, he does not use
the term "prima facie" in quite the same way it was defined
and illustrated above in chapter one. For Childs moral laws
"are more than just mere guides: that is, they are not
subject to subjective reinterpretation or dismissed. . . .
[B]y this term [prima facie] I mean more than that these
norms are just a summary of the collective opinion of past
ethical reflection on given questions . . . . In that they do
embody love, they participate in its absolute character and,
therefore, even accuse us in our failure while they provide
direction." Ibid. Since this article was published Childs
has revised some of his terminology. See idem, Christian
Anthropology and Ethics (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978),
177-78. Thus the difference between Childs' views and those
of the author of this dissertation seem to be more semantic
than substantive.
3lbid. Perhaps this could lead to an understanding of
love as the formal norm in ethics and the numerous moral laws
as the concrete material norm in ethics, confer Louis
Janssens, "Norms and Priorities in a Love Ethics," Louvain
Studies 6 (Spring 1977): 207-238.
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conflicting absolutism and need not be repeated here.
The third tenet of conflicting absolutism agrees with
hierarchicalism insofar as both methods hold that there are
higher and lower laws among God's absolute moral commandments. Both hierarchicalism and non-conflicting absolutism
emphasize that the moral commandments given in Scripture can
be arranged in a hierarchical order.4 However, the two views
are not identical. Geisler, representing the
hierarchicalists, seeks to construct a hierarchy that is
static and unchanging. For Geisler certain laws always take
precedence over other laws. This has led him to construct
the following hierarchy of duties:
1. Love for God is to take precedence over love for man.
2.Life-saving is to take precedence over telling the
truth. ("A person not promoting non-loving activity is
more worthy of the respect of love than one who is
promoting non-loving activity.")5
3.People must take precedence over things.
4.Many people must take precedence over a few people.
5.Actual people must take precedence over potential
people. ("A fully developed person is of greater worth
4The Scriptural substantiation for the hierarchical
ordering of the moral commandments was given above in the
discussion concerning the second tenet of hierarchicalism.
It need not be repeated here.
5Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love (Grand Rapids:
Zondervan Publishing House, 1973), 80.

225
than an embryo.")6
6.Potential persons must take precedence over actual
things.
7.Complete persons must take precedence over incomplete
persons. ("A person with complete mental and physical
abilities is more valuable than one without."7)8
The hierarchy of the conflicting absolutists is
dynamic and flexible, depending upon the variables within the
situation. The moral agent is to determine the lesser evil,
not by consulting a prearranged list of duties, but, by asking, 'What best serves the need of my neighbor?" Or "How can
I best express the love of God in this situation?" In this
way the teleological element of love functions to determine
the lesser of the two evils. The two methods of theological
ethics, the deontological method and the teleological method,
are brought together to create one complete hybrid system.
6lbid., 83. Geisler latter changed his mind on this
point when he became convinced that an embryo is an actual
person, see Geisler, "A Response to Olson's Critique of
Ethical Hierarchicalism," Evangelical Journal 4(Fall, 1986):
86.
7Geisler, The Christian Ethic of Love, 85. This
statement is nonsensical without a detailed analysis of the
following questions: More valuable to whom, one's friends
and family, or society at large? By what criteria is such
value determined? Are the criteria to be arranged in a
hierarchical order? Who determines the criteria? Geisler
discusses none of these questions.
8Ibid., 76-87.
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In one situation a particular commandment may take precedence
over another commandment; however, in a different situation
the order may be reversed. Thus the hierarchy must be flexible and dynamic not static. Franz Pieper points out this
flexibility when he writes
When we divide sins into peccata cordis, oris, operis
(thoughts, words, deeds), we classify them, as a rule
according to degree. But that is not always the case.
A secretly harbored implacability may be a more grievous
sin than a word or deed promoted by a sudden burst of
passion.9
Here Pieper shows that even though there is a hierarchy it is
not static. Usually sinful actions are more grievous than
sinful thoughts; however, in the particular situation where
one has harbored an evil thought, perhaps over a long period
of time, that could be more grievous than a sudden sinful act
done on the spur of the moment.
Thielicke also refers to this flexibility when he
writes,
9Francis Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 4 vols., trans.
Theodore Engelder et al., (St. Louis, MO: Concordia
Publishing House, 1950-1953), 1:568. "Die Einteilung der
Sunden in peccata cordis, oris, operis ist in der Regel, aber
nicht in jedem einzelnen Fall eine Gradeinteilung. Eine im
Herzen still gehegte Unversohnlichkeit kann eine schwerere
Slinde sein als ein in plotzlich aufwallender Leidenschaft
ausgestossenes bases Wort oder auch vollbrachtes Werk."
Franz Pieper, Christlich Dogmatik, 4 vols. (St. Louis MO:
Concordia Publishing House, 1924), 1:679-80.
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Decisions cannot be made a priori. . . .
To decide ethical questions in advance is possible
only within the framework of an illusory natural law
which pictures the world as an orderly construct, permeated by eternal norms laid down at creation, the structure of which may be demonstrated. . . . The world then
becomes a hierarchical cosmos, and in principle every
case which arises and every decision which may be
required can be prejudged morally by reason of the hierarchy of values. This type of cosmic order presupposes
a specific interrelationship between the original state
and the fallen world, between creation and sin. . . .
This relationship is determined by the fact that sin
violates creation only in a very peripheral way. In
Reformation thought, on the contrary, the world is seen
to be so totally permeated by both creation and sin that
we are prevented from. . . espousing the illusion of
hierarchical cosmos of natural law. It is only logical,
then, that on the Reformation view there can be no
advance decisions. . . . decisions must be made within
the framework of each existing situation. The ethics of
Law is replaced by a kind of "situational ethics."10
10Thielicke, Evangelical Ethics, 1:648, 650. "Es
Keine apriorischen Vorweg-Entscheidungen geben konne. . . .
Dass solche Vorweg-Entscheidungen immer nur im Rahmen
eines Naturrechtsphantoms mOglich sind, das uns die Welt als
ein geordnetes, von ewigen, der Schopfung entstammenden
Normen durchzogenes und in seiner Struktur aufweisbares
Gebilde erscheinen lasst. . . . Dann wird die Welt zum
hierarchischen Kosmos und dann lasst sich im Prinzip jeder
eintretende casus und jede von ihm geforderte Entscheidung
infolge der mOglichen Rangstufung der Werte moralisch
prajudizieren. Die so verstandene Weltordnung setzt eine
ganz bestimmte Inbeziehungsetzung von Urstand und gefallener
Welt, von Schopfung und Slinde voraus. . . . Diese Beziehung
ist dadurch bestimmt, dass die SUnde nur in hochst peripherer
Weise die Schopfung verletzt, wahrend fur das reformatorische
Denken die Welt eine totale gegenseitige Durchdringung von
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Thielicke's use of the phrase "situational ethics"
should not be misconstrued. He does not use the phrase the
same way Joseph Fletcher uses it in his popular book
Situation Ethics."

Joseph Fletcher has no respect for the

third use of the law. It is an essential aspect of
Fletcher's brand of situational ethics to reject any instructional use of the law. In this sense Fletcher can say he is
allergic to the law.12 However, Thielicke has a very high
regard for the instructional use of the law. He writes,
'The Law is to be retained in the third place in order
that the saints may know what works God requires for the
exercise of obedience to him.' . . . It has . . . a
regulative significance. . . . The Law does not make the
new man, but it does exercise him and shows him the full
range of relationships in which his newness is relevant. . . .
[St. Paul] stands in relation to the Law no longer
as a servant but as a free man. He still respects it as
Schopfung und Slinde zeigt, die es verbietet. . . der
naturrechtlichen Illusion eines hierarchischen Kosmos zu
kommen. Es ist darum nur logisch, dass von hier aus keine
Vorweg-Entscheidungen moglich sind.
. . . dann kann die Entscheidung immer nur im Rahmen
der jeweils zustandigen Situation gefallet werden, dann gibt
es also allein so etwas wie 'Situationsethik/ und kein
'Gesetzesethos." Thielicke, Etik, 2.1: 305-308.
11Joseph Fletcher, Situation Ethics (Philadelphia, PA:
The Westminster Press, 1966).
12Ibid., 152-53.
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a declaration of the will of God.13
Thielicke is not a "situational" ethicist in the same vein as
Joseph Fletcher. When Thielicke mentions that, "Decisions
cannot be made a priori, "14 and ethics must be, "situational
ethics"15 he is referring only to conflict situations.
Thielicke emphasizes this, when, after using the term
"situation ethics" he writes,
What this term means is best illustrated once
the borderline situation of extreme conflict.
thus makes good sense that we should conclude
cussion of the borderline situation with this
tion.16

again by
. . . It
our disinvestiga-

13Thielicke, Ethics, 1:134, 136. "'Lex retinenda est,
ut sciant sancti, quaenam opera requirat Deus, in quibus
obedientiam exercere erga Deum possint.' . . . In diesem
Sinne hat es eine regulative Bedeutung . . . . Das Gesetz
macht nicht den neuen Menschen, sondern es iibt ihn and zeigt
ihm die BeziehungsfUlle, in der nun diese Neuheit des
Menschen akut ist.
. . . [St. Paul] verhalt Bich zu ihm nicht als Knecht,
sondern als Freier. Er achtet es nach wie vor als eine
Willenskundgebung Gottes." Thielicke, Ethik, 1:224-27. This
quote contains the debated passage from Luther's "Second
Disputation Against the Antinomians" 1538 W. A. 39.1:485.
14Thielicke, Ethics, 1:648.
15Ibid., 1:650.
16Thielicke, Ethics, 1:650. "Was dieses Stichwort
bedeutet, ist wiederum genauestens an der Konflikt-und
Grenzsituation zu klaren. . . . Es ist deshalb sinnvoll, wenn
wir mit dieser Untersuchung das Kapitel fiber die Konflikt-
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Outside of a conflict situation God's will is clear,
decisions can be made a priori, right and wrong can be easily
distinguished. However, inside a conflict situation the
Christian moral agent has no such certainty. The situation
becomes more complex. No a priori decision can be made.
From within the conflict situation the moral agent should
attempt to consider every pertinent variable. For example,
in a bioethical decision concerning the initiation or withdrawal of extraordinary treatment, the moral agent should
consider the tension among cost, risks, pain and benefits to
the patient.17 Only after such factors have been prayerfully
considered can one begin to construct the hierarchy based on
the available options. The moral agent is then in a position
to choose the lesser evil (or, that which most expedites
love) for that situation. In this way love serves as the
arbitrator between conflicting moral laws.18

situation beschliessen." Thielicke, Ethik, 2.1: 308.
17For more information on making this type of decision
the reader may wish to see Robert Wier, Abating Treatment
with Critically Ill Patients (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989) and Cynthia B. Cohen, ed., Casebook on the
Termination of Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Care of the
Dying (Briarcliff Manor: The Hastings Center, 1988). This
also contains a lengthy bibliography.
18James I. Packer writes, "We may agree with the
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The fourth tenet of conflicting absolutism stresses
that in a conflict situation the moral agent is to observe
the hierarchical order and do the lesser evil. In performing
this lesser evil, the moral agent does incur guilt for which
he needs to repent and trust in Christ for forgiveness. It
was emphasized above, in the critical response to the sixth
tenet of non-conflicting absolutism (concerning the principle
of double effect), that God demands all of his moral laws to
be obeyed. There is never a time when an infraction of God's
law does not constitute a sin. The argument given above
along with the substantiating Scriptural references need not
be repeated here. However, it may be added that this clearly
distinguishes conflicting absolutism from both hierarchicalism and the situational ethics of Joseph Fletcher, both of
which attempt to remove the lesser evil completely from the
category of evil by calling it a lesser good. They thereby
eliminate the recognition of culpability and the need for
repentance. In doing this, situationalism and hierarchicalsituationists that love for persons must arbitrate between
the conflicting claims of moral principles, that doctrinaire
decisions in such cases will not make the best of a bad job,
and that unwillingness to face the situations full
complexities and insensitivity to the variety of rules and
claims that apply, will lead straight into ironclad Pharisaic
legalism." James I. Packer, "Situations and Principles,"
164.
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ism attempt to remove from God's law its terrifying and
condemning thrust. In this way the second use of the law is
seriously impeded. Isaiah wrote, "Woe to those who call evil
good" (Isaiah 5:20). When evil goes unnoticed the moral
agent fails to recognize his need for Christ. James I.
Packer explains,
We shall reject Fletcher's grotesque idea that in such
situations adultery, fornication, abortion, suicide and
the rest, if thought the best course (which arguably in
Fletcher's cases they might me . . .), thereby become
good: which valuation, as Fletcher himself emphasized,
leaves no room for regret at having had to do them.
Instead, we shall insist that evil remains evil, even
when, being the lesser evil it appears the right thing
to do; we shall do it with a heavy heart, and seek God's
cleansing of our conscience for having done it.19
In this respect Geisler is in the same position as
Fletcher. Both seek to remove the evil, in a conflict situation, completely from the category of evil and transpose it
into something good; whereas, the Scriptural solution to evil
is Jesus Christ.
Within a moral dilemma there is no guarantee that the
Christian will chose correctly. Serious, dedicated, intelligent Christians will have differing opinions over which act
is truly the lesser evil in a particular dilemma. Yet, the
midst of a moral dilemma is no place for timidity. Once the
19Ibid.
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situation has been recognized, the options considered and the
guilt confessed, then action must take place even though it
be sin. The sinful structure of the dilemma may even cause
one to "hunger and thirst for righteousness" (Matthew 5:6).
In such situations, one must have the courage to "sin boldly,
but believe and rejoice in Christ even more boldly, for he is
victorious over sin."20
A Critique of the Most Common Objections
to Conflicting Absolutism
Some critics claim that conflicting absolutism is an
absurd method because its emphasis on the lesser evil obligates the moral agent to sin. Geisler writes,
According to conflicting absolutism, in real moral
conflicts we have a moral duty to do the lesser of two
evils. That is, one is morally obligated to do evil.
But how can there ever be a moral obligation to do what
is immoral? It seems a morally absurd claim.21
20Luther's Works, 55 vols., edd. J. Pelikan and H. T.
Lehmann, American Edition in English Translation
(Philadelphia: Fortress Press and St. Louis: Concordia
Publishing House, 1958-1986), 48:282. Hereafter this work
will be abbreviated as L. W. "Esto peccator et pecca
fortiter, sed fortius fide et gaude in Christo, qui victor
est peccati, mortis et mundi." D. Martin Luthers Werke,
Rritische Gesamtausgabe, Brieswechsel, 18 Bande (Wiemar,
1930-1985), 2:372.
21Geisler, Christian Ethics: Options and Issues (Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1959), 103.
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Conflicting absolutism does not obligate the moral
agent to sin when there is a sinless alternative. However,
it directs the moral agent to the lesser evil only when the
alternative is a greater evil. In such conflict situations
it remains consistent in categorizing evils as evils.
This same objection was emphasized by Joseph Fletcher
when he debated John W. Montgomery at San Diego State College
on February 11, 1971. However, Fletcher did not grasp
Montgomery's answer.
Fletcher: "Aren't you in effect telling us that in your
ethics we are sometimes morally obliged to do what is
wrong, and does that make any sense in terms of ethical
analysis? [Applause from audience] . .
Montgomery: What I'm saying is that it may be necessary
to choose a lesser of evils. But such a choice still
remains an evil.
Fletcher: And isn't the logical import of the lesser
evil doctrine precisely that sometimes we might be
morally obliged to do what is wrong? . . . .
Montgomery: The point that I'm trying to make is that
because something is a lesser evil doesn't somehow
transmute it into a good. But that's what happens in
situationalism. Lesser evils disappear from the class
of evils; and a person sticks in his thumb and pulls out
a plum and is able to achieve moral vindication. I
don't believe that this should be allowable within the
framework of theological ethics.22
22Fletcher and John W. Montgomery, Situation Ethics:
True of False? A Dialogue Between Joseph Fletcher and John
Warwick Montgomery (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany Fellowship,
1972), 69-70.
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On the one hand, the absurdity of which Geisler and
Fletcher speak does exist. It is the absurdity of living in
a sinful world.23 Yet, on the other hand, when there is no
sinless alternative, it is not absurd for the moral agent to
choose the lesser rather than the greater of two evils.
A second criticism has been directed at both conflicting absolutism and hierarchicalism concerning their insistence that divine absolutes can conflict. Olson claims that
Scripture proves that "the believer is never forced to choose
between obedience to two absolutes since God will provide a
way of escape."24 He quotes Paul's first letter to the
Corinthians.
No temptation (irEtpaquic) has seized you except what is
common to man. And God is faithful; he will not let you
23This absurdity was noted by the French
existentialists. For example see Albert Camus Le Mythe de
Sisyphe (Gallimard, 1942) Trans. as The Myth of Sisyphus
(London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955) "The Linchpin of Camus'
argument in The Myth of Sisyphus is the notion of the World's
absurdity, and the world is called absurd . . . . Camus
conceives the great yearning of the human spirit to be for
some evidence of the world's being governed by principles of
To his dismay,
coherence and intelligibility•
however . . . . things do not dovetail into one another in
such a way as to give us any sense of their being established
order." Nathan A. Scott Jr., Mirrors of Man in Existentialism
(New York, NY: Collins, 1978), 133-34.
2401son, 10-11.
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be tempted (TrEtpacreijvat) beyond what you can bear. But
when you are tempted trrepaapt6)) he will also provide a
way out so that you can stand up under it.
(1 Corinthians 10:13)
However, Geisler points out that, "First Corinthians
10:13 is only a promise for victory in temptation — not a
guarantee of intervention to avoid moral conflicts."25 This
passage is referring only to standing firm against an individual temptation. It says nothing concerning the conflict
of two moral absolutes. Such a conflict is not to be
confused with a temptation. A temptation is an enticement to
follow Satan. Richard Trench points out "Perazein is applied
to the solicitations and suggestions of Satan (Matt. 4:1; 1
Cor. 7:5; Rev. 2:10) that always are made with a malicious
hope."26 Also, Bauer, Arndt and Gingrich define "Trepaupos not
only as temptation but also as "enticement to sin."27
Such "solicitations," "suggestions" and "enticements"
are completely lacking in the moral dilemma wherein one must
25Geisler, Christian Ethics, 90.
26Richard Trench, Synonyms of the New Testament, ed.
Robert G. Hoeber (Grand Rapids, MO: Baker Book House, 1989)
295.
27Walter Bauer, A Greek-English Lexicon of the New
Testament trans. William F. Arndt and F. Wilber Gingrich.
Second Edition Revised and Augmented (Chicago, IL:University
of Chicago Press, 1979), 640.
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choose between two absolutes. Thus a moral dilemma is not a
temptation. This passage from First Corinthians, used by
not-conflicting absolutists to criticize conflicting absolutism and hierarchicalism, is inapplicable to this situation.
A third criticism directed against conflicting absolutism is a Christological argument developed by the hierarchicalists. Geisler claims that if moral conflicts are
part of our existence in this world, and if Christ was in
this world, then Christ must necessarily have faced moral
conflicts wherein he was forced to do the lesser evil.
However, Scripture clearly maintains that Christ was sinless
(2 Corinthians 5:21 and Hebrews 4:15). Therefore the sinlessness of Christ illustrates that one is not culpable for
doing the lesser evi1.28
Geisler's argument has one major flaw. Moral
conflicts are part of our existence in this world and Christ
did come into the world, yet it does not necessarily follow
that Christ had to face moral dilemmas. Surely it is possible that he was providentially spared from encountering moral
dilemmas in order that he might retain the status as the
"lamb without blemish or defect" (1 Peter 1:19).
28Geisler, Christian Ethics, 106-110.
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This is analogous to the relationship between Christ
and original sin. Original sin (like moral dilemmas) is part
of our existence in this world. Christ did come into the
world. Yet that earthly existence did not necessitate his
participation in original sin (nor does it necessitate his
participation in moral dilemmas).
Geisler responds to this answer by writing,
It may be that God providentially spared Jesus from
facing moral conflicts in order to preserve his sinlessness. But if this is the case, then the Christian may
ask why he, too is not spared from them if he is
faithful to God . . . . It would be special pleading to
declare that the providential way out applies only to
Christ but not to other servants of God who are faithful
to his will.29
Geisler assumes that if Jesus was providentially
spared from moral dilemmas then it necessarily follows that
Christians today should also be providentially spared from
such conflicts. However the latter does not necessarily
follow from the former. It takes no "special pleading" to
call attention to Jesus' unique purpose on earth. His
mission in this world was to be the sinless sacrifice offered
on behalf of sinners (Hebrews 9:14, 10:10-14 and 1 Peter
1:19). In order to accomplish this mission he was providentially spared from original sin. He could also have been
29Ibid., 107.
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providentially spared from moral conflicts. A Christian
today does not have the task of being the sinless redeemer of
humanity. Therefore a Christian, unlike Christ, is not
spared from original sin nor from moral dilemmas.30
A fourth criticism directed against the conflicting
absolutists is another christological argument. This criticism claims that if Christ never encountered moral dilemmas,
as conflicting absolutists maintain, then he cannot serve as
a moral example for his followers. Whereas Scripture maintains that Christ is our moral example. Geisler writes,
If Christ is our complete moral example then he must
have faced morally conflicting situations in which both
alternatives were sinful. But if Christ never sinned,
then Christ never faced them. Hence we have no example
from Christ to follow in some of life's most difficult
moral decisions. But does not Hebrews say he was
"tempted in every way, just as we are" (4:15)? Does not
Paul exhort us to be followers of Christ (1 Cor. 11:12)? But how can we follow him in ethical dilemmas if he
never faced them?31
It is helpful to examine two points from the above
quote. First, Geisler writes that Christ is "our complete

30Geisler does not discuss the possibility that Christ
could have used his divine wisdom to recognize and avoid
situations that were likely to lead to moral dilemmas.
31Ibid., 109-110.
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moral example."32 On the one hand, Christ himself said that
the example he established should be followed by others. He
told his disciples, "I have set you an example that you
should do as I have done for you" John 13:15. Paul also
exhorts his readers to follow the example of Christ. "Follow
my example as I follow the example of Christ" 1 Corinthians
11:1. Peter also stresses this same point. "To this you
were called, because Christ suffered for you, leaving you an
example, that you should follow in his steps" 1 Peter 2:21.
Such passages point out that Christians are to follow Christ
in his exemplary love. Christ showed the world what real
love is by his perfect obedience to the law. Thus, it is his
love that is to emulated. "Be imitators of God, therefore,
as clearly loved children and live a life of love, just as
Christ loved us and gave himself up for us as a fragrant
offering and sacrifice to God" Ephesians 5:1-2.
On the other hand, this does not mean that Christ is
our complete moral example in the sense that Geisler maintains. In many respects Christ did not set a moral example
for the husband, for the soldier, or for the civil magistrate. This was not his purpose. There was a higher purpose
to his life than merely setting moral examples for everyone
321bid.
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to follow. Certain aspects of Christ's life were intended to
be, and should be understood as, unique to his person and
work. Luther writes,
You ask: Why did not Christ . . . bear the sword?
Answer: You tell me, why did Christ not take a wife, or
become a cobbler or a tailor . . . ? Christ pursued his
own office and vocation. . . . For each one must attend
to the duties of his own calling.
Therefore, . . . Christ . . . had to manifest himself wholly in connection with the estate and calling
which alone expressly served his kingdom. . . . This was
and had to be Christ's peculiar function as the Supreme
King in this kingdom. Since not all Christians, however, have this same function (although they are entitled to it), it is fitting that they should have some
other external office by which God may also be served.33
Because of Christ's unique vocation not every aspect of the
Christian's life can be found in Christ's life, nor can (or
33Luther, "Temporal Authority: To What Extent If
Should Be Obeyed," (1523) L. W. 45:100-101. "So sprichstu:
Warumb hatts denn Christus . . . nicht gefuret? Antwort:
sage myr, warumb hatt er nicht auch eyn weyb genomen oder ist
ein schuster oder schneyder worden? . . . Christus hat seyn
ampt und stand gefuret. . . . Denn eyn iglicher muss seyns
beruffens und wercks wartten.
Darumb . . . Christus . . . muste sich allerdinge
beweyssen mit solchem stand und werck, die eygentlich nur
alleyne zu seynem reych dieneten . . . Wilchs Christus
eygentlich ampt gewessen ist unnd seyn muste als des ubersten
konigs ynn dem selben reych. Nu aber nicht alle Christen das
selb ampt haben (wie wol sie es haben mugen), ists billich,
das sie sonst eyn anders eusserlich haben, da mit auch Gott
gedienet mag werden." D. Martin Luthers Werke, Kritische
Gesamtausgabe, 64 Bande (Weimar, 1883-), 11:258-59.
Hereafter this work is abbreviated as W. A.
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should) the Christian follow every aspect of Christ's life.
Christ is our complete moral example insofar as he completely
manifested the fullness of love through his perfect obedience
of the moral law; however, he did not provide a multitude of
examples upon which Christians are to base every aspect of
their lives. Thus Christ can still serve as a moral example
without having had to encounter moral dilemmas.
The second point in Geisler's quote that deserves
careful examination is his reference to Hebrews 4;15 emphasizing, "that Christ was 'tempted in every way, just as we
are.'"34 Geisler's response to the non-conflicting absolutists use of 1 Corinthians 10:13, given above in answer to
the second criticism, applies here to his own use of Hebrews
4:15. Geisler pointed out that a "temptation" is not the
same as a "moral conflict."
First Corinthians 10:13 stressed that God will enable
Christians to withstand temptations (but it does not say
anything about delivering Christians from moral dilemmas).
Similarly Hebrews 4:15, that Geisler now mentions, stresses
that Christ withstood every temptation (but it does not say
anything about Christ confronting moral dilemmas). Therefore, just as 1 Corinthians 10:13 cannot be properly used by
34Geisler, Christian Ethics, 110.
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the non-conflicting absolutists to show that Christians are
delivered from moral dilemmas, neither can Hebrews 4:15 be
properly used by Geisler to show that Christ faced moral dilemmas. It was shown above in answer to the second criticism
that a moral conflict is not a temptation.

Summary and Conclusion of Part Two
To summarize the discussion on conflicting absolutism
it is helpful to recall the following points. The first
tenet stresses that there are numerous moral absolutes given
by God which are summarized by love. This is in agreement
with both non-conflicting absolutism and hierarchicalism.
The second tenet stresses that due to the sinful condition of
the world there are times when two or more of God's absolute
laws will conflict with one another. This tenet contradicts
the view of non-conflicting absolutism. It agrees with
hierarchicalism, but it is not supported well by the arguments the hierarchicalists gives. It is shown that one of
the best ways to recognize this conflict is to have a
thorough understanding of the distinction between God's
primary will and his secondary will. The third tenet emphasizes that the absolute moral laws of God can be arranged in
a hierarchical order. This tenet also conflicts with non-
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conflicting absolutism. Hierarchicalism agrees with this
tenet; however, it constructs a static hierarchy. The hierarchy of conflicting absolutism is flexible and dynamic,
based upon the needs of the neighbor in a given situation.
The fourth and final tenet of conflicting absolutism stresses
that in a conflict situation the moral agent is to observe
the hierarchical order of God's commands and do the lesser
evil. In performing this lesser evil the moral agent incurs
guilt for which he needs to repent. This entire tenet is
rejected by the non-conflicting absolutists due to the previous disagreement in the third tenet concerning the existence
of any hierarchy of absolutes. The first half of this tenet
is accepted by the hierarchicalists; whereas, the second half
is not. When the hierarchicalists refer to the lesser evil
as the greater good, for which no guilt is incurred, they are
attempting to transmute an evil into a good and thereby
disregard the serious nature of the threat of God's law.
Thus, of the three methods discussed, conflicting absolutism
is the only Scriptural alternative.

CONCLUSION
Part one examines both the deontological and teleological elements in theological ethics. It is shown in this
first part that the basic method of normative theological
ethics used in the Scriptures contains certain characteristics found in rule deontology. That is, humankind has an
unqualified duty to obey every absolute moral command from
God. Yet, it is also emphasized that certain characteristics
of rule teleology are found in the Scripture. In the event
of a moral dilemma the end principle of love must be applied
directly to the situation in order to determine the lesser of
two evils.
Part two examines that, contrary to the claim of the
non-conflicting absolutists, such moral dilemmas are indeed
real. Contrary to the hierarchicalists, such moral dilemmas
cannot be dissolved by placing them in a hierarchical order.
Nor does a good intention relieve the moral agent of
culpability. Thus in the final analysis this dissertation,
which seeks to construct a prolegomenon for normative
theological ethics, proposes the following four steps the
245
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moral agent is to consider in determining the moral option:
1.The moral agent is to search the Scriptures in
order to determine which duties are relevant to the situation. If there is only one absolute moral command of God
that applies to the situation then this is to be followed,
not as an end in itself, but, because such obedience is the
means by which God would have his love flow through the moral
agent and into the situation in order to help the neighbor in
need.
2.If more than one absolute moral command of God can
be applied to the situation, the moral agent must determine
the lesser evil. This can only be done by prayerfully examining all the variables involved in the situation. In a
bioethical decision concerning the initiation or withdrawal
of treatment this may include considering cost, benefit,
pain, risk, and effectiveness of the treatment. Then the
moral agent must prayerfully seek to determine that option
which best serves the need of his neighbor. The moral agent
may ask at this point, "How can I best express, or incarnate,
God's love in this situation?"
3.After the decision is carried out the moral agent
is to recognize his culpability, repent and look to Christ
for forgiveness.
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4. The moral agent can thank and praise God that, even
though there is no guarantee that the best option was chosen,
he can still rest secure in the forgiveness that he has in
Christ Jesus.
These four steps are merely a proposed beginning
toward the development of a Scriptural method of normative
theological ethics. Future study still needs to be done to
determine whether or not it is possible to establish a
specific procedure by which the moral agent can determine the
lesser of two evils within a given situation. If that is
possible, what might such a method be?

APPENDIX I
BIBLICAL TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE PRESENT
INVALIDITY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT
CEREMONIAL AND POLITICAL LAWS
Even in the Old Testament days God made it known that
his way of dealing with his people would not be the same
forever. "'The time is coming,' declares the Lord, 'when I
will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and with
the house of Judah. It will not be like the covenant I made
with their forefathers'"(Jeremiah 31:31-32).1
This change is made even more clear in the New
Testament. Jesus himself spoke of contradicting the
ceremonial laws when he said, "What goes into a man's mouth
does not make him 'unclean,' but what comes out of his mouth,
that is what makes him 'unclean'" (Matthew 15:11).
God also showed to Peter in the vision of Acts 10:9-16
that the ceremonial distinctions are no longer relevant.
About noon the following day as they were on their
1A11 Biblical quotes are from the New International
Version.
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journey and approaching the city, Peter went up on the
roof to pray. He became hungry and wanted something to
eat, and while the meal was being prepared, he fell into
a trance. He saw heaven opened and something like a
large sheet being let down to earth by its four corners.
It contained all kinds of four-footed animals, as well
as reptiles of the earth and birds of the air. Then a
voice told him, "Get up, Peter. Kill and eat."
"Surely not, Lord!" Peter replied. "I have never
eaten anything impure or unclean."
The voice spoke a second time, "Do not call
anything impure that God has made clean."
This happened three times, and immediately the
sheet was taken back to heaven.
Therefore, at the Jerusalem council, when the
Judaizers said, "The Gentiles must be circumcised and
required to obey the law of Moses" (Acts 15:5b) Peter clearly
spoke out against such Old Testament ceremonial legislation
by saying,
God, who knows the heart, showed that he accepted them
by giving the Holy Spirit to them, just as he did to us.
He made no distinction between us and them, for he
purified their hearts by faith. Now then why do you try
to test God by putting on the necks of the disciples a
yoke that neither we nor our fathers have been able to
bear? No! We believe it is through the grace of our
Lord Jesus that we are saved, just as they are. (Acts
15:8-11)
Paul also emphasizes the invalidity of the Old
Testament ceremonial and political laws in his letter to the
Galatians, in which he scolds the Galatians for turning to
the Old Testament ceremonial laws. He emphasizes his point
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by denying the importance of circumcision, one of the most
important ceremonial regulations of all.
It is for freedom that Christ has set us free. Stand
firm, then and do not let yourselves be burdened again
by a yoke of slavery. . . . For in Christ Jesus neither
circumcision nor uncircumcision has any value. The only
thing that counts is faith expressing itself through
love. (Galatians 5:1-6)
In a similar vein Paul wrote to the Colossians.
Therefore do not let anyone judge you by what you eat or
drink, or with regard to a religious festival, a New
Moon celebration or a Sabbath day. These are a shadow
of the things that were to come; the reality, however,
is found in Christ. (Colossians 2:16-17)
Likewise the author of the letter to the Hebrews
writes,
If perfection could have been attained through the
Levitical priesthood (for on the basis of it the law was
given to the people), why was there still need for
another priest to come — one in the order of
Melchizedek, not in the order of Aaron? For when there
is a change of the priesthood, there must also be a
change of the law. He of whom these things are said
belonged to a different tribe, and no one from that
tribe has ever served at the altar. . .
The former regulation is set aside because it was
weak and useless. (Hebrews 7:11-13, 18)
And again he writes in reference to Jeremiah 31
saying, "By calling this covenant 'new,' he has made the
first one obsolete; and what is obsolete and aging will soon
disappear" (Hebrews 8:13).
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Thus the ceremonial and political laws, which were
intended only for ancient Israel for a certain limited time,
must be distinguished from the moral law that is intended for
all people until Christ returns.

APPENDIX II
LUTHER ON THE PURPOSE OF GOOD WORKS
In his Church Postil for the First Sunday in Advent
based on Matthew 21:1-9 Luther explains that the purpose of
all good works is to benefit the neighbor. The following
English excerpts are from John Nicholas Lenker, ed The
Precious and Sacred Writings of Martin Luther, 31 vol.
(Minneapolis: The Luther Press, 1903-1910), 10:17-58. A
German edition may be found in D. Martin Luthers Werke,
Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 64 Bande. (Weimar, 1883—),
10.1.2:21-62.
"We receive Christ not only as a gift by faith, but
also as an example of love toward our neighbor, whom we are
to serve as Christ serves us. Faith brings and gives Christ
to you with all his possessions. Love gives you to your
neighbor with all your possessions. These two things
constitute a true and complete Christian life . . . .
"If you have ears to hear and a mind to observe, pray,
listen and learn for God's sake what good works are and mean.
A good work is good for the reason that it is useful and
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benefits and helps the one for whom it is done; why else
should it be called good! For there is a difference between
good works and a great, long, numerous, beautiful works.
When you throw a big stone a great distance it is a great
work, but whom does it benefit?: If you can jump, run, fence
well, it is a fine work, but whom does it benefit? Whom does
it help, if you wear a costly coat or build a fine house?
"And to come to our Papists' work, what does it avail
if they put silver or gold on the walls, wood and stone in
the churches? Who would be made better, if each village had
ten bells, as big as those at Erfurt? Whom would it help if
all the houses were convents and monasteries as splendid as
the temple of Solomon? Who is benefited if you fast for St.
Catherine, St. Martin or any other saint? Whom does it
benefit, if you are shaved half or wholly, if you wear a gray
or a black cap? Of what use were it if all people held mass
every hour? What benefit is it if in one church, as at
Meissen, they sing day and night without interruption? Who
is better for it, if every church had more silver, pictures
and jewelry than the churches of Halle and Wittenberg? It is
folly and deception, men's lies invented these things and
called them good works; they all pretend they serve God thus
and pray for the people and their sins, just as if they
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helped God with their property or as if his saints were in
need of our work. Sticks and stones are not as rude and mad
as we are. A tree bears fruit, not for itself, but for the
good of man and beast, and these fruits are its good
works . . . .
"Hence direct all the good you can do and your whole
life to the end that it be good; but it is good only when it
is useful to other people and not to yourself . . . .
"A man is to live, speak, act, hear, suffer and die
for the good of his wife and child, the wife for the husband,
the children for the parents, the servants for their masters,
the masters for their servants, the government for its
subjects, the subjects for the government, each one for his
fellowman, even for his enemies, so that one is the other's
hand, mouth, eye, foot, even heart and mind. This is a truly
Christian and good work, which can and shall be done at all
times, in all places, toward all people. You notice the
Papist's works in organs, pilgrimages, fasting, etc., are
really beautiful, great, numerous, long, wide and heavy
works, but there is no good, useful and helpful work among
them and the proverb may be applied to them: It is already
bad . . . .
"Thus faith blots out sin in a different manner than
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love. Faith blots it out of itself, while love or good works
prove and demonstrate that faith has done so and is present,
as St. Paul says, 1 Cor. 13,2: "And if I have all faith, so
as to remove mountains, but have not love, I am nothing."
Why? Without doubt, because faith is not present where there
is no love, they are not separate the one from the other."

APPENDIX III
LUTHER ON THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LOVE AND THE LAW
The following translation is from John Nicholas
Lenker, ed. The Precious and Sacred Writings of Martin
Luther, 31 vols. (Minneapolis: The Luther Press, 1903-1910),
8:56-75. A German edition is found in D. Martin Luthers
Werke. Kritische Gesamtausgabe. 64 &Uncle. (Weimar, 1883-),
17.2:88-104.
Fourth Sunday After Epiphany
Text: Romans 13,8-10.
"'Owe no man anything, save to love one another: for
he that loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law. For
this, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not kill,
Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not covet, and if there be
any other commandment, it is summed up in this word, namely,
Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. Love worketh no ill
to his neighbor; love therefore is the fulfilment of the
law .'. • .
"We will look at the command to love, in the Law of
God. Inumerable, endless, are the books and doctrines
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produced for the direction of man's conduct. And there is
still no limit to the making of books and laws. Note the
ecclesiastical and civil regulations, the spiritual orders
and stations. These laws and doctrines might be tolerated,
might be received with more favor, if they were founded upon
and administered according to the one great law-the one rule
or measure-of love; as the Scriptures do, which present many
different laws, but all born of love, and comprehended in and
subject to it. And these laws must yield, must become
invalid, when they conflict with love.
"Of Love's higher authority we find many illustrations
in the Scriptures. Christ makes particular mention of the
matter in Matthew 12,3-4, where David and his companions ate
the holy showbread. Though a certain law prohibited all but
the priests from partaking of this holy food, Love was
empress here, and free. Love was over the Law, subjecting it
to herself. The Law had to yield for the time being, had to
become invalid, when David suffered hunger. The Law had to
submit to the sentence: 'David hungers and must be relieved,
for Love commands, Do good to your needy neighbor. Yield,
therefore, thou Law. Prevent not the accomplishment of this
good. Rather accomplish it thyself. Serve him in his need.
Interpose not thy prohibitions.' In connection with this
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same incident, Christ teaches that we are to do good to our
neighbor on the Sabbath; to minister as necessity demands,
whatever the Sabbath restrictions of the Law.

For when a

brother's need calls, Love is authority and the Law of the
Sabbath is void.
"Were laws conceived and administered in love, the
number of laws would matter little. Though one might not
hear or learn all of them, he would learn from the one or two
he had knowledge of, the principle of love taught in
all . . . . Every word in this epistle lesson proves Love
mistress of all law.
"Further, no greater calamity, wrong and wretchedness
is possible on earth than the teaching and enforcing of laws
without love. In such case, law, are but a ruinous curse,
making true the proverbs, 'summum jus, summa injustitia,'
'The most strenuous right is the most strenuous wrong' and
again, Solomon's words (Ec 7,17), 'Noli nimium esse justus,'
'Be not righteous overmuch' . . .
"In the conception, the establishment and the
observance of all laws, the object should be, not the
furtherance of the laws in themselves, not the advancement of
works, but the exercise of love. That is the true purpose of
law, according to Paul here, 'He that loveth his neighbor

259
hath fulfilled the law.' Therefore, when the law contributes
to the injury rather than the benefit of our neighbor, it
should be ignored. The same law may at one time benefit our
neighbor and at another time injure him. Consequently, it
should be regulated according to its advantage to him. Law
should be made to serve in the same way that food and raiment
and other necessaries of life serve. We consider not the
food and raiment themselves, but their benefit to our needy
neighbor. And we cease to dispense them as soon as we
perceive them no longer add to his comfort.
"Suppose you were to come across an individual foolish
enough to act with no other thought than that food and
clothing are truly good things, and so proceed to stuff a
needy one with unlimited food and drink unto choking, and to
clothe him unto suffocation, and then not to desist. Suppose
to the command, 'Stop, you have suffocated, have already
over-fed and over-clothed him, and all is lost effort now,'
the foolish one should reply: 'You heretic, would you forbid
good works? Food, drink and raiment are good things,
therefore we must not cease to dispense them; we cannot do
too much.' And suppose he continued to force food and
clothing on the man. Tell me, what would you think of such a
one? He is a fool more than foolish; he is more mad than
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madness itself. But such is about the character of our
ecclesiasts today, and of those who are so blind in the
exercise of law as to act as if works were the only
requisite, and to suffocate body and soul, being ignorant
that they make works superior to love, and a maid to her
matron. Such perversion prevails to an extent distressing to
think of, not to mention hearing and seeing it, or more,
practicing and permitting it ourselves . . . .
"The commandment of love suspends every commandment,
yet it perpetuates all. Its whole purpose is that we may
recognize no commandment, no work, except as love dictates.
"As life on earth apart from works is an
impossibility, necessarily there must be various commandments
involving works. Yet Love is supreme over these
requirements, dictating the omission or the performance of
works according to its own best interest, and permitting no
works opposed to itself.
"To illustrate: A driver, holding the reins, guides
team and wagon at will. If he were content merely to hold
the reins, regardless of whether or no the team followed the
road, the entire equipage-team, wagon, reins and driverwould soon be wrecked; the driver would be lying drowned in a
ditch or a pool, or have his neck broken going over stumps
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and rocks. But if he dextrously regulates the movement of
the outfit according to the road, observing where it is safe
and where unsafe, he will proceed securely . . . . Were he,
in his egotism, to drive straight ahead, endeavoring to make
the road conform to the movement of the wagon, at his
pleasure, he would soon see how beautifully his plan would
work.
"So it is when men are governed by laws and works, the
laws not being regulated according to the people. The case
is that of the driver who would regulate the road by the
movements of the wagon. True, the road is often well suited
to the straight course of the wagon. But just as truly the
road is, in certain places, crooked and uneven, and then the
wagon must conform to the course and condition of the road.
Men must adapt themselves to laws and regulations wherever
possible and where the laws are beneficial. But where laws
prove detrimental to men's interests, the former must yield.
The ruler must wisely make allowance for love, suspending
works and laws. Hence, philosophers say prudence—or
circumspection or discretion as the ecclesiasts put it—is the
guide and regulator of all virtues . . . .
"Love is true discretion; love is the driver and the
true discretion in righteous works. It always looks to the
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good of the neighbor, to the amelioration of his condition;
just as the discretion of the world looks to the general
welfare of the governed in the adjustment of political
laws . . . .
"Faith is ever the actor, and love the act. The law
requires the act and thus forces the actor to be changed.
The Law is then fulfilled by the act, which, however, the
actor must perform. Thus Paul rejects the fancies of the
sophists, who in the matter of love would make a distinction
between the external work and the inner affection, saying:
'Love is an inner affection that loves our neighbor when in
our heart we wish him well.' Its expression in works,
however, they call the fruit of love. But we will not
discuss this idea. Note, Paul terms love not only an
affection, but an affectionate good act. Faith and the heart
are the actor and fulfiller of the Law. Paul says, 'He that
loveth his neighbor hath fulfilled the law.' And love is the
act, the fulfilling; for he says, 'Love is the fulfilment of
the law.'
"Another question arises: How can love for our
neighbor be the fulfilment of the Law when we are required to
love God supremely, even above our neighbor? I reply: Christ
answers the question when he tells us (Mt 22, 39) the second
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commandment is like unto the first. He makes love to God and
love to our neighbor the same love. The reason for this is,
first: God, having no need for our works and benefactions for
himself, bids us to do for our neighbor what we would do for
God. He asks for himself only our faith and our recognition
of him as God. The object of proclaiming his honor and
rendering him praise and thanks here on earth is that our
neighbor may be converted and brought into fellowship with
God. Such service is called the love of God, and is
performed out of love to God; but it is exercised for the
benefit of our neighbor only.
"The second reason why God makes love to our neighbor
an obligation equal to love to himself is: God has made
worldly wisdom foolish, desiring henceforth to be loved amid
crosses and afflictions. Paul says (1 Cor 1,21), 'Seeing
that in the wisdom of God the world through its wisdom knew
not God, it was God's good pleasure through the foolishness
of the preaching to save them that believe.' Therefore, upon
the cross he submitted himself unto death and misery, and
imposed the same submission upon all his disciples. They who
refused to love him before when he bestowed upon them food
and drink, blessing and honor, must now love him in hunger
and sorrow, in adversity and disgrace. All works of love,
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then, must be directed to our wretched, needy neighbors. In
these lowly ones we are to find and love God, in them we are
to serve and honor him, and only so can we do it. The
commandment to love God is wholly merged in that to love our
neighbors.
"These facts restrain those elusive, soaring spirits
that seek after God only in great and glorious undertakings.
It stops the mouths of those who strive after greatness like
his, who would force themselves into heaven, presuming to
serve and love him with their brilliant works. But they miss
him by passing over him in their earthly neighbor, in whom
God would be loved and honored. Therefore, they will hear,
on the last day, the sentence (Mt 25, 42), 'I was hungry, and
ye did not give me to eat,' etc. For Christ laid aside his
divinity and took upon himself the form of a servant for the
very purpose of bringing down and centering upon our neighbor
the love we extend to himself. Yet we leave the Lord to lie
here in his humiliation while we gaze open-mouthed into
heaven and make great pretensions to love and service to
God . . . .
"Love being the chief element of all law, it
comprehends, as has been made sufficiently clear, all
commandments. Its one concern is to be useful to man and not
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harmful; therefore, it readily discovers the way . .
"Love is the chief virtue, the fountain of all
virtues. Love gives food and drink; it clothes, comforts,
persuades, relieves and rescues. What shall we say of it,
for behold he who loves gives himself, body and soul,
property and honor, all his powers inner and external, for
his needy neighbor's benefit, whether it be friend or enemy;
he withholds nothing wherewith he may serve another . . . .
"It is the nature of false, carnal, worldly love to
respect the individual, and to love only so long as it hopes
to derive profit. When such hope ceases, the love also
ceases. The commandment of our text, however, requires of us
free, spontaneous love to all men, whoever they may be, and
whether friend or foe, a love that seeks not profit, and
administers only what is beneficial. Such love is most
active and powerful in serving the poor, the needy, the sick,
the wicked, the simple-minded and the hostile; among these it
is always and under all circumstances necessary to suffer and
endure, to serve and do good . . . .
"He [a Sovereign] is under obligation, according to
this commandment, not to extend a measure of help, but to
serve that neighbor with all he has and all he controls. If
he loves him as God here commands him to do, he must give the
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beggar preference over his crown and all his realm; and if
the beggar's necessity requires, must give his life. He is
under obligation to love his neighbor, and must admit that
such a one is his neighbor . . . .
"But how strange it would seem to us to behold kings
and queens, princes and princesses, serving beggars and
lepers, as we read St. Elizabeth did! Even this, however,
would be a slight thing in comparison with what Christ has
done. No one can ever equal him in the obedience wherewith
he has exalted this commandment. He is a king whose honor
transcends that of all other kings; indeed, he is the Son of
God. And yet he puts himself on a level with the worst
sinners, and serves them even to dying for them. Were ten
kings of earth to serve to the utmost one beggar, it would be
a remarkable thing; but of what significance would it be in
comparison with the service Christ has rendered? The kings
would be put to utter shame and would have to acknowledge
their service unworthy of notice.

APPENDIX IV
UTILITARIAN CALCULATIONS VERSUS
QUANTITATIVE AGAPISTIC ANALYSIS

In part one, under the topic of act teleology, the
utilitarian calculations of Jeremy Bentham are discussed. In
the second part, included in the topic of choosing the lesser
of two evils, a type of quantitative agapistic analysis is
mentioned. That is, in a moral dilemma the moral agent is to
weigh all the variables, consider all the pertinent options
and make a quantitative decision as to which option best
expresses, or incarnates, the love of God. Such a
quantitative agapistic analysis should not be confused with
the utilitarian calculations of Jeremy Bentham. There are
three important differences.
First the utilitarianism of Bentham, which seeks the
greatest good for the greatest number, would weigh the
importance of one human life against such an abstract social
value as the quality of life. For the utilitarian an
abortion may be considered moral if it increases the quality
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of the life of the parents. This would be especially evident
if the child to be aborted were handicapped in such a way
that it was determined to have very little happiness or
quality to its own life. In this way utilitarian
calculations err in reducing human worth to having merely an
instrumental value. However, a quantitative agapistic
analysis recognizes that each individual is infinitely
valuable because it is a soul created, redeemed and
sanctified by God. Such divine dignity (that is, alien
righteousness) bestowed upon each individual gives them a
worth that far transcends their social utility.
The second problem with utilitarian calculation is
that it views the good (that is, benefit, advantage or
pleasure) of the moral agent as equal in importance to the
good of those around him. This is contrary to the quantitative agapistic analysis in which the focus is solely on the
good of the neighbor.
The third problem with utilitarianism is that, like
hierarchicalism, it seeks to dissolve all moral dilemmas on
one hierarchical scale. In the case of a conflict the moral
option is chosen by virtue of its location on the scale.
That is, the utilitarian would choose that option which best
brings about the greatest good for the greatest number. In
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this way every dilemma is believed to be solved. Contrary to
quantitative agapistic analysis, it leaves no room for the
recognition that sin is a necessary result of the moral
dilemma. It fails to recognize both the need for repentance
and the necessity of forgiveness in Christ Jesus. Thus
utilitarian calculation is not the same as quantitative
agapistic analysis.

APPENDIX V
EDMUND SANTURRI AND HELMUT THIELICKE
ON THE QUESTION OF GENUINE
MORAL DILEMMAS
Edmund Santurri has written a detailed argument which
attempts to disprove the existence of genuine moral dilemmas.' The capstone of his argument is a severe criticism
of Helmut Thielicke's interpretation of "The Borderline
Situation."2 This appendix is a defense of Thielicke's view
against those criticisms of Santurri.
Santurri begins by offering a fair, and generally
impartial, summary of Thielicke's view. Thielicke's views
concerning borderline situations (that is, moral dilemmas) is
explained in chapter two above and need not be repeated at
length here; however, the following quote highlights those
basic elements with which Santurri disagrees. Santurri
writes,
'Edmund Santurri, Perplexity in the Moral Life:
Philosophical and Theological Considerations
(Charlottesville, Vir.: The University Press of Virginia,
1978).
2Ibid., 181-200.
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As Thielicke sees it, only in such disruption [that is,
the disruption of moral perplexity perceived as dilemmatic] is the authentic structure of the world disclosed, namely, its extreme disorder, its fallenness. Preoccupation with normal cases of moral experience, that
is, those in which our general principles provide unambiguous guidance, tends to obscure this fact about the
world. Only when our principles fail to serve in this
manner do we come to experience in our moral lives what
the Bible and Reformation theology teach — that the
world is entirely broken by sin. . . .
. . . What Thielicke objects to . . . is the
operative presumption [of Thomistic natural law, with
which Santurri agrees] that moral perplexity is purely
and simply an epistemological problem. Such a presumption reflects, according to him, a fundamental misunderstanding of the significance of moral conflict, which is
said to depict essentially a defect in the moral order
itself rather than a defect in our perception of that
order. In other words, moral perplexity is first and
foremost for Thielicke an ontological rather than an
epistemological problem. . . . Thus Thielicke resists
any purely epistemological interpretation of moral
conflict. . . .
If moral conflict is merely a problem of epistemology, there is in principle a resolution to such conflict in every case despite our occasional failures to
discern the conditions of such resolution, then the way
is open for the agent to escape morally unscathed provided that she hits on the correct answer either by
extended ethical reflection or by sheer luck. Yet for
Thielicke admitting this possibility of a way out betrays a failure to take seriously the fact that this
world is one in which the autonomous achievement of
objective righteousness is impossible . . . . Thus
Thielicke can say that belief in the adjudicability of
moral conflict even as a matter of principle "is only a
variation of that righteousness by the Law which feeds
on the illusion that man is capable of satisfying the
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claim of God."3
The first objection Santurri raises concerns the
relationship between Thielicke's and Santurri's understanding
of sin. Santurri suggests that sin may be defined as "a
moral violation willfully embraced" (emphasis mine).4 Thus a
legal violation that is thrust upon the moral agent, by
external circumstances, against his will, would not,
according to Santurri, constitute a sin. A moral agent in
the midst of such a perplexing situation would not be
confronted with a true dilemma.5 However, it is pointed out
in part two that it does not matter whether or not the moral
agent intends to sin. Nor does it matter whether or not the
moral agent is responsible for the creation of the dilemmatic
situation. It is emphasized in part two above that sin is

3lbid., 182-184. This contains a quote from Helmut
Thielicke, Theological Ethics 3 vols. trans. John Doberstein
(Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), 1:xviii.
4Ibid., 191.
5Thielicke addresses this problem by emphasizing
collective responsibility or "communal guilt" (Gesamtschuld)
for the situation itself. In that way guilt cannot be
avoided, and a dilemmatic situation exists (Thielicke 1:602).
However Santurri rejects such a concept as communal guilt
"unless the guilt can be tied in one way or another to a
specific dereliction of duty on . . . [each] individual's
part." (Santurri, 194.)
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any violation of God's moral law. There are no excuses. Any
effort to justify one's sin, by arguing that it was
unintentional, or that one is not the cause of the problem,
is a weak attempt to become righteous by the Law.
A second problem Santurri has with Thielicke's
position is that the position seems to predicate to God an
unwillingness to adjust to history. Santurri writes,
The intriguing thing about Thielicke's position . . . is
that it seems to make moral dilemmas partially a function of God's unwillingness to adjust entirely to
history. If irresolvable conflict is the product of a
system of moral principles whose content is designed
only for a pre-lapsarian world and if these principles
reflect God's commands, then dilemmas are partly the
product of God's failure to modify these commands for
the conditions of historical existence.6
According to Santurri's view one is not to construe
God as a being who is unwilling to adjust to history. Since
6Santurri, 198. Santurri notes that, "Thielicke does
allow, up to a point, for God's adjusting his commands to
meet the exigencies of the fallen world . . . . For Thielicke
these divine concessions never completely resolve the moral
conflict. On the one hand, they do establish new moral
directives that are genuinely obligatory. Violence in
defense of the innocent, for example, is not simply
permissible; it is required — to deny this is fanatical. On
the other hand, the new directives cannot extinguish the
binding force of the created order left behind; rather, they
call for a 'compromise' of that order, a compromise that
'stands in need of forgiveness' (TE 1:567). The upshot is
that, while God adjusts his mandates for the fallen world,
the accommodations are partial at best." Santurri, 198.
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this construal is assumed by Thielicke's view, his view must
be rejected.
Santurri fails to recognize that God has made
adjustments for nature's fall into sin. In his infinite
wisdom he chose not to relax the legal demands of his initial
will; rather, he became incarnate, suffered and died on the
cross so that the world could have forgiveness for its
failure to meet the perfect standards established by his
primary will. Contrary to Santurri's view, moral dilemmas do
not depend on a God who is unwilling to adjust to the fall of
nature. They are only dependent on a God who refuses to
adjust to the fall of nature by modifying his initial
commands. God did make adjustments for sin. Yet his
adjustment (that is, offering forgiveness through Christ) is
much more gracious than a mere modifications of his original
commands. In this way an adjustment is made, his original
will remains completely unchanged and moral dilemmas become a
necessary part of living in a sinful world.
A

third problem Santurri has with Thielicke's view of

moral dilemmas is that it insinuates that God is
inconsistent. Santurri writes, "To the extent that he
requires sinful actions for the sake of the world's
preservation, God also commands things that are simply
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inconsistent with other things he commands."7
In the first place it would be inconsistent of God if
he would modify his original commands and make them less
stringent.8 In the second place there is consistency, even
in a moral dilemma, in so far as both commands are oriented
toward the same goal or thkoc. Both commands seek to be the
means by which God's love flows through the moral agent and
into the life of the neighbor in need. Also, the dilemmatic
situation is not due to any inconsistency on the part of God
or his laws. It is due solely to the sinful structure of the
fallen world. God and his laws have remained consistent;
however, nature has not. It is man's sinful existence within
a fallen nature that creates moral dilemmas. Thus Santurri
is mistaken when he insists that moral dilemmas must be based
7lbid., 199. In another portion of the book Santurri
writes, "In the case of theological voluntarism, accepting
the existence of dilemmas would mean attributing incoherence
to the divine will, thereby admitting God's practical
irrationality." Ibid., 5.
8This is precisely what Santurri claims God has done.
He writes, "Indeed, God may will any of these things [that
is, something which conflicts with his original will], but in
so doing he always overrides one or more of his [original]
desires." Ibid., 207. Thus Santurri, just as Norman
Geisler, makes the unbiblical assumption that the commands of
God's secondary will preempt, or cancel out those of his
primary will. Thus it is Santurri, and Geisler, who are
guilty of ascribing inconsistency to God.
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on inconsistent commands from God.
Santurri's criticism of Thielicke's view of moral
dilemmas is unfounded and cannot stand up to close scrutiny.
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